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ABSTRACT 
 
This study concerns the widespread phenomenon that music is perceived as meaningful to the 
listener in some sense. The study adopts a style of conceptual clarification and investigation 
that is current in the analytic philosophy of language, and is further informed by recent 
research into the fundamental biology of human musicality, which suggests that musicality 
and language are neurologically related.  
 
The problem of musical meaning is approached as a problem of communicative behaviour, 
and is hence conceptually related to the concept of meaningfulness in the various modalities 
of linguistic communication. ‘Communication’ is defined in terms of the intended 
consequences of communicative acts – that is, a communicative act is an attempt on the 
behalf of the utterer to cause some sort of change in the listener’s mental states. From this 
premise, meaning in both musical and linguistic acts is defined in terms the mental states 
elicited in the mind of the listener. Two classes of mental state are identified: cognitive states, 
which are propositional in nature; and affective states, which are essentially non-
propositional. It is proposed that meaning in both music and language (as well as in other 
communicative acts) can be explained in terms of the elicitation of these classes of mental 
states in the minds of competent listeners, and that in any linguistic or musical act, a 
competent listener will entertain a composite of these mental states that will be perceived as 
meaning. 
 
The mechanisms responsible for the elicitation of these states are discussed, and it is 
concluded that the causal powers of the communicative act, as it is represented in the mind, 
are responsible for the elicitation of these mental states. Directly causal means are responsible 
for affective states: there is a relationship of direct causation between relevant features of the 
communicative act, as represented in the mind, and affective states. Affective states are non-
propositional, in that they cannot be subjected to deductive or propositional operations in the 
mind. By virtue of their being non-propositional, such states are also considered to be beyond 
verbal explication (‘ineffable’). Cognitive states, on the other hand, are propositional in 
nature. The mechanisms by which they are realised are complex in terms of propositional 
computation: the relevant propositional features of the communicative act, as represented in 
the mind of the listener, undergo manipulation by mental processes (for instance, the 
computational system for linguistic syntax). Cognitive states are expressible in propositional 
terms, and are hence expressible in language. 
 
Whereas linguistic communication is efficacious for the elicitation of cognitive states, 
musical utterances tend to elicit affective states to a far greater degree. Furthermore, whereas 
the syntax of language aids communication in the facilitation of semantics, the syntactic 
dimension of music is principally a means of implementing affective states in the listener. 
Therefore, any explanation of musical meaning must take the syntactical dimension of music 
into account. It is also argued that there are features of performance common to both 
language (in its spoken modality) and musical utterances that serve to elicit affective states. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die verskynsel dat musiek deur die meeste luisteraars as 
betekenisvol ervaar word. ’n Styl van konseptuele verduideliking en ondersoek word gebruik 
wat eie is aan die analitiese filosofie van taal. Terselfdertyd word die jongste navorsing op die 
gebied van die fundamentele biologie van menslike musikaliteit in aanmerking geneem, wat 
suggereer dat taal en musikale vermoë neurologies met mekaar verwant is.  
 
Die probleem van betekenis in musiek word as ŉ probleem van kommunikatiewe gedrag 
benader, en is dus konseptueel verbind aan die konsep van betekenisvolheid in die verskeie 
modaliteite van kommunikasie deur middel van taal. ‘Kommunikasie’ word in terme van die 
geïntendeerde uitkomste van kommunikatiewe aksies/dade gedefinieer. Met ander woorde, ŉ 
kommunikatiewe aksie/daad is ŉ poging deur die spreker om uiteindelik ŉ verandering in die 
geestesgesteldheid (‘mental state’) van die luisteraar teweeg te bring. Op hierdie basis word 
twee tipes geestesgesteldheid onderskei: ŉ kognitiewe gesteldheid, wat proposisioneel van 
aard is, en ŉ affektiewe gesteldheid, wat nie-proposisioneel is. Daar word voorgestel dat 
betekenis in beide musiek en taal, soos ook in ander vorme van kommunikasie, verduidelik 
kan word as die belewenis van sodanige geestesgesteldhede aan die kant van die bedrewe 
luisteraar. Dit impliseer dat die betekenis van enige uiting in taal of musiek as ŉ bepaalde 
kombinasie van hierdie twee geestesgesteldhede deur die bedrewe luisteraar ervaar word. 
 
Die meganismes wat hierdie geestesgesteldhede ontlok word bespreek, en die gevolgtrekking 
word gemaak dat dit die kousale mag van die kommunikatiewe daad is, soos dit in die 
bewussyn (‘mind’) neerslag vind, wat hierdie twee tipes geestesgesteldheid ontlok. Daar 
word beweer dat ŉ proses van direkte kousaliteit verantwoordelik is vir ŉ affektiewe 
gesteldheid: daar is ’n oorsaaklike verhouding tussen die onderskeie kenmerke van die 
kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn voorgestel word, en die uiteindelike 
affektiewe geestesgesteldheid. ŉ Affektiewe geestesgesteldheid is nie-proposisioneel omdat 
dit nie in terme van deduktiewe of proposisionele prosesse in die bewussyn verstaan kan 
word nie. Omdat dit nie-proposisioneel is word die kenmerke van hierdie affektiewe 
geestesgesteldheid as onsegbaar (‘ineffable’) deur die luisteraar beleef. Daarteenoor is ŉ 
kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid proposisioneel van aard. Die meganismes wat veroorsaak dat 
hierdie geestesgesteldheid gerealiseer word is kompleks: die onderskeie kenmerke van die 
kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn van die luisteraar voorgestel word, 
ondergaan manipulasie deur denkprosesse wat proposisioneel van aard is (bv., die denkproses 
wat die sintaktiese dimensie van taal moet verwerk). ŉ Kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid kan in 
proposisionele terme weergegee en gevolglik in taal verwoord word. 
 
Terwyl kommunikasie deur middel van taal effektief is om ŉ kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid 
te ontlok, is musikale uitdrukking veel eerder geskik om ŉ affektiewe geestesgesteldheid te 
ontlok. Verder, terwyl die sintaksis van taal bydra tot verwesenliking van semantiese 
betekenis, dra die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek eerder daartoe by om ŉ affektiewe 
geestesgesteldheid by die luisteraar te vestig. Dus moet elke verduideliking van musikale 
betekenis die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek in aanmerking neem. Verder word beweer dat 
daar algemene kenmerke in sowel taal (in die gesproke modaliteit) as musiek voorkom wat 
spesifiek ŉ affektiewe geestesgesteldheid tot stand bring. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The principal inspiration for this study is the recent resurgence in interest regarding the 
origins of human music. Over the past decade, this topic has drawn attention from numerous 
researchers in varied fields, including musicology, ethnomusicology, cognitive musicology, 
palaeoanthropology, archaeology, the cognitive neurosciences and brain studies, linguistics, 
infant studies, and animal ecology. The interest in the topic is largely fuelled by 
contemporary work in cognitive neuroscience and brain studies, which has challenged the 
assumption that human musical behaviour is the product of social forces alone. Research 
around musical issues in cognitive neuroscience appears to suggest that there is a large 
biological component to the story of human music, and current empirical and theoretical 
studies have only served to further reinforce this idea. The interest in evolutionary questions 
follows logically: if musical behaviour is to be regarded as having a biological manifestation, 
one would expect this biological manifestation to have an evolutionary history.  
 
Enough interest in the topic has been generated that any attempt to list academic 
contributions to the debate would run into many pages. Approaches to the topic abound, and 
all approaches raise questions about human musicality. What precisely is this thing we call 
‘music’? In which ways is it biological? Is it related to other capacities, such as language, and 
if so, in what ways? Can aspects of human musicality be regarded as evolutionary adaptations 
that aided survival in some manner, or are they spin-offs of other capacities? Are there 
physical proxies in the archaeological record that can serve as useful markers for the course 
of the evolution of human musicality? If human musicality can be said to have an 
evolutionary history, was it the case that music existed in some more basic state, a sort of 
‘proto-music’? And what could such a proto-music have been used for? 
 
Academic circumstance is not without its cases of irony, for it was linguist Steven Pinker’s 
assertion that music constitutes nothing more than “auditory cheesecake”, pleasurable but 
unessential to survival, that served as an early spark to the debate about the origins of music 
(Pinker, 1997:529-539). This is not to say, however, that Pinker’s view of music being mostly 
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parasitic with regard to neural hardware is entirely incorrect. There currently exist several 
theories within evolutionary musicology that see music as being somehow related to the 
human capacity for language, and hence parasitic on the language faculty’s neural hardware 
to a certain degree. Music-language comparisons in general have long been a topic of interest 
and vigorous debate, with different sides arguing about why it is that music should or should 
not be regarded as some sort of language. However, even a superficial consideration of the 
analogy is bound to lead one to realise that while music may appear to be language-like in 
many respects, it is clearly different in others. To this day, diverging views exist on music’s 
status as a language or as having language-like qualities. For example, in a book entitled 
Musical Languages (1997), musicologist Joseph Swain argues that music is akin to a sort of 
language, while the philosopher Roger Scruton, in a book published in the same year entitled 
The Aesthetics of Music, dedicates entire chapters to argue that it is not. 
 
These two authors were not, however, interested in the origins of musical behaviour. Neither 
was their interest principally in the data surrounding the biological grounding of human 
musicality. There are numerous examples of studies predicated on the idea that, at the very 
least, music and language are conceptually analogous. What the data surrounding the biology 
of musicality suggests, however, is that the human capacities for music and language are to 
some extent biologically linked as well. This study will be an attempt at a synthesis of these 
views: that thinking about an analogy between music and language is, for better or worse, a 
profitable conceptual enterprise; and that the capacities for music and language are 
biologically linked in some way, and thus to some extent share physical manifestation. The 
crossroads at which these two approaches will meet in this study is the question of precisely 
how it comes to be that music is perceived by listeners as being somehow meaningful. 
 
The question of musical meaning may seem far removed from evolutionary musicology. 
However, with data existing suggesting that music and language are linked in some respect, 
questions about how music and language differ is also of interest to researchers wishing to 
account for the evolutionary history of either behaviour. Within the corpus of research on and 
relevant to music origins, the question of musical meaning has found serious consideration 
into two sets of work: a series of articles published by musicologist Ian Cross (e.g. Cross, 
2005), and a chapter in a major work on the neurobiology and evolutionary history of music 
by Aniruddh Patel (2008a). Both authors agree that the common human apprehension of 
music as meaningful requires explanation. Cross’s approach is interesting in that it is a novel 
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conceptual model of meaning being used to account for the functionality of musical 
behaviour in both the present time and possibly the distant past; Patel’s approach is 
interesting in that it takes an empirical approach to the question of musical meaning, testing 
the lengths to which the music-language analogy can be stretched with scientific 
methodology. 
 
It is precisely here, with the question of meaning, that another academic discipline may come 
to contribute something to the debate about the biological heritage of musicality. Absent from 
the list of disciplines above was philosophy. In particular, it is within the analytic 
philosophical tradition, and specifically the analytic philosophy of language, that one would 
expect to find interest in the perplexities of meaning in human communication. Since the turn 
of the last century, the predominant form of philosophy practiced in the English-speaking 
world has been of the analytic variety. This field owes its ascendancy to a general 
disillusionment with idealist philosophies, such as that of Hegel. Coupled with an interest in 
logic and the foundations of mathematics, philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and Gottlieb 
Frege became interested in technical matters surrounding language use, especially in logical 
terms. Anglophone philosophy has remained interested in questions about the logic of 
language, and has also reached out into questions about the nature of the mind in relation to 
the brain, with consciousness and the mechanisms of thought becoming principal concerns in 
this area. Combined with a more recent return to traditional problems of philosophy, such as 
ethics, politics, and the nature of reality, the majority of philosophy departments in the 
English-speaking world can be classified as analytic.  
 
The philosophy of the European-influenced non-English speaking lands (including 
predominantly Afrikaans South African university departments) has tended toward what is 
termed continental philosophy. Here, philosophical topics of wider cultural relevance are 
usually discussed, such as justice, ethics, metaphysics and religion, history, politics, and so 
on. This field was also subject to the immense interest in language around the beginning of 
the 20th century. However, the focus of interest regarding language in continental philosophy 
is in the interpretation of texts, the use of language in situations of power, language’s role in 
the constitution of social reality, and so on. In analytic philosophy, the interest in language is 
narrower, with the relation between cognition and language, the nature of meaning and its 
manifestation in cognition, and the nature of truth in language. However, what most notably 
distinguishes analytic philosophy from its counterpart is a matter of style. The problems of 
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analytic philosophy are technical, and attention is paid to detail rather than the generalising 
and sometimes sweeping philosophical systems found in continental philosophy. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, many analytic philosophers believed that a great many 
philosophical problems arise from confused language use, and hence faulty logic. Whereas 
continental philosophy sees itself as fundamental to human knowledge in general, the first 
analytic philosophers often considered their task as the “logical clarification of thoughts”,1 
and philosophy as subservient (as opposed to fundamental) to the natural sciences. Today, the 
diversity of topics covered in analytic philosophy is far wider, with language, logic, science 
and the philosophy of mind being represented in equal proportions to politics, metaphysics, 
ethics, aesthetics, and other traditional philosophical topics. However, the technical and 
rigorous style of inquiry, along with the subservient attitude toward science, has remained. 
 
What can analytic philosophy offer questions concerning the origins of music? As one can 
imagine, the awareness of conceptual issues that is present in much analytic philosophy is of 
obvious use. However, our own concern will be with the nature of meaning in language and 
music, approached from a cognitive perspective. It is often claimed that music is somehow 
meaningful. As has already been noted, the question of the role of musical meaning has found 
its way into literature about the origins of music. What is this musical meaning, and how is it 
distinguishable from the meaning that is characteristic of language? If language arose in our 
species as a means of communication or conveying meaning, how does music fit into the 
picture? What sorts of mechanisms of cognition are responsible for the perception of musical 
meaning? How is it that a musical stimulus results in this mental phenomenon? And if music 
and language share an evolutionary heritage, what role could meaning potentially have 
played? 
 
Before our understanding of the potential evolutionary significance of musical meaning can 
be properly ascertained, we must identify what this thing called musical meaning is. 
Furthermore, we must do so in a way that will allow us to, at least in principle, begin to 
approach an empirically relevant theory of what it is that happens when people describe a 
piece of music as meaningful. To do so, this study will consider what sorts of mental states 
are elicited in the minds of listeners of musical pieces that are perceived as meaningful 
(‘meaning’ being understood only in the communicative sense). Also considered will be the 
                                                 
1 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §4.112 (1961:29). 
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mechanisms by which these meaning-relevant mental states are achieved. In doing so, we 
will pursue a loose analogy between music and language. This analogy will be cast in terms 
of the sorts of communication-relevant mental states that are elicited by both behaviours, and 
the mechanisms by which either behaviour elicits those mental states. It will be suggested 
that a productive manner of thinking about linguistic and musical meaning in the mind is by 
thinking of meaning in terms of mental states. In other words, these mental states are 
constitutive of the perception of meaning in the mind. Meaning in both language and music, 
as well as other sorts of communicative and interactive activities, is the result of mental 
mechanisms that constitute certain types of mental states. These states determine what we 
perceive as ‘meaning’, whether in language, music, writing, or any other sort of 
communicative activity. Of course, it is not being suggested that the mental states resulting 
from language and music are identical; rather, they are of the same class of mental state, with 
the similar meaning-relevant characteristics. 
 
 
1.2 The meanings of ‘meaning’: arbitrary signs, indexes, and icons; ‘meaning’ as 
significance 
 
It should already be clear from the discussion above that in this study (and in analytic 
philosophy) we deal with the notion of ‘meaning’ in a specified sense. This sense can be 
broadly classified as communicative in nature. When we speak of the meaning of a sentence 
or statement in language, we are talking about what is communicated. The model of meaning 
that is going to be discussed in this study is of a communicative variety, with substantial 
modifications to our understanding of communication. Therefore, our focus is on meaning as 
a property of a communicative act: the meaning of words and sentences in the various 
modalities of language, such as speaking and writing. In a similar manner, other 
communicative or symbolic systems can have the property of meaning in this sense. Traffic 
lights, Morse code, and gestures have this sort of communicative meaning. Common to all of 
these cases of meaning is the fact that the intention to communicate is present.2 Also evident 
is the fact that these examples are all cases of symbols, where a symbol (or ‘sign’) is chosen 
to stand for (or refer to) something other than itself, to which it is not usually causally 
                                                 
2 In exceptional circumstances, that intention is not there: for example, a teenager’s private diary, which is not 
intended to be read by anyone at all. These cases are rare, and to counter this line of argument, the notion of 
communicative meaning is robust enough for present purposes if we simply accept that the potential for 
intention to communicate is present. 
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connected.3 This is the property of arbitrariness: there is nothing intrinsic to the actual 
symbols for comprising the word ‘cat’ that is directly linked to the furry four-legged feline 
that purrs. The relationship between the letters C-A-T (or the sound that you make when you 
utter the word) is one of arbitrary convention, which has been dictated by a community of 
symbol-users who have agreed that the word and sound refers to furry four-legged felines. 
The characteristic of arbitrariness with regard to musical meaning is due to undergo 
considerable scrutiny in the pages that follow. 
 
Another sort of ‘meaning’ can be thought of as circumstantial, or consequential. Consider a 
scenario where a hiker is on a trail, looks to the horizon, and sees a plume of smoke 
emanating from a far-off clump of dry trees. He may come to the conclusion that there is a 
fire. The hiker may actually utter the words, “That smoke means that there is a fire”.    This 
sort of language use is common in similar situations: the heavy clouds mean rain; war means 
suffering; a broken kettle means no coffee. (A semiotician may be more inclined to say that 
smoke signifies fire.) Clear from these examples is that neither the fire, nor the rain, intends 
to communicate with you by means of smoke or dark clouds. Rather, these are things that are 
causally connected with their ‘meaning’, and that ‘meaning’ is something that you, as an 
observer, infer from your environment. Information is gleaned from the environment, and the 
consequences of what is observed are inferred. Such ‘signs’ are often referred to as indexes.4 
There is, however, not necessarily an intention to communicate. The fire does not try to 
communicate its presence to you by means of smoke. Of course, one can use indexes as 
arbitrary symbols in themselves: consider making a fire to send smoke signals. The smoke 
itself is an index of fire, but it is used as an arbitrary signal with a conventional 
communicative meaning. In this study, I will essentially argue that something similar to 
indexes being used to communicate is a part of musical meaning. Of course, it may be the 
case that we do not perceive the causal connection between the index and what it means, but 
rather simply associate the sign with something due to past experience.5 
 
                                                 
3 The following discussion of arbitrary signs, indexes, and icons, is mirrored in concise terms in Cross & Tolbert 
(2009), which is in turn based on work by the philosopher C. S. Peirce. Other similar (semiotic) approaches can 
be found in Nattiez (1990; 2004) and Tarasti (1995). 
4 Indexes share a similarity but should not be confused with ‘indexicals’, which are words in language whose 
reference depends on the situation of the person who utters them, such as ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and so on. 
Indexicals are a particular topic of interest for analytic philosophers of language. 
5 This sort of meaning by association has been considered with regard to music by Burkholder (2006). He 
simply calls it “associative musical meaning”. At times, his model seems to slip between communicative and 
non-communicative (significance) senses of ‘meaning’, a distinction that is discussed in the main text. 
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Another variety of meaning is direct resemblance to the referent. With these cases, there is 
some resemblance to the referent reflected in the sign itself. Consider the common Western 
sign used to mark a bathroom as reserved for ladies: a stick figure with a triangular shape 
superimposed (). This anthropomorphic shape represents the female gender by virtue of us 
associating the shape of the triangle with the outline of a skirt, a garment traditionally worn 
by women. While a community could agree to use this symbol differently, say for men’s 
bathrooms, in a culture where women often wear skirts, it would be difficult to get rid of the 
symbol’s association with the female sex. We are inclined, when presented with this symbol, 
to say that it means ‘woman’ by virtue of the fact that the figure appears to be wearing 
something analogous to a skirt (or ‘women’s bathroom’ due to prior experience of the 
symbol). A more striking example is that of paintings of people: these are in effect objects 
that ‘refer’ to real people. What is important to note is that with these sorts of symbols the 
connection between sign and referent is not arbitrary, but rather depends on a similarity with 
regard to vital characteristics. Indeed, it is from depictions of religious figures that this class 
of sign receives its name: icons. Hence, we may be prompted to say that some symbols are 
iconic in nature, due to the fact that they non-arbitrarily represent their referent.  
 
The three categories of symbols mentioned above – arbitrary symbols, indexes, and icons – 
are of particular interest to the field of musical semiotics. This is not indicative of the 
approach that this study will take. What is noteworthy is that these signs all have 
communicative potential – they can be used to communicate with others. The ‘meaning’ we 
attribute to such signs and symbols is of a communicative nature. However, the word 
‘meaning’ is occasionally used in non-communicative senses as well. In order to distinguish 
our communicative approach to meaning from other senses of the word (that is, our 
understanding of meaning as a property of communication), we should briefly investigate the 
other principal use of the word.  
 
The non-communicative sense of the word ‘meaning’ can be thought of as having a 
connotation similar to ‘significance’, and is not the same thing as communicative meaning. 
Instances of this concept’s usage are cases of the ‘meaning (or significance) of something for 
someone’.6 Take the following question: What is the meaning of the Munich Agreement? We 
                                                 
6 Readers of Cross and Tolbert (2009) may notice the use of ‘significance’ in a slightly different sense in the 
opening paragraphs, viz. something has ‘significance’ if it points to or indicates the existence of something else. 
 15 
could have a look at the Agreement, and figure out the meaning of the words as instances of 
communicative meaning (arbitrary symbols, according to our discussion above). However, 
there is another way to interpret this question: namely, as a question about the significance of 
the Munich Agreement. More accurately, meaning as significance should be thought of as 
‘meaning for x’, or ‘significance for x’.  Such meaning is always a meaning for someone. 
Therefore our question about non-communicative meaning could be rephrased as: What is the 
significance of the Munich Agreement for x? We may come up with a variety of answers. For 
Hitler, it meant success; for historians, it meant a failed attempt at appeasement; for 
contemporary Czechoslovakians, it meant disaster. For British comedy troupe Monty Python, 
its significance for history was satirised as “Britain’s great pre-war joke”. For young, modern 
Europeans, the Munich Agreement may mean little more than an unfortunate fact of history, 
regardless of whether they are aware of its role in shaping the modern Western world. 
Questions of meaning as significance are tied closely to questions about value. But none of 
these ‘meanings’ or significances are related to the communicative notion of ‘meaning’, 
which is a property of communicative acts. The value we place in a piece of literature is not 
the same as the communicative meaning that is a property of the sentences which comprise it. 
And while pieces of music may have great ‘meaning’ in our lives, this significance should not 
be confused with communicative meaning. In this study, our concern is with meaning as a 
property of communicative acts. The  non-communicative sense of the term ‘meaning’ (as 
significance) is not the object of investigation in this study. For the remainder of this study, 
the term ‘meaning’ will refer to meaning in its communicative sense, and not meaning as 
‘significance for x’. 
 
 
1.3 Fundamental assumptions: the ‘matter of the mind’ 
 
One would expect that a theory of musical meaning that has been inspired by interests in the 
biological constitution of human musicality would be closely allied to a naturalistic 
conception of the mind. In other words, a naturally congruent view of the mind in 
evolutionary investigations is that the ‘matter of the mind’ is the human brain.7 This is indeed 
the case in this study, and one of its motivations. In analytic philosophy, naturalism about 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cross and Tolbert do not persist with this terminology, and in this study, I have chosen to use the term in the 
sense specified in the main text. 
7 The term ‘matter of the mind’ is borrowed from Lewis-Williams (2002). 
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mental phenomena is common (Blackmore, 2006). This includes accounts of linguistic 
phenomena – that of Devitt and Sterelny (1987) is an accessible example. In this study, a 
major premise is that musical meaning can be discussed against the background assumption 
of naturalism, and hence we expect a natural explanation for an ontologically accessible 
phenomenon. The reason that this proviso is important is that the theory about to be put 
forward is primarily a cognitive one. We are going to be discussing the constitution of 
musical meaning as a mental phenomenon that is describable in terms of mental states. 
Therefore, it would be wise to be clear, from the outset, about what is assumed regarding the 
nature of the mind, and put it on record that these mental states are assumed to have a 
physical constitution. 
 
A major motivation for this study is grounding the discussion of musical meaning in terms of 
causal principles and mental states that are open to empirical investigation. Current studies on 
musical meaning appear to make no fundamental assumptions about the ontological status of 
meaning, nor as to the status of the mind that plays host to meaning.8 Of course, the practical 
problems surrounding the discussion of mental phenomena are daunting, and it would appear 
unreasonable to expect researchers who are principally interested in music to have a 
definitive grasp on the issues surrounding the nature of the mind and mental phenomena. In 
this study, an effort to be clear about such grounding principles is made: a naturalistic 
conception of the mind and mental phenomena is adopted. That is, the mind and mental 
phenomena are phenomena which, after adequate conceptual clarification, are subject to 
empirical validation by scientifically accessible means. The ‘empirical validation’ proviso is 
one that must, for the purposes of this study, be considered in principle. Current research on 
the brain has not yet provided clear-cut answers on the precise mechanisms whereby 
consciousness and the sensations of subjectivity are achieved, nor as to the fundamentals of 
communicative meaning as it is neurologically manifested.9 Nonetheless, there appears to be 
a growing trend toward naturalistic explanations for mental phenomena, which per definition 
will be eventually available to scientific validation (see, for example, the interviews in 
Blackmore, 2006). 
 
                                                 
8 Granted, however, that discussions of meaning in the work of Cross and Patel are tacitly congruent with 
scientific realism regarding the ontology of the phenomena discussed. 
9 For an easily accessible and highly entertaining discussion of consciousness by leading figures from relevant 
fields, see Blackmore (2006).  
 17 
There seems to be little reason to think that that which we call the mind is anything other than 
the brain – namely, that the brain is the matter of the mind. This would be a position 
compatible with (but not necessarily identical to) physicalism, where it is assumed that all 
mental phenomena are at base physical, and are governed by physical laws that are open to 
empirical investigation. The reader will note that hard and fast ontological assumptions are 
not vital to the applicability of this model. However, it might be stated that the favoured 
ontological assumption is akin to the so-called ‘causal closure of physics’ position adopted by 
some philosophers. Let us state, therefore, that all the phenomena described in this study are 
subject to empirical investigation that is, in principle, attainable through present and future 
methods of the empirical natural sciences.10 
 
Although it is being forwarded that naturalism with regard to the mind should be taken as a 
given, it is worth (briefly) mentioning one or two issues around the subject. Here we must 
venture into a field that is also generally subsumed under the banner of analytic philosophy: 
the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of mind is as old as philosophy itself, being that part 
of philosophical investigation that enquires as to the nature of thought and consciousness. 
With a resurgence in interest in the twentieth century because of the field of cognitive 
science, the philosophy of mind has undergone something of a reawakening as a major topic 
of interest, becoming an interesting subject which draws researchers from a variety of fields 
other than philosophy. The mechanisms of thought, issues of perception, the possibility of 
artificial intelligence, and the fundamental nature of the mind are all topics of interest in 
modern philosophy of mind. These issues all become intertwined when questions are raised 
as to the ontological nature of the mind in relation to the physical manifestation of the human 
brain. Is the mind composed of special subjective ‘mind stuff’, that is independent from 
physical processes? This was the view of Descartes, who in 1641 expressed the belief that the 
mind and the body were composed of different ‘substances’. According to Descartes, the 
body (that is, the brain) is material, but the mind (or ‘res cogitans’) was not reducible to 
physical matter.11 Unfortunately, this explanation brings about the famous mind-body 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, the present author is no expert on modern physics. Nonetheless, the view that in some deep 
sense there may possibly be some randomness underlying physical phenomenon is the single reason why the 
term ‘causal closure of physics’ has been qualified! 
11 The reasons that Descartes arrived at this conclusion are epitomized in the famous phrase, ‘cogito ergo sum’ 
(‘I think, therefore I am’). According to this view, the systematic elimination of physical matter does not 
eliminate the thinking subject itself. Systematic doubt of the existence of the body and all physical reality is 
possible, but doubting the existence of thinking is impossible, because there must be a subject who is thinking 
those doubtful thoughts. 
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problem: how does the mind, which is purportedly non-physical, interact with the material 
body, when material effect necessarily requires a material cause? While it has been argued 
that the Cartesian formulation of the problem is flawed (e.g., at length in Dennett, 1991), the 
problem of how mental phenomena arise from physical phenomena remains at the heart of 
philosophical discussions about consciousness. Rock art expert David Lewis-Williams puts 
the stickiness of the problem into perspective when he notes that the mind “cannot be placed 
on a table and dissected as can a brain” (2002:104). 
 
Despite these problems, the mind and its contents appear to us to be a concrete reality. Our 
subjective lives are as real to us as the so-called contents of consciousness, our subjective 
experience of the world. It is this subjective, thinking self and all its experiences that 
Descartes called the ‘mind’, Plato called the ‘soul’, and that philosophers and cognitive 
scientists attempt to define in relation to the brain. How it is that mechanistic processes in the 
brain give rise to the experience of what it is like to taste wine and other features of our 
introspective lives, is the topic of vigorous debate. And, even if we are able to explain 
consciousness and our subjective experience of the world in physical terms – what Chalmers 
(1996) refers to as “the hard problem” – we are hard pressed to provide an evolutionary 
explanation for it.12 Nonetheless, the present author finds the reasons to assume a non-
physical explanation of consciousness less compelling than naturalistic attempts. 
 
What, then, are we to assume when we speak of ‘mental states’, a major topic in this study? 
The following explanation should suffice for the purposes of the ensuing discussion. First, 
note that ‘mental states’ and consciousness are not equivalent. I am not making an 
assumption as to the nature of consciousness, although I am going to use phrases such as 
mental states ‘coming to conscious attention’. Second, all activity in the mind must be 
underwritten by activity in the brain. A change in mental state cannot occur without a change 
in material arrangement of the brain, and no two individual, differing mental states can have 
identical arrangements of brain matter underlying them. In other words, a mental event only 
occurs when there has been a change in the ‘matter of the mind’, the brain. Any given mental 
state will have a particular physical constitution in the brain, an arrangement of atoms that is 
                                                 
12 The problem of the evolutionary rationale behind subjective self-awareness and consciousness has been 
referred to as “the other hard problem” (Polger & Flanagan, 1999). However, it is likely that knowledge as to 
the biological constitution of the processes that give rise to consciousness is likely to open a window on its 
evolution. For example, if consciousness is simply the by-product of complex brains, there would be no 
evolutionary reason why it exists beyond the selective pressure for more complex brains. 
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unique to that mental state. Every mental state is therefore uniquely determined by a brain 
state. It should be noted that I have not said that a mental state is the same thing as a brain 
state.13 However, at the very least, a mental state is determined by a brain state (that is, the 
arrangement of matter in the brain). Therefore, when we say that someone is entertaining a 
particular mental state, the claim is that there is an arrangement of matter in the brain that 
determines that mental state. For the duration of the study, I will adopt the terminology 
‘mental state’ to describe this state of affairs. 
 
An ambiguity can arise from this nomenclature. When a person looks at a tree and takes 
notice of the appearance of its branches, which reminds her of clouds, we can describe the 
exact arrangement of every bit of matter in the brain as this person’s ‘mental state’. If we 
were time travel back to before she has looked at the tree branches, and then somehow 
rearrange all the matter in her brain to match the tree-relevant mental state, she will have the 
sensation of looking at the tree’s branches and being reminded of clouds, even if she has 
never had this thought before. However, it is also common to speak of there being numerous 
mental states (plural) in the mind of a person. Thus, ‘feeling sad’ can be described as a 
mental state. In this case, we can induce a feeling of sadness by exposing the subject to 
certain stimuli. We can say that the person entertains several brain states, such as the state of 
sadness, a state regarding the apprehension of her surroundings, a self-reflective state of the 
form ‘I am feeling sad’, and so on. Note that there is an in-built plurality ambiguity to this 
terminology: in the first case, we can say that a person at a particular time t has such-and-
such an arrangement of all the matter in the brain, and that this arrangement determines the 
person’s mental state in toto. This mental state (in the singular) comprises whatever is the 
focus of conscious attention, the person’s overall mood, physical tokens relating to memory, 
and so on – everything about mental life, conscious and subconscious, at time t. However, in 
the second case, we can speak of mental states in the plural: conscious attention directed 
toward a tree’s branches, the state of being in a contemplative mood, etc. In this manner, we 
can say that several individual mental states can be entertained simultaneously. Defined in 
terms of each other, mental state in toto is comprised of various individual mental states. We 
                                                 
13 I strongly suspect that this is the case, however (that brain matter is in some sense the mental state). I think 
that the intricacies of the problem of whether mental states simply are brain states is  further complicated by the 
fact that we tend to talk of physical processes as one domain, and mental states as another. Issues surrounding 
the mind are therefore often approached by use of metaphor, which intuitively inhibits us from simply seeing 
brain matter arrangement (brain states) as mental states. However, this assumption is not required for application 
of the model of meaning presented in this study. 
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will use the plural form of ‘mental state’ throughout this study, allowing us to claim that a 
mind is able to entertain several sorts of mental states simultaneously.14 
 
 
1.4 Linguistic modality and linguistic computation 
 
This study is principally about music, and the typically human phenomenon of perceiving 
musical pieces as being somehow meaningful in a communicative sense. The topic of 
communicative meaning cannot be successfully discussed without reference to the human 
communicative medium par excellence, language. And to successfully tap our knowledge 
about language, we must be sure that we are clear about what this unique ability is. It is clear 
that whatever language is, it can take many forms. One encounters language when the radio 
or television is turned on, when a book is opened, when we look at a direction sign on the 
highway, and when we communicate with each other by talking. Therefore, we can note that 
language manifests itself in several forms, speech and writing being the most obvious. The 
use of gesture in sign language is another example of a form of language, as sign languages 
also make use of similar grammatical rules to spoken and written language. The various 
manifestations of language are its modalities. Hence, we have the modality of speech, the 
modality of writing, and the modality of gesture in the case of sign language.  
 
Since the 1950s, interest in the biological constitution of linguistic behaviour has grown 
immensely. This has led to an increased awareness of the constituent behaviours comprising 
language usage. For instance, throughout history, language has principally been used in the 
spoken form. Doubtlessly, the evolutionary heritage of language as a communicative medium 
is closely tied to the physiology of our vocal tracts. But does this imply that language is 
dependent on the physiology of speech? That cannot be the case, as people who are unable to 
speak are often still able to communicate through writing, which is perfectly intelligible to 
other language users. Indeed, writing in general is a speech-independent manifestation of 
language. Likewise, people who were born deaf, and have therefore never heard the sounds 
of speech, are able to utilize sign language, which depends on similar grammatical rules to 
                                                 
14 Also note that mental states are not the only sorts of ‘objects’ in the mind. There are also computational 
systems for handling data input, which result in various mental states.  The computational system ‘Language’, 
described in the next section, is one such example. 
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those underlying other modalities of language (Bickerton, 1996; Botha, 2000).15 Because we 
can say that language is implemented in several modalities, we can raise the question of 
whether there is some sense of ‘language’ that is independent of those modalities. 
 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) write that any investigations into language, especially 
those that purport to make claims about evolution, need to take two conceptions of language 
into consideration. These two conceptions affect a distinction between the communicative 
system of language considered as a whole, and the computational system in the mind that 
underlies this form of communication. The former is what the authors call the faculty of 
language in its broad sense, or FLB. The latter (that is, the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
the execution of linguistic communication that are common to all its modalities) is the faculty 
of language in its narrow sense, or FLN (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002:1570-1571). The 
broad sense of the language faculty, FLB, subsumes the narrow sense, FLN. FLB is 
composed of systems that Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch call the “sensory-motor”, “conceptual-
intentional”, and “computational” systems.16 We needn’t go into too much detail about the 
precise nature of these systems. It will suffice to note that these are the sorts of systems that 
allow us to use concepts and a vocabulary, the cognitive equipment for apprehending and 
producing utterances, as well as the power to operate all the necessary physiological 
apparatus that is used in various manifestations of language. These are all the things that are 
necessary for the effective use of (spoken) language as a communicative medium.17 The FLN 
comprises the “computational” system alone: the “abstract linguistic computational system... 
independent of the other systems with which it interacts and interfaces” (p. 1571). Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch believe that the only part of FLB that has no homologue or analogue in 
any other species is the computational system, or FLN. The linguistic computational system 
is the only human-specific feature of language as a whole. For these authors, the distinctive 
feature of FLN is recursion; for Chomsky, recursion is manifested by virtue of syntactic 
operations of the sort described as ‘minimalist’ (see Chomsky, 1995).18  
 
                                                 
15 Superficially, what all these modalities have in common is the use of syntactical rules and arbitrary symbols 
that are treated semantically. Later in this study, the notions of semantics and syntax will be considered in more 
detail. 
16 The ‘computational’ system is FLN. 
17 Note that FLB does not include things like memory, or even a living organism that can play host to FLB. 
These are necessary but not sufficient conditions for FLB. 
18 This sort of distinction can already be seen in early work by Chomsky, such as the distinction between 
competence and performance (1965). 
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This is a distinction worth making, especially in light of views expressed by Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch, as well as Bickerton (1996), amounting to the claim the cognitive 
apparatus underlying the operations of syntax in linguistic behaviour may not have had their 
origins as organs of syntax implementation, but rather as aspects of cognition evolved for 
dealing with other circumstances.19 It is a distinction that we should be aware of. Our primary 
concern is going to be with language in its communicative sense, as a package. When I wish 
to indicate the computational system that is language (analogous to FLN), I will use 
‘Language’ (with an upper case ‘L’). Linguistic behaviour in general will be indicated by use 
of a lower case ‘l’ (‘language’).  
 
How does music shape up with regard to modality? Should we be speaking of a faculty of 
music in the broad sense (FMB) and a faculty of music in the narrow case (FMN)? Or, 
rephrased, is there a computational system for music, and can music be implemented in 
different modalities? In this study, it will be argued that there is indeed something that can be 
characterised as a syntactical dimension for music, but its existence as an independent 
computational system in the mind is a moot point. It may be the case that this system is a 
combination of various domain-general (as opposed to music-specific) cognitive capacities, 
and possibly one or two music-specific subsystems. This, along with the reservations about 
the presence of ‘mental objects’ such as a deep structure for musical utterances expressed by 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983:278ff; see also Lerdahl, 2009), will serve as a restraint for 
speaking of music (or ‘Music’ in the narrow sense) as a computational system in the mind. 
Furthermore, the cognitive apparatus underlying musical cognition has a major difference to 
that of language: music only occurs in one modality, namely sound. It is inconceivable to 
think that there is a computational system underlying the implementation of musical syntax in 
different modalities – that is, music in gesture and writing in addition to its regular 
manifestation in sound. Music is modality-specific, and that dedicated modality is sound.20  
 
This is an interesting difference between music and language. The cognitive abilities 
underlying language use (that is, FLN) can be used in various modalities, but the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying music are dependent on the medium of sound. It can be noted, 
                                                 
19 The issue of linguistic ontology with regard to evolution has also been taken up Botha (2000).  
20 The case of musical writing, such as a score, is a function of our semantic abilities, as the inscriptions are 
arbitrary symbols referring to actual music (that is, sound). It will be argued in this study that the syntactical 
dimension of music is intricately connected to its modality of sound, in that it functions as a means of 
organizing that specific modality. 
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however, that linguistic behaviour (in general) does not escape modality-specificity 
completely. For instance, in ordinary inscription of language by means of writing, there is no 
commonly used system for mapping the inflection of the voice onto the piece of paper, 
despite the fact that we regularly use voice inflection to communicate over and above the 
powers of syntax and semantics. There is no way of indicating the voice inflection that is 
often used to indicate displeasure, for example. But these features do not reflect what is 
common to instances of language usage in each of its modalities. What is common to the 
various modalities in any given language are the syntax and semantics of the language, which 
are implemented by means of FLN. Non-syntactical, non-semantic arbiters of meaning are 
specific to the modality that is used to implement the common syntax and semantics. In this 
study, it will be argued that such non-syntactical, non-semantic features of language are 
modality-specific, and play a part in the determination of mental states that represent 
communicative meaning in the mind. The syntax of music differs in that it has a vested 
interest in the communicative potential of the modality of sound itself: musical syntax exists 
to organise sound and no other modality. 
 
We have now considered several foundational issues pertinent to this study. We are presently 
due to turn to a consideration of the concept of musical and linguistic ‘meaning’, as a 
property of communicative acts. In doing so, we are going to evaluate the concept of 
‘communication’, and introduce the idea of describing meaning as manifesting itself in the 
mind by means of mental states. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE MENTAL STATES 
 
 
2.1 Introduction: A model of communication 
 
This study has, as its primary concern, the idea that music somehow boasts ‘meaning’. It 
steps off from the premise that it is fairly common for people who listen to music to attach 
some sort of meaning to it, or claim that the music somehow complements some situation in 
an appropriate (or inappropriate) manner. Often, the idea that a piece of music is meaningful 
is accompanied by questions about what the composer or performer was attempting to 
communicate to the audience.  A listener may ask what the composer or performer is trying to 
say with a particular piece of music. What is the reason for the use of such-and-such a chord 
at this time, instead of a different one? Am I, as a listener, expected to understand what the 
composer intends with that chord? Has the composer used a musical medium to communicate 
something that is difficult to verbalise, that could not have been said in ordinary speech?  
 
Music would appear to have a close relation to linguistic communication, as can be easily 
thought in light of recent work on the biological basis of musical behaviour (e.g. Patel, 
2008a). Is music, therefore, a communicative medium? And if so, what does it communicate? 
Conceptually, this is a tricky question to answer; a question with which thinkers grapple to 
this day. The sounds that constitute non-programmatic music (that is, music that is not 
intended to illustrate or accompany some non-musical story or scene) do not have 
conventional meanings in the manner in which linguistic communities have agreed-upon 
meanings for words. There exist musical pieces that cannot be said to refer to anything 
beyond music, in the manner in which a statement such as “Those mushrooms are expensive” 
refers to the monetary expense of real-life fungi that exist in a world independent of 
language. And yet, throughout history, there has been an urge amongst humans to employ 
sound musically in interactive activities, to somehow give an additional sonic voice to their 
thoughts. The term ‘musical expression’ has saturated talk about music. But what is 
expressed, and how does it come to be so viewed? 
 
Cross sees music as a form of communication (1999; 2005; Cross & Woodruff, 2008). 
However, he notes that the notion of information theory does not entirely capture the 
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uniqueness of musical activity. Remarking on the generally accepted model of 
communication proposed by Shannon and Weaver (1949), Cross notes regarding this 
traditional model that 
 
a sender makes use of a channel to send information to a receiver, the sender and receiver can 
be of any type of entity, the channel can be constituted of any medium, and the information 
that is sent may take any form. In a musical context, one can think of the sender as the 
performer, the receiver as the listener, the channel as the air and the information transmitted is 
the sonic patterns that constitute the music.  
(Cross, 2005:2) 
 
However, Cross goes on to note that while this model appears to fit well with the modern 
listening habits of many Westerners, it is not congruent with many other sorts of music. For 
example, he cites particular Western examples of cases where the role of performer is often 
not realised (amateur rock bands and recreational choirs whose goal is not public 
performance). According to the traditional model of Shannon and Weaver, these musical 
cases do not count as instances of communication. Furthermore, in many non-Western 
contexts the roles of performer and listener are blurred. It is not immediately obvious that the 
roles of sender and receiver of information in traditional information theory are fulfilled in 
cases of (for example) ritualistic music. In such interactive cases, says Cross, “music may be 
more a medium for participatory interaction where all are equally and simultaneously 
performers and listeners than a medium for display, for communication of musical 
information to ‘passive’ listeners” (Cross, 2005:3). Cross also notes that unlike language, 
music lacks unambiguous intentionality or ‘aboutness’ (ibid.:5): a non-programmatic musical 
phrase is not about something in the world. Musical utterances do not refer; and if they ever 
do, those referential meanings are inherently ambiguous to the listener (ibid.:8).  
 
With musical statements lacking intentionality and frequently violating accepted 
informational-communicative norms, it would appear that the case for any clear-cut 
classification of music as a communicative medium is problematic. However, if we consider 
communication from a different point of view (that we could possibly call a psychological 
perspective), musical behaviour may be able to fit the bill as a form of communication 
despite a lack of unambiguous intentionality and its interactive nature. This would involve 
viewing the traditional idea that communication involves the transfer of information from the 
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mind of one person to that of another as a subtle misconception, albeit one that seems 
generally tolerable. There is no informational entity that, having being appropriated by the 
communicative medium, ends up in the mind of the listener. Rather, what happens is that 
some thought in the mind of the utterer is rendered in the communicative medium by virtue 
of the medium’s causal properties. Provided that the listener has the appropriate mental and 
perceptual apparatus for apprehending that communicative medium, the thought is then 
represented in the mind of the listener, because of the causal properties of the utterance. 
Hence, there is a process in the listener’s mind: from the perception of the message in the 
communicative medium to its representation in the mind, which then goes on to constitute 
appropriate mental states by causal means. Hearing a statement about the quality of a 
particular lager in English involves the perception of the string of sounds as a statement in 
English, the application of appropriate linguistic and semantic principles to successfully 
identify appropriate concepts about lager, and then entertaining a mental state that stands in 
some relation to the lager your friend is speaking about. 
 
Thus, the ultimate point of communication is the attempt to alter the mental states of others. 
All communicative media share this important characteristic: the ability to affect the mental 
states of others. Language and music, our primary concerns, both share this common feature, 
as do other communicative media – gesture, written language, and sign posts are all media of 
this sort. Let us examine the case of spoken language, by considering Smith, who wishes to 
tell his friend Jones something about lager. There is a thought in the mind of Smith; Smith 
renders this thought in the communicative medium of speech according to the grammatical 
and semantic rules of the language utilised by himself and Jones. This message in the 
communicative medium of speech is then apprehended by Smith. The end result of the 
process is that Jones has Smith’s intended mental state regarding lager in his mind. Jones has 
undoubtedly employed the cognitive apparatus needed to parse the statement grammatically 
and semantically, but these processes have been spurred into action by features of the 
message itself: features that have some kind of causal efficacy with regard to communication-
relevant cognition. 
 
The picture of communication illustrated above is broad enough to include animal 
communicative behaviours, if we accept the proviso that in many cases the intent to 
manipulate the mental states of conspecifics is not necessarily a self-reflective action 
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requiring a theory of mind.21 However, it is human communication that interests us at 
present. With a multiplicity of human behaviours that could conceivably count as 
communicative media, the reader should be prompted to ask if some are more specialised at 
certain tasks than others. This certainly seems to be the case. It is very difficult to describe 
the ingredients of a recipe to someone by simply using spatial gestures. Likewise, it is easier 
to draw a picture of a vertebrate eye than to use written language alone in explaining what it 
looks like. But regardless of the aims of individual communicative acts, they all share that 
similar feature: they result in a change in the mental state of attentive and competent 
apprehenders. We will return to the question of specialised function shortly, as it is natural to 
ask what the specialisation of music is. For now, what is important to note is that while the 
ends achieved by various communicative media differ, the means employed are essentially 
the same. For communication to work, the mental state of the listener must, to some degree, 
change as the result of an utterance. Successful communication is when the mental state 
triggered by the sender’s message results in the mental state that the sender intends in the 
mind of the listener.22 Hence, successfully deceiving someone is a communicative act on this 
model; as is attempting to relay thoughts about the world honestly. 
 
How do musical utterances shape up in the view of communication discussed above? Let us 
take an elementary example. A performer plays a piece of music to a listener, with the 
intention of inducing some sort of state of sadness in the listener’s mind. The intended state is 
not necessarily very precisely realised – after all, musical utterances often seem to have an 
inbuilt vagueness. However, for the purposes of our example, we may assume that the utterer 
intends to evoke a state that we can classify as being of the ‘sadness’ variety. She achieves 
her aim; the listener experiences a mental state akin to sadness. What has happened in this 
case is that the performer has sought to elicit a particular mental state in the mind of the 
                                                 
21 An organism is said to have a theory of mind if it is aware of the existence of other similar minds within the 
same species. In other words, a theory of mind is present if the organism is aware that conspecifics are able to 
think in a similar manner. That organism would also believe that other organisms within the same species have a 
similar conception of its own mental life. For more about the concept of a theory of mind, see Premack and 
Woodruff (1978). The reason for the proviso of animal communication not requiring a theory of mind is to 
remove the need for the intent to alter the mental states of others, which would not be possible without the 
concept of conspecifics having mental lives of their own. In cases of animal communication without theory of 
mind, the communicative act may be purely manipulative. Mental states, however elementary, will be altered by 
the causal properties of the communicative act in all cases of animal communication. However, the utterer itself 
would act on the premise of manipulating behaviour rather than manipulating mental states, because without a 
theory of mind, it would not be aware that others have mental states. 
22 In the case of animal communication, the intent to alter the mental states of others may not be consciously 
perceived as such. Rather, in animals without a theory of mind, the intent to alter the mental states of others may 
be seen by the animal as an attempt to alter another animal’s behaviour by means of what we would term a 
communicative act, in a manipulative fashion. 
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listener. To do so, the communicative medium has been sound, and the causal properties of 
the message itself have, as intended by the performer, altered the mental state of the listener 
in the desired manner. Another example is the intention of an utterer to induce a state of 
excitement in the listener by means of a vigorous piece of music with (for instance) a fast 
tempo and complex, driving rhythms. The performance of this music serves as a 
communicative act, resulting in an excitement-relevant mental state forming in the mind of 
the listener by virtue of the causal properties of the utterance. 
 
The use of things like gesture, speech, music, and writing to affect the mental states of others 
is communication. Obviously, communication can be more or less effective in terms of the 
goals and intentions of the producer of the communicative act, largely due to the choice of 
the medium of communication and the competence of the parties involved in the production 
and reception of that communicative act. It is possible to intend to elicit particular thoughts in 
the mind of a listener, and not succeed. If the lack of success results in zero change in mental 
state for the listener, we might say that no communication has taken place whatsoever. This 
can be because of any number of reasons: perhaps the apprehender was out of earshot, or has 
no means of facilitating the proper perception of the communicative act by not being able to 
read. If there is a resultant mental state in the mind of the apprehender, but it is not the one 
that the communicator intended, then we say that the communicator has been 
misunderstood.23 Once again, there could be many reasons for such a state of affairs. One 
such reason is mistaking elements of a communicative medium with other elements in that 
medium, despite being fully competent (for example, mistaking the referent of one word for 
that of another; or even having a different referent for a word than the person initiating 
communication). It is possible, however, for communication to take place despite 
inadequacies with regard to the utterance itself. This is in virtue of the listener’s interpretation 
of the communicative act as a whole. When the communicative act is incomplete or 
inadequate in some manner, an inference of what it is that the utterer intended to 
communicate can be made by the listener. This is pragmatic context. 
 
                                                 
23 In the case of music, which is inherently ambiguous, cases of being misunderstood would occur when the 
listener perceives a piece of music intended to elicit a reaction in some broad class (e.g. ‘sadness’) as being 
indicative of some completely alien class (e.g. hearing the same piece as belonging to a ‘happy’ class). In other 
words, the communicative ambiguity characteristic of many types of music means that communicative intent 
cannot be as specific as it is with other media, such as writing. 
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Before discussing pragmatic context, an exception to the basic communicative rule needs to 
be pointed out. Sometimes utterances are produced simply because they sound nice to the 
utterer, or are used by the utterer simply because he or she feels like engaging in musical 
activity. However, such utterances do not just sound joyful, sad, or profound to a chance 
listener, but also elicit mental states in a manner indiscernible in type from other 
communicative acts. While the utterer’s intention to communicate was not present, this still 
does not prevent a process similar to what I am about to describe from happening. A lack of 
intention to communicate on behalf of the utterer does not prevent a statement in a 
communicative medium from affecting the mental states of others that receive it. Music 
played by yourself, for yourself, and for no one else, will have communicative effects on 
chance, unintended listeners regardless of your own communicative wishes. It is nonetheless 
true that there exists the fact that while music is predominantly an interactive group activity 
in the majority of the world’s cultures, there are cases where music is performed solely for 
the benefit of the performer – such as instrumentalists playing for themselves, alone. These 
non-intentional cases do not, however, change the way in which musical meaning comes 
about in the minds of chance listeners. Doubtlessly, there is in many such cases a fair amount 
of extra-musical significance attached to the musical performance by the performer. But such 
a scenario does not change the fundamental manner in which music changes mental states, 
even if that change is somehow the result of a reflexive process in the mind of the performer 
herself. 
 
 
2.2 Pragmatic context in linguistic communication 
 
At this point, it would be opportune to mention the role of pragmatics in philosophical 
considerations of meaning and linguistic communication. The following statement by 
Stalnaker, made with specific reference to linguistic expressions, should set the agenda 
neatly: “Syntax studies sentences, semantics studies propositions. Pragmatics is the study of 
linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed” (Stalnaker, 1970:275). Whereas 
syntax concerns the order of elements in a communicative act, and semantics the meaning of 
those elements and the sentence as a whole, the pragmatic meaning of a statement concerns 
the effect that the conditions under which the utterance was made have to the overall meaning 
perceived by the listener. Phrased succinctly, “pragmatics is fundamentally concerned with 
recovering the thoughts communicators intend to convey by their ostensive acts” (Carston, 
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2008:340). Let us take the following sentence as an example. Imagine two people, John and 
Peter, sitting in a room on a summer day. John is sitting next to a closed window. Peter utters 
the following sentence, directed at John.  
 
(1) It’s getting very hot in this room. 
 
John then gets up and opens the window. What did Peter really say to John with (1)? Judging 
from the meaning of the words alone, Peter’s sentence is merely a reflection on the current 
state of affairs regarding the ambient temperature of the room. On such a literal reading of the 
meaning of the words of the utterance, the apprehension of sentence (1) would not appear to 
be the reason that John opened the window.  Of course, this is obviously not the case. What 
happened is that Peter implied with (1) was that John should get up and open the window, so 
that the room could cool down. The literal meaning of the words of the sentence alone 
reflects the semantics of the sentence, as facilitated by the syntax of the English language. 
Understood in isolation from the context under which it was uttered, (1) is not a request that 
John should open the window. However, when considered in context, the obvious implied 
meaning of (1) is that John should get up and open the window. This second (contextual) 
interpretation is made in virtue of the pragmatics of the utterance. Even though the words of 
sentence (1) have retained their semantic meaning, they are being used for another 
communicative purpose. Put in terms used in this study, the change in the listener’s mental 
state is not just in virtue of the meaning of the words, but also in virtue of the manner in 
which the utterance is being used in a particular context. 
 
Another well-used example is that of a school pupil who has not been excelling in his 
schoolwork. On the year-end report card, the teacher writes only the following: 
 
(2) Peter is pleasant and has neat handwriting. 
 
By virtue of the meaning of the words alone, the sentence expresses precisely what it says: 
Peter is pleasant in the school environment, and his handwriting is legible. These statements 
can be confirmed as true or false. But what the teacher is really saying is what is conspicuous 
by its absence: Peter has not got much in the lines of academic promise. This unwritten 
meaning, understood in the context of report cards, is the pragmatic meaning of the 
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sentence.24 As this example and the example before demonstrate, it is possible to say things 
with a statement that are not encoded in the utterance itself. In these cases, it is not in virtue 
of the meaning of the words and the syntactical means by which they are combined that a 
listener (or reader) can understand what the utterer is really trying to say.25 
 
At first glance, the fact that the sounds of music do not have conventionally agreed-upon 
referents in the manner in which words refer to things beyond the confines of language, 
would seem to pose another problem to those wishing to understand music as a 
communicative medium. It also makes a clear distinction between semantics (or 
communicative meaning) and pragmatics in music difficult to draw. This is the view of 
Swain (1997:77), who reduces musical pragmatics to a matter of stylistic genre. But 
examples of non-linguistic pragmatics can be formulated. Carston (2008:338-389) provides 
an example where encoded meaning is kept to an absolute minimum. Two friends, Sue and 
Bob, are in a pub. Sue is standing near the bar when Bob catches her eye. He waves an empty 
pint glass in the air, making sure that Sue notices it. Sue takes this visual interchange as a 
signal for her to order Bob another pint of beer, which she proceeds to do. In this case, there 
has been no conventionally encoded signal used at all. Waving an empty pint glass is not a 
conventionally agreed-upon signal meaning ‘Order me another beer’. Rather, in the context 
of the pub, and based on the mutual acquaintance of Bob and Sue, Sue’s interpretation of this 
as a signal for her to order Bob another beer is “derived through a bit of probabilistic 
reasoning based on general knowledge” (Carston, 2008:339). This is general knowledge of 
the situation: Sue’s interpretation of the gesture is a matter of pragmatics, and has nothing to 
do with the meaning of symbols. 
 
What is interesting in these three cases is that there is an intention to communicate present, 
even if there is a poverty of relevant encoded meaning and syntax in the communicative 
medium (the spoken sentence, the writing on the report card, and the gesture, respectively). 
Pragmatics deals with the recovery of what the utterer, writer, or gesticulator intended to 
communicate. When framed in terms of communication, it would appear that pragmatics 
augments the use of any communicative medium – after all, pragmatics is the recovery of 
                                                 
24 A third example is provided by Aitcheson (1989:269): ‘Do you know the time?’ If we were to interpret this by 
the meaning of the words alone, the answer would have to be ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ – either you know the time, or you 
don’t. However, that is not what the question is really about. Rather, the utterer wants you to tell her what the 
time is, not ask whether you know the time. It is the pragmatics of the question – how it is used – that leads to 
the appropriate reaction. Yet another excellent example can be found in Carston (2008:322-323). 
25 More on pragmatics in debates about linguistic meaning can be found in the essays comprising Grice (1991). 
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what the utterer intended to communicate. Describing how pragmatics in music occurs will 
involve a description of how the intention behind musical utterances is recovered by the 
listener in virtue of the context in which the musical utterance is made. It is not, however, 
written into the music itself, in the same way that the pragmatic meaning of the examples 
cited above are not intrinsic to the utterances and gestures involved. One would therefore 
expect to find that musical pragmatics is mostly a matter of the individual contexts in which 
musical utterances are heard, and depend to a large degree on non-musical factors. For the 
remainder of the study, we will make note of relevant cases where pragmatics contributes to 
the musical meaning perceived by the listener. 
 
It should also be noted that information about the mental states of others can still be 
apprehended without a communicative act having taken place. This sort of ‘informational 
updating’ is a fairly elementary way of getting about in the world. You can ascertain that 
your friend is in a foul mood, based on the manner in which he treats the things in the 
environment (for example, slamming a door). Such behaviour is a consequence of a mental 
state, and not an act of communication. To be sure, a large amount of our information about 
others is gathered in this manner. But this is not the same sort of process as the act of 
communication. Recall that earlier, it was stated that communicative media could result in a 
change in mental state in the apprehender. What is important to note is that unintentional use 
of communicative media will always result in a change in the mental state of an apprehender, 
provided the apprehender has the requisite competency for the communicative medium in 
question. Behaviour or other non-communicative factors used in informational updating do 
not always result in a change of mental state for the apprehender. Observing that my friend is 
nauseous does not mean that I will automatically believe him to be nervous. 
 
This sort of informational updating should be distinguished from scenarios of pragmatic 
context, such as those that were described above. With pragmatics, the listener attempts to 
recover the meaning that the utterer intended to convey. In the examples cited above, Peter 
intended that John should interpret the statement about the room’s ambient temperature as a 
request to open the window; the schoolteacher intended that positive remarks regarding non-
academic matters on an academic report card be interpreted as a negative comments about 
scholastic ability; and Bob intended that Sue should interpret his gesture as a request for 
another pint of beer. What is common to these cases is the intention to communicate. 
However, simply observing that my friend has slammed a door, and therefore inferring that 
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he is in a bad mood, does not mean that he is trying to communicate to me that he is angry. 
This deduction is merely made on the basis of non-communicative evidence in the 
environment. Making an inference that your friend is in pain after an involuntary cry has been 
issued upon stubbing his toe is another example: here, the involuntary utterance is not made 
with the intention to communicate to you that he is in pain. The inference that he is in pain is 
made from a non-communicative, non-intentional (albeit audible) cue. Informational 
updating occurs when you make a deduction about a conspecific based on non-
communicative cues, where there is no intention to communicate present. Pragmatics deals 
with the recovery of intended meaning that is underspecified in the communicative act. Care 
should be taken that the two are not confused. 
 
 
2.3 Music and language as communicative media 
 
What sorts of things can be communicated? In principle, any thought can be communicated, 
provided a medium that is capable of handling that thought, and a community of at least two 
interlocutors that are capable of wielding that medium.26 For example, a principal feature of 
spoken and written language (indeed, all ‘Language’ with an upper case ‘L’) is the ability to 
communicate propositions. Therefore, all thought capable of being framed in terms of 
propositions can be expressed by spoken and written language. The only types of mental 
content that cannot be communicated are those for which no appropriate communicative 
medium exists. If such mental content indeed exists, we would not be able to represent it in 
any communicative medium we currently possess. 
 
Questions remain as to the nature of the mental states that are realised in the minds of persons 
who are on the receiving side of communicative acts. Different sorts of thoughts require 
different sorts of communicative media, which in turn result in different sorts of mental 
states. Some states result in beliefs, others in emotion or affect, and others are contributors to 
a pool of knowledge. The use of the English language, to communicate a proposition about 
the weather, results in a belief in the mind of the listener with respect to the proposition 
communicated. The sorts of mental states we are concerned with are those termed cognitive 
states (which often lead to the formation of beliefs) and affective states (which result in the 
                                                 
26 By ‘thought’ I mean any mental state of which a person is consciously aware. 
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experience of affects). However, before we consider these concepts more closely, we should 
narrow our discussion down to the two communicative media that interest us the most: 
language and music. 
 
It has already been mentioned that music is to be thought of as a communicative medium. 
The goal of communication is the elicitation of desired mental states in the mind of the 
listener. An obvious question now arises: what nature of thought is communicated with 
musical utterances? It is clear that music communicates ‘content’ that is not easily facilitated 
in a form of spoken language.27 If musical thoughts were easily represented in speech, we 
would have to wonder what precisely the point of musical communication would be. In terms 
of communication, it would not be parsimonious to have one communicative medium that 
handled all the same sorts of content that could be more easily handled by another medium. 
 
It is possible to imagine that the sort of content that is communicated with musical utterances 
could be of two varieties. The first is of the sort that could indeed be communicated by some 
other communicative medium, albeit not quite so easily. For instance, it is possible to speak 
of music in terms of structure, tonality, and thematic material. These are all concepts that are 
firmly in the domain of propositional content, and hence are expressible in the various 
manifestations of natural language (such as speech and writing). We could say that a 
particular piece has a melody consisting of these notes, and a temporal duration expressible in 
seconds, and this and that timbre, expressed in terms of the relative amplitudes of its 
fundamental frequency and partials. But it is far easier to listen to the piece of music in 
question – all of this linguistically framed information can be actively experienced in a single 
musical utterance, akin to a sort of demonstrative survey of the piece. It is difficult to imagine 
any linguistic description of a piece being fine-grained enough to capture every describable 
element that is heard. Likewise, any linguistic description of the piece is likely to highlight 
aspects of the music that might not necessarily have come to conscious attention, in the 
manner in which labels appended to a diagram of the vertebrate eye presents information in 
manner not identical to actual visual experience of an eye. Listening to a musical piece also 
grants us access to a different way of representing this propositional content – that is, a 
language-free description. This is a different way of encountering the music, and brings with 
                                                 
27 In the ensuing discussion, the term ‘content’ is used mainly as a matter of convenience. We might describe the 
content of a mental state representing the proposition ‘The grass is green’ as simply that statement (i.e. the 
content of a mental state is that mental state). 
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it the important aspect of musical experience that cannot be linguistically represented: what it 
is like to experience the music.  
 
This brings to our attention the second sort of content that we may imagine music being 
capable of communicating, which is content that cannot be communicated in any other 
communicative medium. These are, if you will, uniquely musical thoughts, which are 
inexpressible in any other medium than music. By analogy, we can imagine a similar scenario 
for gesture, or any other communicative medium. We shall see that this sort of content can, 
for our purposes, be lumped together with content that is not expressible in the form of 
propositions. This larger category of content will be called non-propositional content (NPC), 
of which uniquely musical thoughts are one type.28 
 
Spoken language is similar in this regard. It too is capable of representing content that can be 
represented in another medium. We can describe a vertebrate eye, but the communicative 
medium of a picture is far easier to use and understand. However, once again, experiencing a 
description of the eye, experiencing a diagram of the eye, and experiencing the eye itself are 
not equivalent. The second sort of content – that is, content that cannot be represented in any 
other medium – is also present. Arguably, there are concepts unique to each medium that we 
would struggle to find any other way of expressing. Temporal concepts are a good linguistic 
example. How else but with language can we communicate concepts like ‘later’, ‘yesterday’, 
or ‘in the future’? It would seem that only linguistic creatures can possess the ability to talk 
(or even think) about these sorts of concepts. Added to this is the fact that language is tailor-
made to express propositions. Therefore, it may make sense to say that language is able to 
communicate concepts and propositional content, as well as other types of content via 
performative and pragmatic means. 
 
How far an analogy between music and language can be stretched remains to be seen. For 
now, we can note that both are communicative media in the sense that utterances serve to 
affect changes in the mental state of listeners, usually with the aim of the listener 
experiencing a mental state that the utterer intends. The change in mental state is usually 
realised by content in the mind of the listener, and that content can either be propositional or 
                                                 
28 The reader should note that I have stopped short of saying that the communication of such uniquely musical 
thoughts is the raison d’être for music’s existence. I think that given current thought about the evolutionary 
rationale behind musical behaviour, the idea that the need to express uniquely musical thoughts provided the 
pressure required for selection of musical traits is implausible. 
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non-propositional, and can sometimes be unique in that it can only be communicated via a 
particular communicative medium. So far, the analogy between music and language is 
common to all communicative media. Of course, both music and language (in its speech 
modality) are forms of aural communication. Both require the perception and production of 
sound for their effectiveness. This holds the implication that both require some sort of parsing 
or processing in the mind, in order to differentiate them from other sounds in the 
environment. The precise nature of this parsing and processing of aural perception with 
regard to music will be developed later. In anticipation, we can ask whether it is possible that 
our analogy can be extended in general to the mental processing of music and language, its 
effect on our mental states, and the sorts of mechanism that allow the implementation of such 
mental states. 
 
One aspect of comparisons between music and language is the idea that both feature 
principles for the combination of sonic elements into utterances that are well-formed. In 
language, this set of principles is grammar, whether one speaks of the generative, innate 
variety, or more culturally-specific grammatical idiosyncrasies. With regard to music, 
questions of rules and principles for forming acceptable strings of sound are often subsumed 
by the notion of the musical styles present within a given culture. Thus, we could say that 
there are principles present within a musical community for combining sounds to create 
acceptable musical utterances. While a piece may be in violation of certain culturally 
determined stylistic rules, it may still be comprehensible in terms of deeper, cognitively-
based rules. Whether this deeper, universal, and cognitively-based level of principles for 
music exists seems to me to be beyond question, even though the details of this level and its 
fundamental nature have not been agreed upon by the broader musicological community. 
Indeed, in comparison to studies of language, there have been few attempts to investigate this 
matter.29 For now, we are able to say that both music and language are aural communicative 
                                                 
29 Both the matter of syntax and the matter of musical universals are by no means areas of agreement in 
musicology. This is not to say that attempts at plotting universal features of music haven’t been penned, with a 
notable early example being Erpf (1967). The most obvious musical universal is the fact that, in all recorded 
societies, the activity of music-making is itself a universal (Peretz, 2006; Blacking, 1995; Nettl, 2005). This is 
another analogy between music and language, but one that we should be careful of considering remarkable. 
After all, ritualised preparation of food is another universal in human societies, but we would be wary of 
attributing this to any special cognitive process. What we should ask is whether there are, within the world-wide 
music-making community, aspects of the activity that are universal and analogous to language. (We will 
discount the functional universals of music for now, and focus on the properties of the sonic phenomenon itself.) 
To do so, we would require an extensive knowledge of linguistic and musicological data, with special attention 
paid to neuroscientific evidence. For more on the universals of the world’s music, see Nettl (2005), especially 
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media, and that both require the combination of discrete sounds in accordance with rules for 
their combination into utterances (whatever the fundamental nature of these rules is). The 
perception of both music and language require the listener to identify the sounds as music or 
language, and to assess whether the utterance in question is well-formed or not. Provided an 
intelligible utterance, a particular mental state is elicited in the mind of the listener. 
 
 
2.4 Mental states as a precondition for musical meaning 
 
At this point, the proverbial elephant in the room is the concept of meaning. In the opening 
chapter, we established that our primary concern with the concept of meaning is in the realm 
of communication (as opposed to meaning as significance). With all this talk of mental states, 
well-formed utterances, and communicative media, it seems reasonable to ask where the 
meaning of utterances fits into the picture. This is especially pertinent with regard music: 
what does such and such a musical utterance mean? Is there place for meaning in music? Is 
this not precisely where the analogy between music and language breaks down? 
 
It is generally thought that, should musical meaning exist, it would differ from linguistic 
meaning not only in degree but also in kind. For instance, if use of the term ‘meaning’ is 
exhausted by a word’s referent, it would seem to rule out any possibility of a strict sense of 
‘meaning’ in absolute music (this is the view expressed inn Kivy, 1990). Absolute music does 
not have words, and musical sounds do not have agreed-upon referents in musical utterances. 
Of course, it is possible that a musical community could agree on a set of conventions that 
could be used as arbitrary symbols. We could say that a particular chord progression has a 
referent x, and every time the community hears that chord progression, it is understood that x 
is being referred to. But what we would have is tantamount to a language capable of 
expressing propositions. Thus, if this were the case, absolute music would simply be used as 
a language. It would just be another modality for semantics. It would also have the 
appearance of a contradiction in terms. Non-programmatic music is, per definition, the sort of 
music that has no extra-musical referents. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
pp. 42-49. Both the issue of universals and that of the status of well-formed utterances will receive more 
attention in Ch. 5. 
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Despite this, it seems to be the case that when most people are confronted with non-
programmatic music, they somehow feel that there is something to be grasped or understood, 
some sort of ‘meaning’. In addition, most cultures use different sorts of music for different 
purposes, depending on which music fits the context best.30 What is it that is grasped or 
understood? Scruton (1987) has pursued such a line of reasoning, stating that “[t]he meaning 
of music is what you understand when you understand it” (p. 169), and that “meaning is the 
object of understanding” (ibid.). This avenue of thought seems to make a fair amount of 
intuitive sense. After all, we have already stated that music is to be thought of as a 
communicative medium, and surely this implies that in musical statements, there is 
something to be understood. This something to be understood is, in Scruton’s view, musical 
meaning. 
 
However, the problem with defining meaning as the object of understanding is that it narrows 
the applicability of the concept, thus rendering certain commonplace uses of ‘meaning’ (with 
regard to music) unaccounted for. The term ‘understanding’ implies that there is, to some 
degree, a process in the mind that must take place before meaning is grasped. Upon hearing a 
musical stimulus, the mind must somehow process the information it has received and 
represent it in some manner, possibly according to some set of principles that serves an 
evaluative purpose. Now, I am not denying that such processes occur. Indeed, this was a 
point in favour of the analogy between music and language: both require the parsing or 
processing of auditory stimuli, thus differentiating linguistic and musical sounds from others 
in the sonic environment. But now we are confronted with what, at first, will seem a major 
disanalogy between the two communicative media. There is a vast array of musical sounds 
that appear to have effects on us that are not dependant on ‘understanding’. Take, for 
example, a sudden loud chord where one would not expect it. The sudden fortissimo chord 
signalling the beginning of the development section, b. 161, of the first movement of 
Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony, is a very good example. The reaction that the composer 
intended – one of alarm, no doubt – is not a matter of ‘understanding’.31 Rather, the state of 
                                                 
30 There seem, in most cultures, to be differences between the stylistic traits of say, music for ritual funeral and 
music for weddings or music for didactic children’s songs. Obviously, there is something about particular sorts 
of music that affords them for use in certain contexts, something that one must understand in order to use the 
correct music at the correct time. Regardless of whether these uses are dictated by societal context or not, there 
are often qualitative differences between different sorts of music that influence a society’s attitude with regard 
to its appropriateness in various situations. 
31 Many other sounds in the environment result in non-voluntary mental (and physical reactions), including 
sounds accompanying language in the modality of speech. 
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alarm is achieved by non-syntactical, minimally-processed means. It is a reaction. There is no 
need for a set of mental processes that identifies the sound as a particular element of an 
utterance, represents it, and only then sets the cognitive wheels turning that result in a mental 
state of alarm. Likewise, the association of an increase in volume, thickness of texture, rising 
melodic material, and rhythmic activity to an increasing state of excitement is also not a 
matter of processing. Such direct reactions to musical stimuli seem not to be products of a 
process of ‘understanding’.32 
 
But how does this detract from the idea that meaning is the object of understanding, and that 
to understand a piece of music is to know what it means? The reactions described above are, 
after all, natural. We respond to loud, unexpected, and sudden sounds with alarm, and we 
treat the source of a general increase in noise as something in an excited state. What has this 
to do with the perception of music as something meaningful? Consider a piece of music, such 
as a moderately paced, medium-loud folk tune. Now, consider the same piece of music, only 
that the last note of each phrase is played with an aggressive attack and at a high volume. 
Alternatively, imagine the same piece of music with loud, aggressive attacks being used on 
every note; or, imagine the entire length of the piece comprising a crescendo from very soft 
to very loud. What is the difference between our original folk tune and the versions that are 
changed with respect to attack and volume? The mental states that result from these various 
versions are most certainly different. There is a distinct difference in what is communicated 
in our original folk tune and what is communicated in the altered version, despite the fact that 
we have made no changes to the notes or the manner in which they are combined. The 
changes are very much intended to form part of what is communicated to the listener, but 
these are not changes that result in any need for a type of processing resulting in 
‘understanding’. They are purely changes of the type that we naturally have reactions to – 
there is no need to postulate a chain of mental events and representations, a set of evaluative 
mental processes. But these changes still contribute to what is communicated in a vital way. 
An aggressive rendering of our folk tune communicates something different than the original 
version does; the two versions result in different mental states in the mind of the listener. 
Most would say that the perceived meanings of the two versions are different. If the idea is 
correct that parameters like the use of loud, aggressive attack result in mental states that are 
                                                 
32 I am not, however, denying that it is possible for the subject to be artificially conditioned to react differently 
to aural stimuli, and hence have a reaction to a sound that we would not ordinarily expect. However, such a 
scenario would involve conditioning to such an extent that the natural reaction to the stimulus is overridden. 
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not the result of processing (that is, not a process of ‘understanding’), then arguably the 
overall perceived meaning of a piece of music is not exhausted by mental processing.  
 
Musical meaning must, therefore, be made up of at least two sorts of co-existing mental 
states: cognitive states, that are the result of mental processes (such as concepts or data 
represented in the mind being manipulated by principles of some sort); and affective states, 
that are elicited by directly causal processes (that is, elicited by our hard-wired reactions to 
sonic stimuli). When a listener expresses the perception of meaning in a musical piece, her 
report stems from the existence of these two sorts of mental states in the mind: cognitive 
states that are the products of evaluative mental processes (‘understanding’); and affective 
states, which result from aspects of the musical experience that cause largely involuntary 
reactions. When the performer attempts to communicate (that is, attempts to change the 
mental states of the listener), both cognitive and affective states are exploited. 
 
 
2.5 Causal mechanisms surrounding the elicitation of appropriate mental states 
 
Before continuing, the idea of mental ‘computation’ must be discussed. Throughout the 
remainder of the study, mention will be made of processes of mental computation. However, 
the initial state of the data that is processed should be defined. When someone hears a 
linguistic or musical utterance (or any sonic stimuli, for that matter), the string of sounds 
needs to be made amenable to mental operations. In other words, the string of sounds, as 
apprehended by the sense organs, needs to be rendered in ‘mind matter’: it needs to be 
represented or encoded in such a way that the brain can make sense of it as computationally 
malleable data in its most basic form. Let us refer to input from the sense organs, in a format 
potentially available to the brain for further processing, as the stimulus as it is immediately 
represented in the mind. Thus, when we speak of features of the musical utterance being in a 
directly causal relationship with a particular mental state, what is implied is that it is those 
features immediately represented in the mind that do the causal work. This is a scenario 
similar to the way in which we might describe the process behind a pinprick that results in a 
mental state of pain. We would ordinarily say that the pinprick is in a directly causal 
relationship with the reaction of pain: the pinprick causes the state of pain. However, the 
resultant mental state is actually in a directly causal relationship with encoded information 
regarding the pinprick, as it is made available as input to the mind by virtue of the signals of 
 41 
the nervous system. The entire process can be described as the pinprick causing the nervous 
system to send a message to the brain, where it is immediately represented or encoded in 
‘mind matter’, and it is this immediate representation that is in a directly causal relationship 
with the state of pain. This representation is in a computationally malleable state, and has 
itself already been subject to computation of some basic sort (that is, some sort of 
computational representation in the nervous system). Therefore, with musical and linguistic 
utterances, the message is apprehended by the sense organs, and then immediately 
represented in the mind; and it is this immediate representation that stands in a directly causal 
relation to the resultant mental state. When we speak of computational processes on this 
immediately represented data, the reader should note that such data has already undergone a 
measure of computation in being rendered an immediate, computationally malleable 
representation of the stimulus in the mind. 
 
Recall that it was stated that the point of communicative acts is to elicit a particular set of 
mental states in the mind of the listener. Effective and successful communication results in 
the utterer’s successful elicitation of the desired mental states in mind of the intended listener. 
The argument up to this point has mentioned two specific sorts of mental states: cognitive 
states and affective states. Before considering the roles of music and language in the 
achievement of these mental states, some time should be spent exploring the nature of the 
mechanisms by which these states are achieved. 
 
Assuming a naturalistic view of the workings of the mind that is consistent with the processes 
describable by the methods of physical science (that is, akin to the causal closure of physics), 
it should be apparent that all activity in the mind is, at a fundamental level, the result of 
causal relations in the matter of the brain. Therefore, we should expect that however the 
apprehension of meaning works, it is bound to be underwritten by causal mechanisms. There 
are combinations of causal mechanisms that are of such a nature that we can describe them as 
computational systems. Innate grammatical principles, such as those that are described in 
psycholinguistics, are examples of such complex causal computational mechanisms. At a 
fundamental level, things like innate grammatical principles must be sets of causal processes, 
material causes and material effects. But what is remarkable about causal complexes such as 
generative grammars and the like is the fact that they are themselves computational systems: 
a set of causal processes that manipulate data, but are independent of that data. The point of 
these computational complexes, these sets of causal mechanisms that can be described in 
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terms of principles, is to manipulate an input and produce an output. For example, sentences 
need to be processed in terms of grammaticality and the meaning of the individual terms 
before the meaning of the sentence as a whole can be appreciated and represented in the 
mind. Thus, the input is the string of sounds constituting an act of speech, as it is immediately 
represented in the mind, and the output is the general meaning of the sentence.  
 
These computational processes serve various purposes. However, whenever data is 
processed, we can conclude that the output results in a change in the arrangement of the 
matter of the brain. In some cases, the outputs will be available to conscious experience. 
When these outputs do come to conscious attention, we can say that they serve to change 
mental states. When we hear a spoken utterance, the output of the various computational 
systems involved will include the general meaning of the sentence in toto, semantically 
irrelevant sonic properties (say, representations of the speaker’s accent), pragmatically 
relevant information, and the actual physical sounds. While the meaning of the sentence is 
usually immediately available to conscious experience, things like the qualities of the speech 
sounds and semantically irrelevant sonic details can be brought to conscious attention. In 
these scenarios, it is fair to say that content is consciously represented in the mind; or, in 
other words, there is a change in mental state.33 
 
Mental states that are the result of systems of computation, as described above, can be termed 
cognitive states. One feature of such states is the fact that they lead to beliefs about the 
outside world. For example, the apprehension of speech has, as an ultimate result, a cognitive 
state that can be used in the formation of beliefs about what has been said. If an utterer says 
“The British public is very fond of curry”, and this sentence has been perceived and 
processed successfully by an apprehender, that apprehender will be able to form beliefs 
regarding the representation of the sentence’s meaning. The apprehender may form a belief 
about the sentence as a whole, such as a belief that it is true. By logical means, this can 
conceivably lead to other beliefs about the culinary preferences of individual members of the 
British public (for instance, the belief that the British public is fond of at least one type of 
food). Such beliefs have been arrived at via cognitive mental states. 
                                                 
33 Note that the earlier distinction between communication and the mere apprehension of information about the 
speaker applies here. Someone who tells you that your car’s headlights are on in a Scottish accent is not also 
trying to communicate the fact that he is Scottish. That you gain knowledge of the speaker’s nationality is a case 
of picking up information not from the communicative act per se, but from the details of its execution (i.e. 
features of the sonic environment at large). 
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Note that the very stuff of such computational procedures must be represented in the mind in 
such a way that allows for the inference of beliefs. Beliefs can only be inferred from 
propositional content. Let us pause to consider this statement. It is possible for beliefs to be 
about content that cannot be expressed in propositional format, but beliefs cannot be inferred 
from content that cannot be expressed in propositional form. You can believe that you are 
sad, but you cannot infer things from the state of sadness itself. We have already mentioned 
the existence of non-propositional content (NPC). It follows that NPC cannot be used to infer 
beliefs. It also follows that NPC cannot be subject to computational procedures and processes 
in the mind. If computational procedures result in content that can be represented in such a 
way as to allow for the formation of beliefs (and other propositional attitudes), and beliefs are 
propositional, then non-propositional content must be the sort of content that does not allow 
for beliefs at all. Of course, non-propositional content is perceivably available to conscious 
experience, so it does constitute mental states.34 The sort of mental state that arises in the case 
of NPC is what we called an affective mental state earlier. 
 
Two questions now confront us. The first concerns the nature of the mechanism by means of 
which the apprehender of a communicative act, such as the listener of music, arrives at an 
affective mental state. The second question is whether a situation analogous to cognitive 
states leading to the formation of beliefs occurs with regard to affective states. (Or: if 
cognitive states lead to beliefs and other propositional attitudes, do affective states lead to 
something analogous?) 
 
The first question: It has already been mentioned that affective states are the result of causal 
processes, in a more direct manner than the evaluative propositional-computational 
procedures underlying the achievement of cognitive states. Now we will consider this idea 
further. The conclusion we will arrive at is that NPC is realised in affective mental states, and 
that with affective mental states the stimulus, as it is immediately represented in the mind, 
stands in a directly causal relation to the resultant mental state. Thus, with a communicative 
act that results in non-propositional content in the mind of the apprehender, the means by 
which that act is delivered stands in a directly causal relation to an affective mental state. Let 
us suppose that someone listens to a piece of music. There are plenty of features about the 
                                                 
34 The contents of subjective conscious experience (‘qualia’) also constitute non-propositional content. 
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piece of music that can indeed be represented linguistically. However, recall that there are 
features of musical experience that are like reactions to sounds in general (b. 161 of the first 
movement of Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony was an example). We had originally said that 
these were aspects of music where there was no process of ‘understanding’ involved. There 
was no manner of process in the mind that receives a loud, sudden sound as an input, and 
then manipulates it into an evaluated representation by some complex set of principles 
underwritten by causal processes in the mind, resulting in a mental state that then leads to an 
appropriate reaction to the sound upon becoming the focus of conscious attention. We noted 
that such a chain of events violates parsimony, and that these sorts of reactions could be 
better described as hard-wired reactions. The mental state that results from experiencing such 
sounds is not the result of evaluative, propositional-computational processes.  
 
Assuming the causal closure of physics, we also noted that the activity of the mind is 
fundamentally underwritten by causal relations. Hence, the evaluative computational 
procedures leading to cognitive mental states can be described in terms of complexes of 
causal relations between the various bits of matter in the brain. Because all activity in the 
mind is, at a fundamental level, underwritten by causal relations between bits of brain matter, 
it would follow that the mechanism by which affective mental states are realised must also be 
causal in nature. The difference, however, between the causality of cognitive states and that 
of affective states is firstly a matter of complexity, and secondly a matter of function. The 
computational processes for realising the cognitive states described above are complex 
systems of causal relations, assembled in a complex manner in order to fulfil a particular 
function. This sort of mental organ exists independently of the data that it handles, and the 
data it handles does not impinge on the structure of the organ. Computational systems like 
this exist for the sake of computation. Computing and processing an input to produce a 
manipulated output, available to other systems or to conscious experience, is the purpose of 
such an arrangement of matter in the brain. Evaluative computational systems are not only 
complex entities, they are also there to function as a producer of input for other processes in 
the brain, and ultimately to realise cognitive states. Input is acted upon by a causally 
underwritten computational system. Now, causal mechanisms in the brain are either acting 
upon data, or they are reacting to data. Computational processes exist to act upon data, but 
what of the data that is reacted to by causal processes in the mind? Such a relation – a 
directly causal relation between data and the matter of the mind which it encounters – is what 
characterises the realisation of affective mental states. It is the by-passing of complex 
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evaluative computational systems by certain types of immediately represented data that 
results in affective states. 
 
To summarise the answer to the first question (what is the nature of the mechanism by which 
affective mental states are realised?): affective mental states are realised when the 
communicative act contributes an immediately represented input that is not acted upon by 
complex sets of evaluative, propositional-computational processes, but rather acts upon the 
matter of the brain in a directly causal manner. Such a situation will result in the realisation of 
an affective mental state. The nature of this mental state will provide the answer to the second 
question posed above: is a situation analogous to the inference of beliefs from cognitive 
mental states present with regard to affective mental states, given that inference only occurs 
when content is propositional in nature? 
 
I would like to argue that there is a roughly analogous situation with regard to affective brain 
states. For lack of a better term, we can say that affective states lead to the apprehension of 
affects. (I have purposely chosen to avoid the term ‘emotions’ in favour of ‘affects’, as 
‘emotion’ has too narrow a connotation.) Take, for example, a communicative act that results 
in an affective state (the Tchaikovsky example is a good one). After experiencing such a 
stimulus, we should expect a state to be present that has been arrived at via directly causal 
processes. With the Tchaikovsky example (a loud, sudden orchestral chord after a long period 
of quiet respite that was ended with an extremely soft downward line in the bassoon), one 
could conceivably imagine a state of alarm. Such a state has been affected by directly causal 
processes, and was not arrived at by a set of computational procedures similar to those 
described in relation to cognitive states. This state leads to awareness of an affect: in our 
example, the affect that we often name ‘alarm’. How would this sort of affect differ from 
propositional attitudes, which result from cognitive brain states? Most noticeable is that the 
state is non-propositional, and therefore, no inferences can be made from it. What is there to 
make an inference about? Can one state of alarm provide the means by which we can make 
inference about other states of alarm? Of course, we can name the state, but this sort of 
naming simply points to the particular affect, and does not explain the characteristics of that 
affect (or class of affects).  
 
Thus, affective states lead to the apprehension of affects, and neither affects nor affective 
states are propositional in character. It follows that affects cannot be verbalised (although 
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they can be named, and those names can be used in propositions). They are, in essence, 
beyond verbal description. Affects are ineffable, being cases of non-propositional content. 
The qualities of affects like alarm, or possibly even a sense of foreboding triggered by a 
sequence of musical sounds, are not expressible in terms of propositions, and are not the 
products of cognitive states and evaluative computational procedures. 
 
 
2.6 The argument so far 
 
Let us take stock of the present state of the argument. Communicative acts have the principal 
purpose of eliciting a desired mental state in the mind of the listener. If the desired mental 
state is achieved in the mind of the listener, we can say that the utterer’s communicative act 
has been successful. In principle, anything that can be thought can be communicated, 
provided a communicative medium capable of articulating those thoughts and a community 
of at least two people that understand that medium. Some sorts of thoughts are only 
expressible in a certain medium – these thoughts are unique. Others are translatable in other 
communicative media. The principal reason for choosing one communicative medium over 
its translation in another is ease of use, although what is capable of being communicated in a 
particular medium is also a major motivating factor. 
 
Meaning, it was claimed, is constituted in the mind by at least two co-existing mental states: 
cognitive states and affective states. Cognitive states are the result of processes in the mind 
that are in a deep sense underwritten by causal relations. These processes are complex, and 
serve an evaluative, propositional-computational function. This means that they exist 
independently of the data that they compute. The outputs of these evaluative computational 
processes result in cognitive states, which are propositional in character. Cognitive states lead 
to propositional attitudes (such as beliefs, hopes, etc. – that-clauses). Cognitive states are 
instances of propositional content in the mind. Affective states, on the other hand, are the 
result of directly causal processes in the mind. Here, the immediately represented input stands 
in a directly causal relation to the resultant state; there is no intermediary system of causal 
relations constituting further computational processes which act upon the input. Affective 
states result in the awareness of affects. Affective states are non-propositional. This means 
that they cannot of themselves be part of computational procedures, and nothing can be 
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inferred from them. They are also not expressible in the form of propositions: they are in 
effect ineffable with respect to our linguistic abilities. 
 
Our next task will be to continue the analogy between music and language, in an attempt to 
see how far it can be stretched. It has already been noted that music and language, both being 
communicative media, serve to elicit changes in the mental states of listeners. These states 
are either the product of directly causal or causally-underwritten, propositional-computational 
procedures. Together, these two sorts of states account for the perceived ‘meaning’ of a 
communicative act, as they are forms of content in the mind of the listener. In short, a 
listener’s perception of the meaning of an utterance is reducible to content represented by 
cognitive and affective states. When we talk about a listener’s perception of the meaning of a 
piece of music or a linguistic act, we are in fact talking about a composite of these two types 
of mental state. The analogy between music and language stems from their common 
classification as communicative acts. Hence both elicit cognitive and affective mental states 
in the mind of listeners.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STRUCTURE, SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND CONTEXTUAL MEANING IN MUSIC 
AND LANGUAGE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we noted that music and language can both be considered as 
communicative media, and that the meaning of an utterance in a communicative medium is 
realised in the apprehender’s mind by two sorts of co-existing mental states. These mental 
states differ in terms of the mechanisms by which they are achieved. It was suggested that 
complex, evaluative and propositional-computational processes acting on data, but remaining 
independent of that data, were the sort of processing mechanisms that led to what was termed 
cognitive states. In such cases, data underwent the operations of a computational system in 
the mind. Cognitive mental states are of the sort that allow for the formation of propositional 
attitudes, such as beliefs, which essentially constitute cognitive states themselves. It can also 
be noted that cognitive mental states are truth-apt, and can only process the type of data that 
is represented in the mind in propositional format. On the other hand, affective mental states 
were the result of the immediately represented communicative stimulus not being subjected 
to computational processing, but rather eliciting the mental state in a directly casual fashion. 
Such mental states were not propositional in character, nor could truth-aptness be assigned to 
them. Rather, the sort of content comprising them was termed non-propositional content 
(NPC). It was also suggested that affective mental states are termed affects – that is, states of 
alarm and so on. 
 
The difference between the two mechanisms can be easily seen when one considers that 
every process in the mind is underwritten at a deep level by some sort of causal mechanism. 
This includes the constitution of the propositional-computational processes that result in 
cognitive mental states. While these processes are in reality made up of a complex of 
fundamentally casual mechanisms, they are independent of the data that is computed. Hence, 
the input data is not directly causing the resultant mental state; rather, it is happening in 
conjunction with an otherwise encapsulated computational procedure. On the other hand, 
with affective states, the input data is in a directly causal relationship with the resultant 
mental state. The immediately represented input data resulting in a cognitive state is 
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subjected to processing by computationally complex systems in the mind. Affective states, 
being constituted by non-propositional content, are not subject to evaluative, propositional-
computational procedures. It follows, per definition, that NPC cannot be expressed in the 
communicative medium of natural language. 
 
The following question now arises: if language and music are both communicative media, 
and communicative media elicit mental states in this manner, how do the two differ? At this 
point, it would seem that what has been asserted is that the elicitation of mental states in 
music and language do not differ in kind. How then, do they differ? In order to answer this 
question, it is necessary to once again take up the analogy between music and language. 
Where the analogy holds, we will be able to make assumptions about the nature of the two 
communicative media. Where the analogy begins to fail, we will have an indication of the 
differences between the two behaviours. 
 
 
3.2 Structure in music and language 
 
There are many compelling reasons to pursue an analogy between music and language. The 
literature on the neurological relations between music and language cognition is growing (e.g. 
Patel, 2008a; Peretz, 2006). However, what we wish to understand is whether this analogy 
can be pursued on a conceptual level, and specifically in the terms described in the previous 
chapter. To pursue this conceptual examination more closely, we will have to begin to 
distinguish between what parts of music and language contribute to the two sorts of co-
existing mental states. One aspect is the way in which musical and linguistic utterances are 
actually put together. The keen reader will note that in the following discussion of structure in 
music and language, I have assumed that there are constituent elements of which musical and 
linguistic utterances are composed. In language, these constituent elements are formatives 
and words, combined into phrases. With regard to music, I will later develop the view that 
there is a grouping principle, largely dependent on perceptual constraints, which demarcates 
similar structural units. For now, we will assume that music too is composed of discrete 
elements (such as individual notes of varying duration) that are combined to form musical 
utterances. 
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Music and language, it is often claimed, share certain structural similarities. Without yet 
examining the precise nature of these structural similarities, we should consider examining 
the idea that organised structure exists at all. This is hardly a controversial issue with regard 
to language: some orderings of English words make sense to English speakers, and others do 
not. Analogously, it would appear that in music, some orderings of notes seem to make 
musical sense, and others do not. It would seem therefore that there are acceptable and 
unacceptable ways to combine constituent elements in both communicative media. Violating 
these criteria of acceptability results in music or language that ‘doesn’t make sense’ to 
speakers and listeners that are fluent in the language and music in question.35 This implies 
that the sounds of communicative media are perceived and processed structurally, and 
violation of structural principles results in a lack of comprehension with regard to the 
utterance. In music, it would appear that there are many ways to combine sounds in making 
comprehensible and acceptable phrases. However, anyone who has listened to a toddler 
bashing randomly at a piano keyboard should be aware that there are also sequences of 
sounds that make no musical sense whatsoever. 
 
The fact that the order of constituent elements is significant to the comprehensibility of 
communicative acts allows us to say that both music and language have a syntactic dimension 
(on a particularly weak understanding of the term ‘syntax’). In other words, the ordering of 
the constituent elements that make up a linguistic or a musical utterance has an impact on the 
comprehensibility of that utterance (that is, our ability to make sense of it). At this point, we 
are not going to make any assumptions about the precise nature of this syntactical dimension, 
such as what precisely counts as well-formed with regard to syntax in music and language. 
All that needs to be noted for present purposes is that, with both musical and linguistic 
utterances, there are examples of well-formed and ill-formed statements. An ill-formed 
sentence is incomprehensible: we may be able to find out what the words mean, but if they 
are haphazardly combined, we will be unable to make any judgement regarding the meaning 
of the sentence as a whole.  
 
With an ill-formed utterance, syntax makes absolutely no contribution to our identification of 
a string of sounds as a communicative act. Take, as an example, a sentence in a natural 
                                                 
35 Another way to illustrate this is to imagine yourself as a blind anthropologist, encountering an undocumented 
society for the first time. It is conceivable that you would be able to distinguish musical from other (say) ritual 
sounds, because of the presence of basic syntactical principles in musical statements, even if you are not familiar 
with the intricacies of the musical style. These principles are the focus of the fifth and sixth chapters. 
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language that is simply a random jumble of words, with no ordering whatsoever. Unless it is 
well-formed by complete chance, the listener will have to depend on other cues to identify the 
string of sounds as an unsuccessful communicative act. Recognisable words with agreed-
upon meanings are used in sentences like “Man dog bite”, and their combination in the act of 
elocution accounts for us identifying this as a communicative act of some kind. But the 
syntactical ordering of the words is ill-formed, and does not contribute to communication in 
any way.36 Analogously, a random sequence of sounds that does not subscribe to syntactical 
principles will also not be recognisable as music. To identify a sequence of sounds as an 
attempt at a musical communicative act, we usually would have to rely on other cues. The 
example of a toddler bashing away at a keyboard is a paradigm case – the only thing that 
would link this sequence of sounds to the idea of a musical statement is the fact that the 
sounds are coming from a well-known musical instrument.37 Ignoring intentionality, the need 
for a performer, and the aims of communication for the moment, a random sequence of 
sounds in nature can only be heard as a musical statement if they happen to satisfy syntactical 
demands in some way (for example, a regular pulse, identifiable pitches in a well-formed 
order, and so on).  
 
One may note that there is a grey area with regard to the well-formedness of statements: 
sentences that are, strictly speaking, ill-formed, but we are still able to correct in our heads. 
An example is simply omitting words from a sentence, such as “Charlie fell down hole”, 
which is missing an article such as ‘a’ or ‘the’. Here, we are still able to figure out meaning to 
a large extent, namely, that Charlie has fallen down some or other hole. However, with “Man 
dog bite”, we cannot work out much beyond the fact that the sentence is about a man, a dog, 
and either a noun or a verb in the form of ‘bite’, if there is no pragmatic context to help us. 
We cannot identify a subject and a verb phrase, and hence we cannot attribute an action to 
either the dog or the man. We will return to this grey area, because something analogous is to 
be found in the syntax of musical statements: statements that are not quite well-formed, but 
recognisable in terms of musical syntax. 
 
                                                 
36 Unless, of course, there is an appropriate pragmatic context. For example, the ill-formed utterance ‘Man dog 
bite’ is perfectly intelligible if there happens to be a man with a canine-inflicted injury present. In such a case, 
the listener will deduce from the context that what was intended was a communicative utterance that amounts to 
‘The man was bitten by the dog’. 
37 Another example is musical bottles. In that case, there are orderings of hitting bottles that are syntactical and 
understood as music, and others that are just heard as noise. 
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There is another feature of syntax that is notable at this point. Syntax in language cannot be 
perceived if the apprehender does not know the meaning of any of the words in the sentence. 
It is impossible to judge a sentence using French words as well-formed or not unless you are 
familiar with those French words. The French sentence may be of subject-predicate form, 
with a noun phrase and a verb phrase, but this knowledge is of little value to someone 
confronted with words whose meanings are completely alien. What words constitute the verb 
phrase, and which ones the subject? It is impossible to tell without some tentative knowledge 
of the lexicon of the language.38 We will return to this feature when we consider semantics 
below, as it holds interesting implications for our discussion of music. 
 
We have not ventured deeply into the differences between music and language in terms of the 
precise nature of their structuring principles, but we have stated firmly the premise that both 
language and music boast some sort of syntax (i.e., that the ordering of constituent elements 
makes a contribution to the comprehensibility of the utterance). We shall investigate syntax 
in more detail in later chapters, when our focus shifts to the details of musical syntax. We 
will also then briefly consider two claims that are often made, especially in evolutionary 
musicology: that the structuring of music is hierarchical, and that the structuring of music is 
recursive. Both of these claims deserve mention, but cannot be handled unless we are on firm 
conceptual ground. They are, however, of importance. Recursion is earmarked by some as the 
single distinguishing feature of linguistic computation (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002), and 
it would be of interest to see if and how it could be realised in musical utterances. For now, 
we will proceed to consider the issue of semantics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The reader should note that I have stopped short of saying that we must know the meaning of words in order 
to perceive the syntactical features of an utterance. Indeed, it is often the case that the syntax gives us the very 
meaning of a word. For example, the meaning of ‘bite’ is determined by the syntax in the following two 
examples: (a) “That’s a nasty bite” and (b) “He can bite you”. In (a), ‘bite’ functions as a noun (an injury); and 
in (b), ‘bite’ functions as a verb. Note also that the meaning of the sentence as a whole contributes to cases that 
would otherwise be equivocation: (c) “I need to draw some money, so I am going to the bank” and (d) “I want to 
catch a fish, so I am going to the bank”. Nonetheless, there are ambiguous sentences, such as (e) “Bill saw the 
boy with a telescope” (example from Gillon, 2008:376). Here, it is syntactically unclear whether Bill used a 
telescope to see the boy, or whether Bill saw a boy who had a telescope in his possession. In such cases, we are 
likely to rely on the context in which the sentence was uttered to interpret the intended meaning. 
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3.3 Semantics in music and language 
 
As with our discussion of syntax, we will have to forestall complexity in the following 
discussion of semantics. What we need at this stage is to establish what semantics is, and how 
it could be discussed in terms of our current project. Semantics, in colloquial terms, deals 
with meaning, usually understood as a quality or characteristic of natural and artificial 
languages. However, we are trying to explain ‘meaning’ in music, so a similar definition will 
not serve our purposes. Looking beyond matters of definition, we can note that semantics is 
studied by a group of people who are of considerable interest to our endeavours: analytic 
philosophers of language. Let us consider the term ‘semantics’ as it pertains to this field. 
Semantics is a discipline within analytic philosophy that is primarily concerned with studying 
the conditions under which sentences in a natural or artificial language can be said to be true 
or false.39 Stated in simpler terms, semantics can be said to be the philosophical discipline 
that studies how meaning is facilitated by a language.  
 
Consider the following definition, formulated by logician Alfred Tarski: “Semantics is a 
discipline which, speaking loosely, deals with certain relations between expressions of a 
language and the objects (or ‘states of affairs’) ‘referred to’ by those expressions” (Tarski, 
1944:435; his emphasis). The ‘relations’ posited by Tarski can be expressed as the truth or 
falsity of those expressions. An example will suffice to provide the flavour of such 
philosophical pursuits. Consider an English expression like this: 
 
(1) My cat is sitting on my bed. 
We say that this expression is true if and only if there is a state of affairs in the world, such 
that the cat that belongs to me is sitting on the bed in question. This state of affairs is the 
expression’s truth condition. If there is no cat, or it is not on my bed, or it is standing on my 
bed, or any other violation of the truth conditions, we say that the expression is false. If it 
were somehow logically impossible that my cat could sit on my bed, then we would either 
deem the expression false, or claim that it is somehow meaningless (this is a fine distinction, 
that depends largely on one’s theoretical position regarding the manner in which terms refer 
to reality). 
                                                 
39 Note that in linguistics, semantics is often construed as the study of the meaning of words or phrases, whereas 
in analytic philosophy it deals with the conditions under which propositions can be said to be true or false. 
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One should note, therefore, that in terms of semantics, expressions in two different languages 
that have identical truth conditions mean the same thing. Thus, (1) and the Afrikaans 
expression “My kat sit op my bed” mean the same thing, and the same state of affairs will 
render both true or false. (At any particular given time, the one cannot be true and the other 
false.) Therefore, it makes sense to say that whatever those two sentences mean, it is the 
meaning of the sentences that is true or false (if semantics alone is considered as the 
determinant of meaning). We call this meaning, this hypothetical ‘thing’, that is true or false, 
a proposition. Therefore, we can recast Tarski’s definition as a standard definition of 
‘semantics’ (SDS):  
 
(SDS): Semantics is a discipline which deals with certain relations between 
propositions and the objects or states of affairs referred to by those propositions. 
 
This immediately leads us to the question of whether music can be said to boast semantic 
qualities, when ‘semantics’ is this narrowly construed. The reader is likely to recall that 
earlier, we noted that if various musical statements had agreed upon meanings, accepted 
within a community of listeners, and that it was used to refer to things, then music would 
simply be a sort of language (with a small ‘l’). When music is not used in this manner, it does 
not handle propositions and therefore cannot bear truth.40 Here, I am in agreement with 
philosopher of music Peter Kivy (1990). Music, if it is used in a manner where sounds have 
been arbitrarily agreed upon by a linguistic community to refer to things beyond music, is 
acting as a language (albeit an ineffectual and clumsy one). Music can easily be made to 
mean something by convention, just like the sounds in language mean by convention. But 
music does not always function like this. Therefore, it would seem that semantics, defined as 
in (SDS), is not a necessary feature of meaningful music per se. With a bit of effort and the 
co-operation of a community of listeners and utterers, music can be made to behave like 
language, in that it is a system of organised sound acting semantically. But this is a feature 
stemming from the fact that both music and language have been found to be communicative 
media. The fact that there is a thing called language that handles propositions, and a thing 
called music that does not, suggests that at a level of analysis less fundamental than that of 
communicative media, there is a point of disanalogy between music and language. Language 
                                                 
40 Indeed, when one considers a view such as Stalnaker (1970), where semantics is defined as the study of 
propositions, it becomes clear that music has no semantics if it is unable to express propositions. 
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and music, at their extremes, differ in that the one handles propositional content and the other 
does not.41 We will see later that this difference can be explained in terms of the mechanisms 
by which music and language elicit mental states. 
 
Let us take stock. Semantics is defined according to (SDS), whereby it is seen as dealing with 
the relations between propositions and relevant states of affairs in the world. These relations 
are expressed as truth conditions. Language, with its ability to express propositions, has 
semantic characteristics. However, music can only have similar semantic characteristics if we 
treat it as a language, by assigning referents to sounds that have been agreed upon by a 
linguistic community. This is a matter of definition. While we have said that both music and 
language can be thought of as communicative media affecting the mental states of competent 
listeners, the case of semantics and language’s position as the handler of propositions seems 
to mark a major difference between the two communicative behaviours. When we treat music 
like a language, by assigning conventional meanings to the elements that comprise it, we are 
more inclined to think of it as a sort of language, because we understand language as being 
the communicative medium that has semantics.42 What is the importance of this observation, 
that the case of music having or not having semantics is a matter of definition? The effect of 
these remarks is that the case of music not having semantics is the outcome of what would 
otherwise simply be a verbal dispute: that arguments where music has semantics must define 
semantics as something broader, usually an all-encompassing conception of ‘meaning’; or 
erroneously treat non-programmatic music as if it has its own semantic dimension. 
Conventional symbolism does not, per definition, function in non-programmatic music. It is 
meaning in non-programmatic music that we are trying to explain. 
 
 
3.4 Non-communicative contextual ‘meaning’ 
 
A task that now remains for this introductory discussion of mental states and musical syntax 
is to account for an idea that can be found in much recent musicology, namely that the 
meaning of music is largely determined by the non-musical context in which it is heard 
                                                 
41 It is worth mentioning at this point that it is common practice for philosophers to talk of ‘meaning’ as if it 
were exhausted by semantics (truth conditions, reference, etc.). However, we have already adopted a much 
broader conception of meaning, as the amalgamation of mental states in the mind of a listener. 
42 A good example that immediately springs to mind is the use of leitmotivs in Wagner’s operas. An instance of 
a particular leitmotiv signalled to the listener that a particular character or concept should be brought to mind, by 
virtue of the fact that the leitmotiv was earlier directly associated with that character or concept. 
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(whether that context is social, political, gender-determined, economic, and so on). The 
pursuit of the contextual ‘meanings’ of music has been the focus of much mainstream 
musicology since the mid-1980s, and the term ‘meaning’ has been subjected to much misuse. 
Often, semantics is conflated with this sort of meaning. Alastair Williams, in a reflective 
book on the state of musicology, manages to discuss ‘semantics’ without ever defining it, 
tacitly equating it to some sort of conception of meaning that is largely determined by social 
“discourses” surrounding the music (Williams, 2001:42-47).43 Similar is Lawrence’s 
Kramer’s Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History (2002), which suggests that meaning 
in music is a socially determined affair, but fails to distinguish between social significance of 
music for people and the matter of meaning in terms of the intelligibility of musical 
utterances. Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s widely read Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of 
Music (1990), in its discussion of music as a system of ‘signs’, seems to equally blur any 
distinction between significance attributed to a musical piece by a listener and meaning as a 
property of the experience of musical utterances themselves.44 Nattiez, despite discussing and 
acknowledging a difference between meaning that is intrinsic to music and meaning that is 
extrinsic, further confuses issues by talking of “musical semantics” (e.g. 1990:9 fn).  
 
Seeing as we have already accepted the phenomenon of musical meaning as the experience of 
an amalgamation of mental states present in the mind of the listener in virtue of the causal 
properties of musical utterances, it would appear that non-musical cases have been ruled out. 
Our principal interest here is precisely those cases where it is the properties of the musical 
utterances themselves that determine the experience of music as meaningful. However, this 
second idea of ‘meaning’, as related to the extra-musical significance that a musical piece has 
for the listener, merits brief discussion. For this purpose, it is worthwhile distinguishing intra-
musical (intrinsic) meaning and contextual (extrinsic) meaning – but the reader should at all 
                                                 
43 In fact, the section Williams labels ‘Semantics’ is actually a discussion of narratives in discourse and music, 
and does not even mention the word semantics in any place but its title. With the opening sentence of the first 
chapter, Williams claims that a major concern in his book “is that music is embedded in discourses and 
surrounded by ideas that contribute to its meaning” (2001:1). He never goes on to define ‘meaning’ and 
distinguish the idea of meaning as anything other than social (for example, as a property of communicative 
acts). 
44 See, for example, his definition on p. 9 (Nattiez’s emphasis): “An object of any kind takes on meaning for an 
individual apprehending that object, as soon as that individual places the object in relation to areas of his lived 
experience – that is, in relation to a collection of other objects that belong to his or her experience of the 
world.”  
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times be aware that the use of the word ‘meaning’ in both concepts does not equivocate 
them.45  
 
We are going to accept the ‘context’ as all the factors that appear to affect the experience of 
music as meaningful for the listener, that are not derived from the properties of the music 
itself. The contextual dimension is far more unprincipled and variable than the sort of intra-
musical properties we have thus far been discussing. Broadly construed, there are two sorts of 
contextual determinants of meaning: (a) those that, despite not being intrinsic to the music in 
question, are dependant on features of the other determinants of meaning (such as structure 
and syntactical arrangement); and (b) those that are only very loosely attached to the music, 
and are not really dependant on the nature of its physical composition at all. ‘Attach’ is the 
operative word for case (b): the contextual determinant of this latter variety is the sort of 
significance that is implied when people associate pieces of music with specific events in 
life, events that are themselves extra-musical. For example, a particular song on the radio 
(lets say, a particularly jovial one) might evoke feelings of nostalgia, because the song was 
current in bygone youth. Clearly, the structural and syntactic nature of the song would not 
impinge on the feeling of nostalgia that accompanies a hearing of it.46 However, the case 
where the contextual determinant is somehow dependant on (but not intrinsic to or derived 
from) other music-specific determinants of meaning, is of interest. A similar view of meaning 
has been referred to as homological fit (Cook, 2001a:172) or affordance (Clarke, 2005), and 
it deserves more attention. However, we should first clarify the general notion of contextual 
determinants of meaning or significance a little further. 
 
We have already considered the fact that both music and language have structural features 
that contribute to our perception and comprehension of utterances, and are partly responsible 
for that perception of mental states we call ‘meaning’. By altering these fundamental 
structural features, we alter those mental states, and hence the perception of meaning.47 A 
cursory consideration of this fact about intra-musical meaning should put the nature of 
contextual determinants of meaning into perspective. The contextual determinants are not 
intrinsic to the music itself. Rather, these determinants can be divided into two groups, those 
                                                 
45 Koopman and Davies (2001:262) point out instances of a similar distinction being made between intra-
musical (or “formal”) meaning and extra-musical meaning. Examples, in respective order, are embodied and 
designative meaning (Leonard Meyer), intrinsic and extrinsic referring (Jean-Jacques Nattiez), introversive and 
extroversive semiosis (Roman Jakobson), and endosemantics and exosemantics (Wilfried Nöth). 
46 Indeed, this is none other than the ‘Darling, it’s our tune’ syndrome (Mithen, 2005:18). 
47 That is, intra-musical meaning. 
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that depend on the structure of the music, and those that don’t – (a) and (b) above. Alluded to 
above were those determinants that are not dependent on the music, case (b). What of those 
that are? Consider the following example, which we shall use to illustrate both sorts of 
contextual determinants. Operas by Wagner are not particularly well-received by the Israeli 
authorities, because of the composer’s anti-Semitic sympathies. However, there is nothing 
intrinsic to the musical structure of Wagner’s works that is anti-Semitic. Indeed, we can 
imagine a fictitious case where Wagner had written in the style of Mozart, and a lot of his 
music had become equally famous. In such a hypothetical situation, there would still be an 
association with the anti-Semitic attitudes of the composer. Wagner’s music, even if it were 
written in the style of Mozart, would still attract the ire of the Israeli authorities. This is 
plainly not because of the music itself, but rather because of the attitudes of its author. This 
sort of contextual meaning, equivalent to case (b), is associative, and it is essentially extra-
musical. 
 
However, it is sometimes the case that a piece of music seems to lend itself well to particular 
interpretations, and not others. Successful interpretations would not work as well if the 
manner in which the music is constructed had been different. In other words, this sort of 
meaning is dependent for its validity on properties of the music in question. This is akin to 
case (a), discussed above. A particularly famous example is that of Susan McClary, who 
likened the arrival of the recapitulation in the first movement of Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony to the “murderous rage of a rapist incapable of attaining release” (McClary, 1991; 
as quoted in Treitler, 1993:36). Setting the controversy that this statement generated aside, it 
would be difficult to imagine that McClary could have arrived at this colourful interpretation 
had the recapitulation begun with a quiet statement of the opening theme, instead of 
crescendo and loud bravado. McClary’s ‘reading’ of this part of the music is not intrinsic to 
the music itself, but it is compatible with it. Her view would not have been tenable had 
Beethoven instead chosen to reduce the excitement at this point. Note that the murderous rage 
of a rapist is not encoded in the music. It is something that McClary brings to the music 
herself, and the music is of such a nature that her contribution has in some quarters been 
taken seriously.  
 
Clarke (2005) has suggested that in cases like this, the music itself affords particular 
interpretations, but at the same time does not afford others. This is similar to the way in 
which a chair affords sitting to a tired person. In a bar fight, the same chair would afford the 
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function of a weapon, even if it was not designed to perform this duty. But the chair could 
never afford making coffee, or printing a thesis. These sorts of things are beyond the logical 
possibilities that the chair affords. Similarly, the Beethoven example that provoked 
McClary’s much-discussed interpretation could afford several others: calamity, bravura, the 
menacing return of a diabolical main character in a plot, and so on. But it could not afford the 
image of an idyllic pastoral scene.  
 
Note that a similar scenario exists for language as well. Both spoken and written language 
can be seen as having an extra-linguistic dimension of meaning over and above that governed 
by the grammar and the meaning of the words. For example, a sentence out of Mein Kampf 
has, for 21st century readers, the added dimension of being written by Hitler, which results in 
associative extra-linguistic meanings. However, this added meaning – or better yet, this 
added significance – is independent of the grammar and the meaning of the words concerned 
(provided, of course, that we have chosen a fairly politically neutral sentence from the book). 
Likewise, singular words or phrases can have connotations for a particular community, that 
they do not have for other communities. The fact that these connotations are peculiar to one 
community and not another shows that they are not intrinsic to the nature of the utterance 
itself.  
 
Therefore, contextual determinants of musical and linguistic meaning are of two varieties: 
those that are afforded by the utterance (McClary’s Beethoven), and those that are totally 
independent of the utterance (nostalgia for old pop tunes). Both these determinants are not 
intrinsic to the utterance itself: two listeners in different environments and contexts will have 
different ideas of this sort of meaning. Contextual determinants of meaning are generally 
extra-communicative, although it is easy to imagine them being employed pragmatically in 
the service of communication. One could say that the utterance does not of itself elicit this 
sort of thing: rather, music either provides the means (by affordance), or the listener simply 
imposes a general meaning of his or her own, irrespective of the structure of the utterance 
(extra-musical).48  
 
 
 
                                                 
48 The use of the word ‘meaning’ in this sentence illustrates the sort of equivocation that takes place in the vast 
majority of discussions about musical meaning. 
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3.5 Some more comments about syntax 
 
We have noted that the contextual determinants of meaning are divorced from the utterance 
itself. Communicative acts in and of themselves only result in the elicitation of cognitive and 
affective states in the mind of the listener with determinants that are intrinsic to those acts. It 
should thus be clear that the sorts of significance-relevant scenarios that have been listed as 
contextual are not intrinsic to the communicative act, although they may depend on an act’s 
structure and be used to communicate pragmatically. Turning our attention to music, it would 
make sense to say that if music has a set of ‘design features’ as a communicative medium, we 
would expect that the contextual determinants of meaning may take advantage of them. But 
these design features were not tailored for contextual determinants per se. The way music is 
put together may enable views such as that of McClary, but it would not make sense to say 
that the facilitation of such interpretations is the reason that music is put together the way that 
it is. Rather, it makes more sense to say that the structure of music is anchored in its nature as 
a sort of non-semantic communicative medium. Contextual determinants are no doubt 
exploited by composers – that is, after all, what musical quotation and stylistic parody is all 
about. But it would be difficult to substantiate the claim that written into the architecture of 
music are elements of the music’s context. There is no reflection of society in the way in 
which utterances in natural language are put together – syntax does not reflect context. 
Rather, the way that they are put together reflects cognitive and processing demands. 
 
Music and language both have a syntactical dimension, and this dimension makes a 
difference to whether we perceive an utterance as well-formed or not. Earlier, two issues 
were mentioned which we must now take up. First, it was mentioned that there is a grey area 
with regard to the perception of well- and ill-formed utterances in music and language. It 
seems to be that some utterances are perfect in terms of grammaticality or the rules of a 
musical style, while others are less perfect but still comprehensible as instances of music or 
spoken language. On the other end of the spectrum, there are a large proportion of utterances 
that are perceived as ill-formed, and if it wasn’t for our knowledge of the meaning of the 
elements making up the utterance, or other cues such as observation, we would not recognise 
the utterance as a communicative act. Second, we must address the idea that in language we 
need to know the meaning of (most of) the words in a sentence before we can grasp the 
syntax, whereas in music we have no semantics to speak of with which to help in the 
identification of syntactical cues. Let us take these issues up in order. 
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The idea that there is a grey area between well- and ill-formed utterances in communicative 
media is best illustrated with musical statements. If music has a syntax, it would seem that a 
phrase (thought of as functionally equivalent to a sentence in language) would be able to be 
so ill-formed and random in construction that one would not recognise it as a statement of a 
musical nature. For instance, a random, unprincipled sequence of notes played on a piano by 
a toddler lacks syntax, and is hence not perceived as music. Rather, the sounds produced on 
such an occasion are ‘just notes’, and the only real reason that we hear them as ‘notes’ is 
because the toddler happens to be eliciting sounds from an object that is often used to make 
music. This is an example of an ill-formed musical utterance. On the other hand (and once 
again, without intricate details), if our toddler played ‘Happy Birthday’, this would be an 
example of a well-formed musical statement. However, if our toddler played every third note 
of ‘Happy Birthday’ a semitone flat, then most would probably recognise it as ‘Happy 
Birthday’ – just with wrong notes. The wrong-note version is an example of an utterance 
inhabiting the grey area between well- and ill-formed utterances. Note that if we had an 
example of ‘Happy Birthday’ in which every note was incorrect, or if we had an example 
where so many notes differed from the tune that we would not be able to recognise it as a 
musical piece, the utterance would be judged as ill-formed. Of course, in such cases, the 
passage could be played with different notes, and then simply end up as a different piece that 
is well-formed. But if the order of notes was not syntactical, it would be no different from the 
toddler bashing away at the keys of the piano. 
 
The reader should note at this point that the old philosopher’s chestnut, ‘How many wrong 
notes need to be played before a piece by Bach is no longer a piece by Bach?’, is in part a 
perceptual issue. The importance of this problem to music philosophy at large is because of 
its links to the question of the ontology of musical works. The problem and the question of 
whether it is at all relevant will be taken up in the final chapter of this study. What should 
rather be asked (from a perceptual point of view) is the question regarding when sounds cease 
to be music at all. Setting aside the issue of style in the musical genre or culture in question, 
as soon as we are not able to perceive a piece of music as well-formed to any degree, we are 
faced with an ill-formed utterance that is unrecognisable and non-syntactical. In such cases a 
piece of music ceases to be perceived as a piece of music. The perception of music is of 
importance here, and one should carefully distinguish between questions about the ontology 
of a ‘musical piece’ as a philosophical question, and the perception of music as a cognitive-
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perceptual issue. Few would deny the term ‘music’ to John Cage’s compositions, but it is 
clear that there is no perception of musical utterances going on in a piece like Imaginary 
Landscape No. 3.  
 
This brings up an interesting question that has been raised with regard to accounts of musical 
syntax such as those of Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) and Raffman (1993): if we are willing 
to accept ‘Happy Birthday’ as a well-formed utterance, and ‘Casta Diva’ from Bellini’s 
Norma as one too, why are we more inclined to say that Bellini’s aria is more profound or 
moving? If one accepts that this is a valid question, then any sense of profundity cannot be a 
function of well-formedness, as both pieces are well-formed.49 Roger Scruton, in The 
Aesthetics of Music (1997), has made precisely this argument, specifically against Raffman’s 
account of ineffable musical experiences. Scruton’s argument was geared against Raffman’s 
computational explanation of ineffability. Ineffability, claims Scruton, “is a mark of the 
aesthetic experience, in all its higher forms” (1997:200). In short, Scruton believes that the 
aesthetic experience of music cannot be reduced to a computational description such as 
Raffman’s (with profundity and ineffability being part of aesthetic experiences).50 I will 
argue otherwise when we pick up on the question of ineffability later. However, for now it 
should be noted that well-formedness is not the source of any sense of profundity attributed 
to pieces of music. But I will argue that well-formedness is a contributor to the mental states 
that afterwards account for our sense of aesthetic experience as a qualitative experience. 
 
The second major problem that we had to address was the fact that, in language, one has to 
understand the majority of the words being used in an utterance before the syntax can be 
properly discerned. Granted, there are other factors, such as perceptual cues and phrasing, 
that allow us to distinguish the various elements that go into a linguistic utterance. However, 
a large part of grammar’s contribution to the meaning of a linguistic utterance can only be 
discerned if the majority of the words of which the sentence is comprised are understood. A 
problem arises when we try to consider musical utterances in an analogous fashion. There 
                                                 
49 Note that ‘Happy Birthday’ and ‘Casta Diva’ are both well-formed (or, at least it must be assumed so for the 
purposes of our argument). One is not more well-formed than the other. Therefore, one cannot say that 
profundity (or related senses of awe) is related to the degree of well-formedness. 
50 Note that Scruton’s use of ‘aesthetic’ is a name for what he considers artful, and not a term covering the 
experience of beauty (or other features) in general. Scruton would not say that listening to Nirvana allows for 
any experience of ‘the aesthetic’. However, I use ‘aesthetic’ in a broader sense, allowing discussion of ‘the 
aesthetics of Nirvana’, for instance. In other words, my use of ‘aesthetic’ is not prescriptive, but rather 
descriptive. 
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appear to be no ‘words’ to understand, so as to make better sense of the syntactical elements 
of the phrase. This is a major disanalogy between music and language. To answer this 
question fully, we will have to consider the constituent elements of musical utterances that 
are put together in a syntactical fashion, and we will have to consider how these differ from 
the words that make up phrases in natural languages. It is this disanalogy that is a key to 
understanding why language and music differ in terms of communication. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CAUSAL MECHANISMS AND AFFECTIVE STATES IN MUSIC AND LANGUAGE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As we are implored by cognitive musicologists Patrik Juslin and John Sloboda (2001b:3), any 
science of music must explain the emotional responses that are often closely tied to musical 
experience. That music can have a powerful grip on our emotional lives seems to be a fact 
that is so often pointed out that it has become a cliché. Music, we are often told, is a language 
of emotion and a way of expressing ourselves. The expression of emotion or affect is the sort 
of thing that prompts us to engage in musical and other artistic activities. Leonard Meyer has 
put forward a theory where the entire concept of musical meaning is principally predicated on 
emotion (Meyer, 1956). Cooke (1959) has claimed that music is a language of emotion. 
Arguments about music’s emotional-expressive powers have also been at the heart of 
philosophical arguments such as those of Davies (2003) and Kivy (1990; 2002). There have 
been numerous investigations into the psychological nature of the emotions elicited by music 
(e.g. Juslin & Laukka, 2003, is an excellent and comprehensive example; as is Juslin & 
Sloboda, 2001a). 
 
The idea has also crept unexamined into other sorts of musical scholarship, including 
evolutionary musicology. Brown (2000) contends simply that music’s meaning is emotion, 
and that music and its postulated evolutionary precursor are communicative media tailored to 
express emotion. On a firmer conceptual and empirical footing, Dissanayake (2008) suggests 
that we may find music’s origins in infant-directed speech, the original purpose of which was 
the regulation of emotion in infants. Mithen (2005) suggests that the rationale behind musical 
behaviour is emotional expression. However, the idea that emotional expression is 
universally intrinsic to musical activities is not entirely supported by ethnographic evidence 
(Cross & Woodruff, 2008). Take, for example, Venda children’s songs. The famous study by 
Blacking (1967, but see also his 1976) contains numerous examples of songs whose 
functional existence is not predicated on emotional expression, but rather on the didactic 
virtues of the text and the actions that accompany performance. 
 
 65 
Care must be exercised when considering an ‘emotional’ account of music. Precisely what do 
these authors mean with the term ‘emotion’? In general, one can take for granted that they 
mean mental states such as those of happiness, sadness, anger, and so on. But what of 
apprehension? Or fear? Or a feeling of elation that accompanies the triumphant ending of 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony? Or the emotional flavour of blues music? The generally 
aggressive timbre of the heavy metal genre? And what of the sense of profundity that often 
accompanies musical experiences? It would appear that such ‘emotions’ are also of the sort 
that Juslin and Sloboda would like a science of music to explain. But is ‘emotion’ not a 
misleading term for all these diverse mental states? Is a sense of profundity or a sense of 
foreboding distinguishable from baser, more general emotional states such as sadness and 
happiness? And is it a foregone conclusion that musical experience will always have this sort 
of emotional dimension? I will be assuming that such distinctions can indeed be made. 
However, for the purposes of this study, it would not appear immediately necessary that this 
distinction needs to be painstakingly delineated. After all, a sense of foreboding and the 
emotions elicited by a piece sensed to be joyful are both examples of affective states. A sense 
of foreboding and a state of happiness are both non-propositional mental states. Hence the 
use of the term affect: this term seems broad enough to encompass emotions such as 
happiness and sadness; as well as general ‘moods’ that may be induced or attributed to 
musical pieces and the more complex sorts of feelings sometimes experienced when listening 
to music, such as a sense of profundity or foreboding. Any mental state that is non-
propositional is an affective state, and has all of the essential qualities that have thus far been 
attributed to such states.   
 
The explanation that we are about to encounter has already been mentioned with regard to 
another complexity of the experience of music – the idea that something ineffable is 
expressed by musical statements (Raffman, 1988; 1983; Scruton, 1997). (Often, the matter 
regarding emotion and music is further complicated when authors such as Raffman speak of 
‘ineffable feelings’.) It is with the directly causal processes that result in affective states in the 
mind that we will look for answers to our questions about ineffability in music. We will need 
to expand and further elucidate our theory of affective states, and the causal means by which 
they come into existence. This explanation will undercut arguments such as those of Davies 
and Kivy, which seek to explain where in the musical process ‘emotion’ is to be accounted 
for. Instead, we will consider music as a communicative medium that can be used to induce 
certain types of mental states in the minds of listeners; types of mental states that include, but 
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are not limited to, the nebulous concept ‘emotion’ and ineffable feelings. Put crudely, musical 
statements, like other communicative acts, thus serve the purpose of changing the mental 
states of others. There is no need to pursue a line of argumentation suggesting that music 
‘expresses’ emotional content. A musical communicative act changes the mental state of 
competent listeners. The resultant mental state may indeed be a state that we can classify as 
an emotion, but it needn’t be. It could be a sense of foreboding or profundity; it could be 
relatively inefficacious in terms of affect. Indeed, in the theory that I am about to describe, 
we will see that musical activity does not have hard-and-fast principles regarding whether 
this or that mental state is achieved by listeners, or the degree to which such states are 
affective. However, it is with the two types of mental states that we described earlier that 
communicative acts in general do their business. Of the afore-mentioned mental states, 
cognitive states and affective states, it is the latter to which we will now turn. In doing so, I 
would like to conceptually account for the purported emotional and ineffable content of 
musical experience. 
 
 
4.2 Affective states and language 
 
The reader will recall that we considered two sorts of mental states, cognitive and affective, 
which constitute the mental manifestation of what is commonly called ‘meaning’ in 
communicative media like music and language. The point of musical and linguistic 
statements is to induce the listener to form cognitive and affective states that are at least 
analogous to those that the utterer intends. Cognitive states were said to be the result of 
evaluative, propositional-computational processes in the mind. Examples of cognitive states 
are that- states: X believes that Y, X fears that Y, X hopes that Y. (These sorts of states are 
often referred to as propositional attitudes.) Affective states, on the other hand, were said to 
be the result of directly causal processes, where the stimulus (the communicative act 
represented in the mind) is in a directly causal relationship to the resultant mental states. 
Affective states are states of fear, alarm, happiness, and so on. It is now our task to consider 
the idea of affective states more closely. A number of peculiar properties were ascribed to 
affective states earlier. For instance, it was said that affects are the sorts of things that can be 
named, but beyond that, are essentially ineffable and beyond verbal description. This is a 
direct result of the fact that affective states are non-propositional in character. Affective states 
are also not parts of processes of deductive computation, as such computation can only 
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proceed on mental content that is propositional in character. The affect ‘fear’ cannot be part 
of a logical operation; however, the cognitive state of ‘fearing that Y’ may well be.  
 
Emotional mental states are states of mind such as sadness, anger, happiness, and so on, and 
are examples of typical affective states. We can satisfy ourselves with a fairly loose definition 
of ‘emotion’, because such mental states are subsumed by the class of states we have been 
calling affective states (and hence, once again, the use of the term ‘affect’ instead of 
‘emotion’). The vast majority of emotions that we feel inclined to accept as instances of 
‘emotions’, as well as a whole host of private feelings for which we do not necessarily have 
names, are cases of affective mental states. Affective states also account for other sorts of 
feelings that we may not easily think of as emotions – such as benevolent feelings, feelings 
associated with suspicion, and so on. Also included are other sorts of states, such as the state 
of fright (which many would hesitate to classify as an emotion), as well as those sorts of 
occasionally non-intentional emotions referred to as ‘moods’.51 Affective states also subsume 
the sort of feeling that accompanies the alleged expression of loftier ideals in music and 
literature; the sorts of objects of expression that prompt people to describe works as virtuous 
or profound. The state of profundity is an affective state (but note that the belief that 
something is profound is a cognitive state). So, when John Blacking suggests that certain 
passages in the third movement of Mahler’s Tenth Symphony “express something about life 
and death and man’s struggle for fulfilment and spiritual peace” (1976:61), he is attempting 
to describe a sort of affective state that he experiences. Note that Blacking says that the music 
expresses “something” about those topics – a case in point regarding the ineffability of such 
feelings. 
 
Our account of musical experience is going to deal with affective states to a large degree. 
Indeed, the idea will be forwarded that, in the absence of semantics, music monopolizes 
affective states. However, both cognitive and affective states are common to the apprehension 
of all communicative and expressive media. To illustrate the difference between cognitive 
and affective states more clearly, and to prepare for the discussion that follows, let us turn to 
spoken language for a few more examples. Imagine a situation where a researcher angrily 
                                                 
51 Some possible further clarification: moods are taken as non-intentional because they appear to have no object 
of intentionality. When you wake up in the morning in a foul mood, there is often no particular thing with which 
you are angry. Of course, some event may have triggered your mood, and in that case, it may be more accurate 
to say that your general attitude is being influenced by your attitude toward that particular event. Drawing such 
distinctions is a prime example of how difficult handling concepts such as ‘emotion’ and ‘mood’ can be, as well 
as serving as an example of why that broader concept of ‘affect’ was chosen over ‘emotion’. 
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reprimands a student for speaking loudly in the library. Let us say that this researcher is 
particularly short-tempered, and shouts angrily and at the top of his voice: “You are not 
allowed to talk in the library!” Ignoring for the moment the requisite perceptual processing of 
phonemes and similar elements needed for understanding speech, we could say that the 
comprehending listener (the student) will simultaneously experience the two sorts of afore-
mentioned mental states: cognitive and affective states. Now, the data that can be 
computationally encoded in a propositional manner – the semantic meaning of the sentence, 
and truth-apt statements regarding the manner of performance – will form the cognitive state. 
However, one could easily see, because of the manner of the sentence’s delivery, that the 
researcher did not merely want to point out that talking in the library is forbidden. He actually 
wanted to tell the student to keep quiet. On a particularly strict semantics, it is obvious that 
this is not the linguistic meaning of the sentence in isolation. The part of the utterance that is 
conveying this information – the fact that the researcher would like the student to keep quiet 
– is the manner in which the utterance is delivered in combination with the pragmatic context. 
(We will ignore pragmatic context for now.) It is the mental representation of this aspect of 
the meaning that leads to the affective state. The affective state resulting from the 
researcher’s impassioned utterance is the listener’s reaction to the researcher’s anger, as 
expressed in his tone of voice. Anger (or something analogous to it, such as extreme 
irritation) was precisely what the researcher had wished to let the student know about. If the 
researcher is very intimidating, the reactionary affective state in the mind of the listener may 
be one of fear, or at least something very similar. This state, the state of fear, is the affective 
state. Note that the student’s belief that the researcher is angry, the belief that she is in a state 
of fear, and any pragmatic deductions, are all cognitive states distinct from the affective state 
of fear itself. The actual state of fear, and not propositional attitudes, are the affective states 
(that is, the affects). 
 
Let us take another example. Imagine an utterance in a language that the listener does not 
understand. For instance, our ill-tempered researcher may be French, and makes a 
semantically identical utterance to the one above, only in his native tongue. The listener, the 
student, does not understand the French language. In such a case, the content of the cognitive 
state is greatly diminished. However, there will be a certain degree of intent that could be 
apprehended by the student by virtue of the manner of performance of the utterance. The 
researcher would usually count on the semantic meaning of the sentence being conveyed 
along with the additional determinant of meaning in the form of the angry manner in which 
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the sentence is uttered. The researcher intends that both aspects of his utterance are 
apprehended by the noisy student. Because of her inadequacy with regard to French, the 
student will not be able to reach a cognitive state with regard to the semantic meaning of the 
utterance. However, she will be able to ascertain that the utterance is being delivered in a way 
that conveys the researcher’s anger about something. The listener will once again experience 
the affective state of fear, as a result of the apprehension of the manner of delivery of the 
utterance by the researcher. Hence, the affective state of fear is still achieved.52 The listener 
will be able to entertain cognitive states such as the belief that the researcher is angry or that 
the researcher is using a particular tone of voice to emphasise what he is saying. However, 
the listener will not be able to have a cognitive state about the semantic content of the 
utterance, or any other cognitive state that is logically entailed by the semantics of the 
utterance, simply because she does not understand French. 
 
As a third example, consider an artificial language which has semantics, but seems to lack an 
effective mode of delivering statements featuring an affective component. (That is, a case 
where the modality of a statement of the language has no consequence for affect.) This is an 
interesting example. Let us postulate a language, called Binary Language (BL), and say that it 
has a dual purpose as a programming language for computers, and as a language in which a 
community of speakers is competent. Now, the language can state the most mundane things 
about objects, such as this sentence, translated into English: “File 3 has been deleted.” This 
sentence can be a statement of BL, written in a notation unique to BL, on a piece of paper. 
Granted that the community holds no strange conventions regarding the meaning of writing 
on pieces of paper, one could say that the performative aspect of this utterance has been 
minimized drastically, if not eliminated. There is no convention in writing that allows the 
writer to express the sentence of BL angrily or joyously: the modality of this statement results 
in no affects. However, the semantic content is plain to see. Cognitive states arising from this 
statement of BL include beliefs about the fate of File 3, beliefs that are logical implications of 
this statement (such as the belief that there is one less file present, or that File 3 will no longer 
be available for copying), and so on. However, the situation surrounding affective states is a 
bit more subtle. Without any inflection to add to the meaning (such as the sentence being 
uttered with an angry inflection), there is no affective state invoked by virtue of the 
                                                 
52 This is not necessarily an identical state of fear to the one that is elicited when she is able to understand the 
utterance (when the researcher speaks English). But an affective state of that sort will be experienced 
nonetheless, as a case of pure reaction to the performative qualities of the French utterance. 
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utterance’s performance. Of course, it may be the case that for the apprehender of the 
sentence, the deletion of File 3 is disastrous, and evokes a state of fear. It may be the case that 
File 3 is required to prove the apprehender’s innocence in a court of law. In such a case, the 
statement results in fear of punishment. Then we have an affective state of fear, as well as a 
cognitive state, namely, fear that one will be punished. But this affective state of fear was not 
caused by the performative aspect or manner of delivery of the utterance – it is caused by the 
semantic meaning of the utterance. If the utterance was written on paper and the reader did 
not understand BL, there would be no stimulus that would allow for the triggering of the state 
of fear. The state of fear for a competent apprehender is caused by the semantics of the 
statement, and is not a directly causal relation between the delivery of the utterance and the 
affective state. This is an important and subtle point, and one to which we will return, as it is 
the source of an interesting distinction between the causal processes underlying music and 
language. 
 
In the examples above, one would be able (in principle) to list the cognitive states (such as 
beliefs and other propositional attitudes) and the affective states (such as the state of fear) that 
are present in the mind of a particular listener. The last example (the artificial language, BL) 
is a case of affective states not being directly caused by the performance of utterances. 
Otherwise, the sorts of cognitive states elicited by utterances of natural language include both 
the semantics of the sentence (provided the listener is competent), and propositional attitudes 
about the semantics, pragmatics and performance of the utterance. The manner of 
performance is also closely tied to affective states. In terms of performance, a difference in 
articulation results in a different determinant of the meaning of the utterance as it is 
understood by the listener, when meaning is understood as being underwritten by these 
mental states. 
 
 
4.3 Affective states and music 
 
I have contended that the apprehension of both musical and linguistic utterances results in 
cognitive and affective states in the mind of a competent listener. We have considered three 
examples of how this occurs with regard to spoken language. Now, we turn to examples of 
musical utterances. In the course of the ensuing discussion, the reader will note that in the 
apprehension of musical utterances, affective states are far more pronounced than in 
 71 
linguistic utterances. This is interesting, because it seems to conceptually support the idea 
that in some respects music and language differ in degree and not in kind when it comes to 
the sorts of mental states that are elicited in the minds of listeners. As with linguistic 
utterances, we should take care to carefully describe the processes that occur in the following 
examples. 
 
When listening to a piece of music, there are several points that we may wish to remark upon. 
For instance, we may wish to comment on the way that the music is put together, such as the 
syntactical structure of various phrases, or how the music is constructed in traditional analytic 
terms. We may also remark on the pitches, the tonality, or other aspects of the musical work. 
We may also be led to philosophical discussions of whether the work is separate from its 
performance, or whether each performance is a manifestation of the work (e.g. Dodd, 2000; 
Ingarden, 1986). We will lay such concerns aside, and rather focus on perceptual issues. This 
means that we are concerned with individual performances. We may think that the 
performance of a particular piece was poor, or unremarkable, or particularly moving. We may 
also say, in the case of music that is familiar, that the piece has been performed or interpreted 
in a particular manner. Interpretation is usually exercised in terms of the technical execution 
of the piece, the way in which it was played. For example, a fast piece may be played 
‘aggressively’ or ‘neatly’ or ‘with relentless excitement’, and so on. It is these characteristics 
of performance, as well as the performance of the piece itself, that concern us when 
considering the elicitation of mental states from pieces of music (as opposed to the qualities 
of the ‘work’, when it is seen as being in a different ontological category than performances). 
 
Let us start by considering a piece of music, which is performed by an utterer. The utterer has 
an audience, the apprehender or listener. The aim of the utterer is to alter the mental states of 
the listener, usually to mental states that the utterer intends. Let us say that the utterer wishes 
to elicit a state of sadness in the listener, and let us say he achieves this goal by means of his 
musical performance. How can we describe this state of affairs? The listener’s mental states 
may be as follows. If the utterer has been successful, we would expect the listener’s mind to 
entertain a state of the sadness variety. This state of sadness is an affective state, and should 
not be confused with associated cognitive states. Cognitive states that are pertinent to this 
example will be states such as the belief that the music expresses sadness, or the belief that 
the utterance has indeed resulted in an affect, namely sadness, and anything propositional that 
can be said about the performance and the music itself. For now, consider simply the 
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affective state of sadness, present in the mind of the listener. Let us postulate that there are 
various varieties of ‘sad’ states, and that this one, in particular, is unique to musical 
expression (at least with regard to the state of knowledge of the utterer). In other words, this 
particular state of sadness, to the knowledge of the utterer, can only be communicated in a 
musical idiom, and by this musical utterance in particular. Only particular musical utterances 
will result in this sort of affective state of sadness.53 The utterer is successful in his 
communicative act if this particular state of sadness (or at least a similar one) is elicited in the 
mind of the listener, and we can accept that he is for the purposes of this example.54 
 
The affective state of sadness is in a directly causal relationship with the communicative 
stimulus (or, more accurately, the representation of the stimulus in the mind of the listener). 
The reader will remember that this is part of our general definition of affective states: 
affective states are directly caused by the actual act of elocution, as it is immediately 
represented in the mind. This affective state of sadness has not been achieved by means of 
deductive propositional-computational processes on represented data. The affect of sadness – 
the state in the mind of the listener – is not a type of content in the mind that is propositional 
in any way. It is purely a mental state, and it cannot be part of any logical operation, much in 
the same way that a chair cannot be part of a logical or computational operation. (Rather, 
propositions concerning or about chairs are involved in logical operations, but not chairs 
themselves.)  
 
At this point, the obvious elephant in the room is semantic cognitive states. Musical 
utterances are not semantic, so we would immediately expect that there are no semantic 
components to purely musical utterances, and hence no cognitive states that concern 
semantics. This is a point of difference between musical and linguistic utterances: musical 
utterances cannot elicit semantic cognitive states. But, as a result of the musical utterance, 
there are many other sorts of cognitive states that can arise. For instance, a belief that the 
utterance expresses sadness is such a cognitive state. Another sort of cognitive state involves 
the means by which the utterance is delivered: the listener may believe that the way that the 
                                                 
53 That is not to imply that musical statements only elicit music-specific affects. 
54 There is a certain amount of leeway to be expected in such cases. It is unlikely that the medium of music is 
able to reliably trigger the exact mental states that the utterer intends. However, the states triggered in a 
successful musical utterance will be of a similar class to those intended (for example, an intended state of 
sadness). This sort of ambiguity is discussed at length in Cross (2005).  
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musical statement is uttered is intended to communicate something. This latter instance is an 
inference from pragmatics.  
 
Take a familiar tune as another example: a folk song, such as ‘Greensleeves’. In a 
performance of this folk song, there will be cognitive and affective states elicited in the mind 
of the listener. Examples of cognitive states include propositional attitudes concerning the 
affective state itself, beliefs about the ultimate goal of the musical statement, beliefs about 
structural aspects of the music, and so on. The affective state will be a result of aspects of the 
performance whose immediate representation in the mind is in a directly causal relation with 
that state of mind, with no processes of computation or logical manipulation of propositional 
data. Changing aspects of the musical performance that are in a direct causal relationship 
with mental states will therefore result in a change in those mental states. In other words, if 
the directly causal parameters of the musical utterance are changed, different affective states 
will arise in the mind of the listener. If our folk song is performed in a particularly aggressive 
manner, corresponding affective states will be experienced by the listener.55 
 
The manner in which a particular folk song’s performance changes the affective state of a 
listener is an illustration of only one parameter of musical utterances that acts in a directly 
causal manner. The music itself (independent of its performance) can be constructed in such a 
way that it acts in a directly causal manner, thus resulting in affective mental states. The 
reader will recall the example of the sudden loud chord in the first movement of 
Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony. This is an example of a structural event in a musical piece 
that results in an affective mental state. An event such as this loud orchestral chord would 
elicit something like a state of alarm. The musical stimulus, as it is immediately represented 
in the mind, is in a directly causal relationship to the affective state of alarm. Other examples 
may include tension building figures such as the rhythmic sequences opening Mozart’s 
Rondo alla turca (from his sonata, K. 331) and Schubert’s Der Erlkönig, accelerandos and 
ritenuetos in general, and climaxes based on volume and increasingly thick orchestration 
(such as Ravel’s Bolero). These latter types of causal parameters are the sorts that are built 
                                                 
55 It should be mentioned that a particularly pertinent example of this is the heavy metal genre known as thrash 
metal, which was popular in the 1980s, especially in the United States of America. Harsh vocal timbre, high 
tempos, and aggressive distortion were combined with extremely quick successions of repeated notes to create 
an aggressive, driving sound. The sound of especially the electric guitar parts in this music is a prime example 
of affects being achieved by timbral and rhythmic means – almost, some would say, a direct translation of 
aggression into sound. 
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into musical figures, and they are the types of cases where we would expect to find a degree 
of universality. 
 
The actual composed structural features of musical utterances, and the manner in which an 
utterance is delivered, are two examples of aspects of the musical piece (as it is immediately 
represented in the mind) causally affecting brain states. These two aspects add to our 
perception that a piece of music is meaningful, by contributing to an amalgamation of 
affective and cognitive states in the mind. I have mentioned that music differs from language 
in that a far greater emphasis is placed on the elicitation of affective states, and that music 
does not have cognitive states that are in any way semantic. Music’s lack of semantics has 
already been accounted for, so now we should investigate more closely as to what parts of 
musical utterances serve as the directly causal triggers for affective states. 
 
 
4.4 More detail about parts of musical utterances resulting in affective states 
 
In summary, the process of arriving at an affective state in the mind of a listener can be 
described as follows. The musical stimulus is apprehended by the sense organs of the listener, 
after which it is encoded in such a manner as to be as direct a representation as possible in the 
mind of the listener. This is the immediate representation of the musical utterance in the mind 
of the listener, ‘translated’ into a sort of mentalese that allows for the remainder of the 
process. This part of the process is not necessarily conscious, for the representation will 
literally be unprocessed by any other perception-related mental organs. It is merely the 
musical act represented in ‘mind matter’. From here, there is some sort of elementary 
separation of those aspects of the representation that result in cognitive states and those that 
result in affective states. Those resulting in cognitive states must be able, in principle, to 
undergo propositional-computational procedures. In other words, the parts of the immediate 
representation that lead to cognitive states must be able to be manipulated by computational 
complexes in the mind. Such aspects of the immediate representation of the musical utterance 
are propositional in character. Note that not all aspects of the representation that are 
propositional in nature will necessarily become available to consciousness. Aspects such as 
the frequencies of individual overtones are apprehended and represented within the limits of 
the capabilities of our mental and physical apparatus. However, while the relative strengths of 
these overtones can be expressed in terms of propositions, they are not perceived as 
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overtones, but rather as a specific timbre. The aspects of the immediately represented musical 
utterance that do not fit the computational and propositional requirements are those that stand 
in a directly causal relationship with the mental states we label as affective, or otherwise have 
no relevant effect on our conscious mental states. 
 
This chapter began with a brief discussion of the idea that music is inextricably bound to our 
emotional lives. In the course of this discussion, further refinement of the term ‘emotion’ was 
abandoned in favour of the use of the word ‘affect’, to better account for the wide range of 
feelings often associated with musical experience. This simultaneously accounts for the idea 
that music is not merely about expressing emotion, but may also have a wider range of 
influence in inducing mental states that seem to be beyond verbal explication. In such a 
manner, we can account for the alleged ineffability of some musical experiences – the idea 
that music is used to communicate ideas that are somehow beyond verbal description, that we 
“come to know something that cannot be put into words” (Raffman, 1993:2). This idea of 
ineffability will be expanded upon in the next section, as it applies in some degree to all 
affective states.56 What will be considered now is the sort of aspect of a musical utterance 
that can serve to elicit affective states by directly causal means. 
 
What are examples of such directly causal aspects of musical utterances? In essence, there are 
two classes of characteristics that lead to affective states. The first of these has to do with 
those features of the musical utterance that are intrinsic to its perceived identity. The second 
class features those characteristics that are variable and independent of the utterance’s 
identity. Both these classes of affect-relevant characteristics lead to affective states by 
directly causal means. To illustrate the distinction between these two classes, consider the 
musical piece ‘Happy Birthday’. In any performance of ‘Happy Birthday’, we can change 
various parameters of the piece, such as the volume, the notes, the rhythm, or the tempo. 
However, some of these modifications change the identity of the piece. That is, when some 
types of changes are made, we are less inclined to recognise the piece as an instance of 
‘Happy Birthday’. If we change every interval from the original to some other syntactical 
interval (that is, the notes will all remain diatonic), a listener is unlikely to recognise the piece 
as ‘Happy Birthday’. Indeed, if we make enough changes, it may be thought of as a new 
                                                 
56 It is worth noting that the idea that music imparts knowledge of a kind that is not possible to gain through 
language usage is often seen as an important part of aesthetic experience. For example, Scruton (1997:200) 
writes that “ineffability is a mark of the aesthetic experience, in all its higher forms”. 
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piece altogether. These changes are identity-relevant, and are closely related to the syntactical 
arrangement of the piece. Such changes also result in altered affective states. 
 
However, there are changes that the performer can make that have no effect on the identity of 
the piece whatsoever.  Playing ‘Happy Birthday’ softly or loudly, quickly or slowly, or with 
aggressive articulation, makes no difference to the identity of the work. It is still recognisable 
as ‘Happy Birthday’: such features are changeable without altering the identity of the work. 
Let us call such features surface variables. The distinction between identity-relevant 
characteristics and surface variables is best illustrated in cases where musical pieces are pre-
composed, and later performed by others (such as a performance of ‘Happy Birthday’).57 In 
such cases, the identity-relevant characteristics are those that are built into the work by the 
composer (form, notes, tonality, and so on), whereas the surface variables are those aspects 
that can be manipulated by performers (such as phrasing emphasis, articulation, dynamics, 
and so on). Because identity-relevant characteristics of musical utterances are closely related 
to musical syntax, we will now turn to a consideration of the nature of surface variables and 
their role in the achievement of affective states. 
 
We have already mentioned that unexpected, loud sounds, such as the sudden orchestral 
chord in our Tchaikovsky example, serve to elicit affective states. Indeed, we can generalise 
this example to a class of phenomena on the musical surface: those of sudden changes in 
dynamics. More broadly, dynamics in general can be seen as an aspect of musical utterances 
that results in affective states. Dynamics can be used to alarm the listener, as well as 
gradually build or release some sort of tension that the listener perceives. Changes in 
dynamic level are particularly noticeable in this regard. Any person who has listened to a 
blues guitarist such as Stevie Ray Vaughan will be well aware of the emotional tension 
induced by sudden changes of volume, and any person who has listened to orchestral music 
will recognise the contribution of crescendo and decrescendo to the affects associated with 
the music. Terraced dynamics in general can serve to set the ‘mood’ of the music: soft music 
can be in turn understood as menacing, mischievous, or sad, depending on the nature of its 
structure and syntactical arrangement (such as tonal and melodic features).  
                                                 
57 The distinction between identity-relevant characteristics and surface variables is blurred in cases of freely 
improvised music. However, if an improvised piece were to be repeated, it would be recognisable as a repetition 
provided we do not change the syntactical arrangement of the music, or alter the temporal pattern of events in 
such a way that it is no longer recognisable. Surface variables, such as volume, articulation, and the other 
variables described in the main text, can be changed without altering the identity of the repeated improvisation. 
(In any case, as soon as an improvisation is repeated, it is essentially a repeat of a composed work.) 
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A second example of a causal characteristic of musical utterances is articulation – the manner 
in which the music is executed. For example, a single phrase can be played with aggressive, 
loud accents, or it could be played in a legato fashion, or all the notes could be played 
staccato. All these different articulations would have different contributions to affective 
states. In general, short, aggressive, and loud articulations lend themselves to the elicitation 
of states of excitement, whereas smoother, gentler articulations are associated with calmer 
affects. 
 
A third example, which depends largely on the way that a particular piece of music is put 
together, is the manner of phrasing. (In spoken language, phrasing’s counterpart is called 
‘prosody’.) Musical pieces are usually put together in a way that allows for the listener to 
break the statement into phrases. In much tonal Western music (and tonal music in general), 
phrases are rounded off by cadential points, many of which demand a tonal resolution in the 
following phrase. The manner in which phrases are performed – where subtle (or not so 
subtle) emphasis is placed by the performer, or where tempo change is used as an expressive 
device – is a characteristic of music that acts in a directly causal manner with regard to 
affective mental states.58 At this point in our discussion, the execution and emphasis of 
phrasing is to be distinguished from phrase structure itself. However, it will also be argued 
that phrase structure is also to some degree in a directly casual relationship with affective 
states. Phrase structure is primarily a syntactical aspect of musical utterances, and an example 
of a far deeper sort of affective determinant. Discussion of phrase structure will be delayed 
until the next chapter. For now, we are more concerned with these ‘surface’ phenomena that 
are alterable by performers, and not necessarily part of the identity or structure of a particular 
piece.59 
 
                                                 
58 Arguably, the various techniques that constitute phrasing can be reduced to other directly causal components 
of musical utterances, such as emphasis via dynamic change, which notes are articulated in what manner, and 
tempo change. The common usage of the term ‘phrasing’ by musicians is the reason for its inclusion as a 
distinct surface variable. 
59 To illustrate this distinction, consider the case of musical works which are composed by a single person, and 
then are later performed by others (as opposed by improvised music). In such cases, the causal aspects of the 
structure that are to be seen in a deeper sense, such as the affective properties of phrase structure, are those that 
are built into the work by the composer (form, the notes, the key, and so on). The surface phenomena (those 
which we are presently discussing) are those aspects of the piece that can be manipulated by performers, such as 
the phrasing emphasis, the articulation, the dynamics, and so on. Note that changing the deeper affective 
properties of the work in performance will have a bearing on the identity of the work. 
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Yet another example of an aspect of musical utterances in a directly causal relation to 
affective states is tempo, tempo change, and the general speed at which a musical utterance is 
performed. In general, faster tempos convey a heightened sense of excitement, whereas 
slower tempos are usually more subdued. Likewise, slowing of tempo is often used as a 
device for relaxing tension, whereas speeding up of tempo generates excitement. This aspect 
of musical utterances is closely related to general rhythmic texture: in general, faster or busier 
rhythms, such as playing many notes in the time interval between beats, convey excitement to 
a greater degree than using fewer notes. Here, one must also mention the effects of 
syncopation as an affective device. 
 
Timbre can also play an important part in the causality of affective states. Timbre, perceived 
as the quality of tone colour of an instrument,60 is frequently used as an expressive 
mechanism by performers (and, of course, in specified scoring by composers). Indeed, certain 
timbres do have affective qualities – one simply has to think of the quality of guitar distortion 
used in heavy metal, or the choice of timpani and low brass to convey an effect of menace in 
orchestral music. These timbral choices are not arbitrary. Distortion is chosen because it 
sounds aggressive, low brass and timpani are often used because they sound like something 
menacing. These timbres result in particular affective states being elicited in the mind of the 
listener. Similarly, a seventh example is the experience of the phenomenal quality of pitch 
height. While the altering of actual pitches is effectively a change in the syntactical 
arrangement of the music, performers can still use the quality of timbre in combination with 
the pitch height to alter the phenomenal experience of pitch for the listener. High tones are 
often described as thin, piercing, light, or something similar; whereas low tones are often 
described as dark, large, cumbersome, and so on. 
 
In summary, we find at least seven surface variables that an utterer can use to elicit an 
affective state in the mind of a listener. These are termed ‘surface’ variables because they are 
not parts of the musical utterance that the listener would consider to impinge on its identity. 
The utterer is able to change these aspects of the utterance without affecting parts of the 
music that contribute to the piece’s identity. These variables are alterable in the act of 
performance. The seven surface variables are: 
 
                                                 
60 See Levitin (2006:43-45) for a basic discussion of timbre. 
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1. Dynamics 
2. Articulation 
3. Phrasing emphasis 
4. Tempo 
5. Rhythmic texture 
6. Timbre 
7. Experience of the phenomenal quality of pitch  
 
These are not the only aspects of a musical utterance that can be used to evoke an affective 
state in mind of the listener. There are also aspects of the syntactical arrangement of a 
musical piece that can be used to cause affective states. However, it is best that further 
exploration of these ideas is left until we have more closely examined the syntactical aspects 
of music, and how they result in cognitive states. It should also be said that cognitive states 
can be elicited, that have affective states (and the features of the immediately represented 
musical utterance that directly caused those states) as their intentional objects. For example, a 
cognitive state can (in principle) be entertained that has some attitude toward the affective 
state caused by the articulation of an utterance. Such a cognitive state may be a belief that the 
way an utterance was phrased was indicative of a certain affect. In addition, affective states 
are often named – we describe a piece of music as ‘sad’, even though we may not consider 
that the same ‘sadness’ that is evident in another piece of music we have heard. 
 
A bold proposition may be forwarded at this point: given the cognitive state that results from 
an utterance in spoken language, accompanying affective states can be triggered by the same 
surface means as employed by music. Loudness, articulation, phrasing (prosody), speed of 
delivery and rhythmic emphasis, timbre, and pitch can all be used to add to or alter the 
meaning of a statement in spoken language. This is a proposition already ventured by Cooke 
(1959), when he suggests that  
 
[if] we think of a group of people talking, it is obvious that, the more excited they become, the 
louder, quicker, and higher their voices will get; the more relaxed they become, the softer, 
slower, and lower they will speak… The louder a person speaks, the more emphasis he gives 
to what he is saying; the quicker he speaks, the more animated he is becoming; the higher his 
voice rises, the more he is asserting himself.  
(Cooke, 1959:94; his emphasis)  
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Cooke then invites us to consider the musical equivalents. Of course, there are exceptions to 
such general rules, such as creating tension (as opposed to relaxation) by using a combination 
of rhythmic complexity, low volume, and low register; or alternatively using loud but low 
booming sounds to create excitement. In these cases, Cooke suggests that in the end, for most 
Western music, it is the tonal treatment of phrases that decides the ultimate affect, and not 
secondary features of the music such as volume and rhythm (1959:95). However, as Western 
tonality is not universal, we may be more inclined to say that it is aspects of the syntactical 
arrangement of the music that have the last say with regard to the affect that is achieved. 
Even this is not always the case: it is doubtful whether the haunting ending of the first 
movement of Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony could achieve its affect if it were played 
fortissimo, even if we preserve every other aspect of its syntactical structure. These directly 
causal surface variables are of a very basic nature, and their pronounced inclusion triggers 
affective states that severely influence our perception of the overall meaning of the music. 
 
This leaves us with an assertion that the seven surface variables listed above should be 
equally applicable to both musical and linguistic statements. We would expect that, if 
loudness and aggressive articulation led to a heightened sense of excitement in speech, the 
same would apply to music. This also highlights another interesting parallel between music 
and spoken language: the application of surface variables to musical or linguistic statements 
does not, to a large degree, impinge on the identity of the statement.61 In speech, whether you 
are shouting or whispering makes no difference to the syntactic structure or semantic 
meaning of the utterance (when the words are understood literally). No surface variable will 
result in the listener interpreting a verb phrase as a noun phrase, or thinking that ‘tree’ now 
refers to cars. In the case of music, where structure also contributes to affect, the ultimate 
affective impact of surface variables would appear to be greater (such as the example of 
Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony quoted above). However, it is worth noting that in the case 
of performances of composed pieces, the performer’s alteration of prescribed surface 
variables does not change the identity of the work. We could play a Chopin prelude with a 
different timbre by playing it on a church organ, but it would still be recognisable as that 
                                                 
61 This is with the possible exception of the phenomenal quality of pitch in the case of intonational languages. 
However, the sort of phenomenal quality of pitch in spoken languages we are speaking of is the general pitch of 
the statement as a whole, and not the pitch relation between syllables. 
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particular prelude.62 Surface variables do not impinge on syntax and semantics in language, 
and they do not impinge on the general identity of works in music.63 
 
Before we go on to consider the case for the presence of syntax in musical statements, it 
would be wise to briefly expand on our previous mention of the idea of ineffability (non-
propositional content) in music. 
 
 
4.5 A brief discussion of ineffability and musical statements 
 
In earlier pages, it was contended that affective states are essentially ineffable, in virtue of 
being non-propositional in character. Whereas cognitive states are of the sort that can be 
manipulated by propositionally-oriented computational processes in the mind, it was claimed 
that affective states cannot be subjected to such processes. The result is that such states are 
not available for manipulation by cognitive systems such as Language (with an upper case 
‘L’). This is the reason why it has been suggested that they are achieved by directly causal 
means. We should now further consider this charge of ineffability with regard to music. 
 
The lengthiest philosophical discussion of the idea that music is related to the expression of 
ineffable states of mind is that of Raffman (1993; see also her 1988). Raffman seeks to 
explain the sorts of feelings that accompany the experience of music, in particular the sorts of 
feelings that we struggle to put into words. As was quoted above, Raffman sees the 
ineffability of musical experiences as the manner in which we “come to know something that 
cannot be put into words” (Raffman, 1993:2). That she finds it necessary to devote 
considerable time to the idea that music expresses things that cannot be put into words should 
                                                 
62 Provided that the instrument can realise all the syntactical features of the piece, of course. For example, you 
cannot realise a Chopin prelude on a mbira that only plays whole-tone intervals, for instance. Furthermore, a 
repeat of any musical statement on the same instrument will not lose its identity as a copy of that the original 
statement, despite changes to surface variables. Pieces such as Cage’s Imaginary Landscape No. 4 (1951), 
scored for 24 randomly tuned radios, or Stockhausen’s electronic music, obviously cannot be repeated on any 
other instruments. However, such pieces are not syntactical in the first place, as they depend on non-syntactical 
features (timbre) to make their artistic statements. 
63 This is not a black and white issue. A weighted aggregate of surface variables could arguably be 
overwhelming enough for the listener to fail to identify the piece as one that has been heard before. For 
example, the combination of extremely aggressive attack, short notes, high volume, and a distracting timbre, 
applied to ‘Greensleeves’, could result in the listener not identifying the piece as a performance of the folk song. 
The reader should also bear in mind that this is largely a perceptual, and not a philosophical, issue. The identity-
relevant features of two performances of a piece are understood as those syntactical features that are 
perceptually identical to the listener, allowing her to conclude that the performances are of the same piece.    
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speak volumes for the challenge posed by this puzzle. Raffman’s approach is highly 
influenced by computational psychology. She accepts, in principle if not in detail, the 
computational account of musical structure perception forwarded by Fred Lerdahl and Ray 
Jackendoff in the GTTM (1983). For the sake of brevity, Raffman refers to this mental 
schema for evaluating the structure of sonic stimuli as an ‘M-grammar’. (It is to be 
considered as analogous to a grammar schema for language perception.) The immediate 
representation of a musical utterance in the mind contains elements that match up to this 
schema. These are elements such as the structure, the key, the intended discrete pitches, tonal 
relations, and so on, and are all aspects of music that we can describe propositionally. But the 
M-grammar schema does not account for the entire representation of the musical utterance. 
Raffman claims that in the total experience of music, there are parts of the representation of 
the musical utterance that are conscious but not verbally expressible or reportable (1988:688-
689). What this implies is that there are parts of the musical representation that don’t fit the 
M-grammar schema, but are in some manner represented in the mind. Instances of such parts 
of the representation include pitch and rhythm nuances that don’t fit the schema exactly, but 
are nonetheless available to consciousness. Without the requisite musical mental machinery, 
such nuances cannot be represented in a way that allows for verbal expression. Hence, 
whatever ‘falls between the cracks’ of our M-grammar schema, but is available to 
consciousness, is what we perceive as the ineffable in musical experience. 
 
The reader will note that Raffman’s account lays similar foundations to those adopted in this 
study: namely, the existence of a mental capability for apprehending the structure of musical 
statements, the idea that there are parts of musical experience that are alterable over and 
above the structure of an utterance, and the idea that non-propositional content can be 
communicated in some manner. According to Raffman, it is these un-schematised nuances 
that are primarily responsible for the perceived ineffability of musical experience. However, 
the present study will go further by claiming that there are parts of musical structure that also 
contribute to perceived ineffability. Indeed, this is an answer to a concern raised by Scruton 
(1997:200); namely, that Raffman cannot account for the reason that most people find what is 
generally referred to as art music considerably more ineffably expressive than ‘Three Blind 
Mice’.64 If ineffability is caused only by the manner of performance, it is difficult to 
                                                 
64 Of course, Scruton’s project is a normative one, as he wishes to justify the claim that art music is of more 
aesthetic value than other sorts of music. This is exemplified in his attitude toward popular music, which for him 
includes not-so-popular genres such as heavy metal. Our project is not normative, but rather descriptive. I would 
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understand why we attribute ineffable expression to the musical piece itself. In other words, 
on Raffman’s account, composed pieces of music are not in and of themselves expressive of 
ineffable content – only performances of pieces (complete with nuances) elicit ineffable 
experiences in the minds of listeners. Or, phrased in our own terms, Raffman is claiming that 
it is not the identity-relevant structural features, but rather the surface variables that result in 
our apprehension of the ineffable and non-propositional. This appears to be counter-intuitive.  
 
Is it really the surface of the music, such as the fine-grained deviations from established pitch 
classes failing to fit our M-grammar schemas, that is responsible for our attribution of 
ineffability to musical experience? Lindsey (1994:576) points out that if all music were to be 
performed by synthesizers, hence nullifying the effect of performance nuances on the surface 
of the music, it is likely that a sense of ineffability will still be attributed to the pieces 
themselves.65 If musical utterances conform perfectly with our M-grammar schemas with 
nothing ‘falling between the cracks’, Raffman’s conclusion would have to be that experience 
of them will not feature any sense of ineffability whatsoever. However, it has already been 
contended that the structural aspects of musical utterances contribute to the formation of 
affective states, which are non-propositional in character and hence instances of ineffable 
content. This is therefore a major point of difference between this study and that of 
Raffman’s. 
 
Because the topic of the semantic behaviour of names is a major point of interest to analytic 
philosophers of language, a brief discussion of language usage with regard to non-
propositional mental states is merited. Affective mental states are beyond verbal explication, 
being of non-propositional nature. But we are consciously aware of them, as affects (such as 
states of sadness, moods, or the ineffable emotions elicited by some aesthetic experiences). 
Raffman, as described above, attributes ineffability at base to be our awareness of the 
contents of perceptual experience that are too fine-grained for conceptual mental schemas. 
Our perceptual experience of the world in general is incredibly detailed, but many of these 
                                                                                                                                                        
not like to suggest that some sort of ineffable feeling fails to accompany pieces in Scruton’s popular genres. In 
any case, Scruton sees ineffability as an aesthetic quality of great art works; I see it as a characteristic of 
affective states. 
65 Lindsey also points out that on Raffman’s model, congenitally deaf persons are completely unable to 
appreciate the ineffable aspect of music in any way whatsoever. The nuances, being verbally inexpressible and 
only communicable by sonic means, are completely unavailable to deaf individuals. This means that no sense of 
ineffability could be gained from the reading of a score, as it is only surface features of the music that contribute 
to the sense of ineffability. 
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details are not taken much note of unless specific attention is directed toward them. Take, for 
example, our apprehension of a tree: not every leaf is consciously noted. Rather, we see a 
collection of leaves constituting the green part of the tree. If we wish, we can isolate 
individual leaves and direct our attention to them. In that way, our general perception of trees 
is a sort of mental shorthand, and we can call attention to detail if we like. Furthermore, it is 
possible to represent all of this in language. 
 
However, can the same be said of phenomenal experience? Is it possible to describe, in 
language, the nature of the greenness of a particular leaf, or the smell of freshly brewed tea, 
or the feeling of pain? Such subjective phenomenal experiences are often referred to as qualia 
(singular, quale). The subjective quality of colours, tastes, tactile sensations, smells, and so 
on, are all qualia. In the analytic philosophy of mind, much ink has been spilt regarding these 
subjective experiences, particularly with regard to whether they can be explained in physical 
terms or not. However, what interests us is how the fundamental nature of the subjective 
phenomenal experience appears to be particularly difficult to frame in language. We can 
describe the smell of curry in physical terms, by referring to the physical constitution of the 
olfactory organs and the motion of particles. Some philosophers believe that, in principle, it is 
not possible to know what curry smells like unless you have smelt it – no amount of physical 
knowledge will teach you what it is like to smell curry (e.g., Jackson, 1982). Others believe 
that qualia are physical through and through, and therefore, if someone knows all the physical 
facts about smelling curry, they already know what it is like to smell it (e.g., Dennett, 1991). 
But can we explain the actual smell of curry in words? 
 
At best, it would seem that we could say that a smell is similar to another smell, albeit not 
identical; and we can refer to a smell by giving it a name or referring to it demonstratively 
(‘that smell’). Is it the same with the sense of ineffability that is often attributed to musical 
statements? Do we apprehend ineffable ‘content’ in musical communication in a similarly 
subjective manner to the apprehension of qualia? It would seem that the nature of qualia and 
the nature of affects are similar in that they both appear to be beyond the grasp of words, 
being non-propositional. Hence, we cannot describe what either is like, but we are able to 
name the relevant mental state. We could talk of Roger’s affective state upon hearing piece x 
as X, the affective state upon hearing y as Y, and so on. Roger will also be able to say that X 
and Y are similar in that both are melancholic states, although he will not be able to say 
precisely in what ways they differ. Affective non-propositional states are ineffable in that 
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while they can be named and roughly categorised, the person experiencing the state cannot 
verbalise the difference between one state and another, nor render an accurate description of 
the state in propositional terms. In this manner, the subjective experience of the state is 
ineffable. We can examine a brain that is currently entertaining a non-propositional affective 
state and account for every neuron in propositional terms, but we cannot verbalise what it is 
like to experience that state ourselves.66 
 
What is notable here is that while we have been saying that affective brain states are ineffable 
by virtue of their being non-propositional, it would be more accurate to say that it is the 
experience of such mental states that is ineffable (the states themselves remain 
propositionally expressible in terms of the physical arrangement of brain matter). Mental 
states are underwritten by biology, and hence, each mental state is of a physical constitution. 
That arrangement of brain matter is obviously describable in language after adequate 
empirical investigation. However, the subjective experience of being in that mental state is 
similar to a quale in that it cannot easily be rendered in language. It is therefore in the 
experience of affective states, that is non-propositional in nature, that the ineffability of music 
lies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Note that I am remaining non-committal as to the ontological status of phenomenal experiences (that is, 
whether qualia are physical or non-physical). What I am suggesting is that the experience is not linguistically 
expressible. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MUSICAL SYNTAX AND THE ELICITATION OF MENTAL STATES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: The question of musical universals 
 
This discussion of syntax in music is one that must, due to both constraints on knowledge and 
the size of the task, remain incomplete. In approaching this topic, it must be stressed that 
research on syntax in music not only requires a broad survey of the music of a variety of 
cultures, but also further understanding of how musical behaviour is realised biologically 
(especially neurologically). This sort of research compliments a search for musical 
universals. Leonard Meyer defines musical universals as “[musical] characteristics common 
to cultures that are unrelated ethnologically and geographically” (1960:49). To this, we 
should add that the concept of musical universals also encompasses those characteristics 
common to the experience of musical behaviour in various cultures. A theory of syntax that 
attempts to describe human music must take cognisance of such universals, as their validity 
underlies the predictive scope of any particular theory. This is a point emphasised by the 
study of syntax in linguistics. Ever since the advent of modern theoretical linguistics 
(particularly with Chomsky, 1957; 1965), a large focus of language study has been on those 
aspects of linguistic behaviour that are universal to all cultures. In this respect, features of 
syntax came under closest scrutiny, with Chomsky and his followers suggesting that the 
surface features of all the world’s languages spring from a limited number of possible 
syntactic cognitive frameworks, which are innate and universal. The formalisations that have 
subsequently become commonplace in theoretical linguistics all owe their origins to this idea 
of a universal structure underlying all natural languages, even if the details of various theories 
have changed and are still the topic of vigorous debate (e.g., Chomsky, 1995). Thus, it is only 
natural that an inquiry into the nature of music vis-à-vis language would require a 
consideration of universals. 
 
What features of musical behaviour are common to all humans, and how is it best to describe 
them? Do these universal features spring from cultural or biological sources? If they are 
biological, do they reflect constraints that are music-specific, or do they reflect the general 
limitations and workings of human cognitive capacities? Granted that all the cultures of the 
world exhibit musical behaviour, are there aspects of the manner in which music is put 
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together that are universal? These are important questions lying at the heart of discussions 
about universals, and by implication, musical syntax. In such investigations, researchers must 
make certain that reported universal features are carefully considered before being included 
in a syntactical theory. Furthermore, in any discussion of universals, it is vital that one 
carefully assesses what the universality of any particular trait implies. For example, the 
utilization of drums is a universal aspect of music-making, but one should be careful before 
suggesting that there is some cognitive correlate for drum-playing in particular. Preparation 
of food by means of cooking is also a universal feature of human societies, but few would 
argue that it is any sense a specifically biological behaviour. Valid universal constraints on 
the intelligibility of musical utterances may be simply a matter of biology, much in the same 
way that numerous aspects of linguistic syntactical structure reflect constraints on mental 
processing and the acquisition of language in infants. A comprehensive theory that addresses 
all universal aspects of music making in humans will have to distinguish carefully between 
those universal traits that result from non-cognitive biological constraints, and those that find 
their constitution in the way in which human brains work. A comprehensive theory will also 
have to make claims about which parts of the processing of music are music-specific and 
which are domain-general. While it would appear that headway is being made in this regard, 
there is still much empirical research to be conducted with regard to determining the nature of 
musical cognition and its status as domain-specific or -general (as evidenced by Patel, 
2008a). 
 
Some researchers have expressed the belief that the search for musical universals is futile. 
This is especially emphasised when the search has been conducted from an 
ethnomusicological perspective. Brown, Merker and Wallin write that in ethnomusicology, 
“universals have been the subject of great scepticism, as they are seen as smacking too much 
of biological determinism, and therefore of denying the importance of historical forces and 
cultural traditions in explaining the properties of musical systems and musical behavior [sic]” 
(2000:13). Ethnomusicologist George List contends that “the only universal aspect of music 
seems to be that most people make it. And that is about the only universal involved” 
(1971:402). Despite these views, scholarly opinion on musical universals has not always been 
negative (see, for instance, Meyer, 1960:49-50; Nettl, 2005). The idea that all human musical 
activity is underwritten by common principles is one that appears to have seen much currency 
in the first half of the 20th century, before subsequent frustration in locating those principles 
lead to a strong tendency to see music as culturally relative. Since the 1960s, it would appear 
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that the pendulum has swung both back to universals, and again in the opposite direction, to 
cultural relativism.67 Currently, the predominantly cultural study of music largely shuns the 
idea of universal principles being applied to human musical cultures.68 Unfortunately, this 
relativistic outlook sometimes seems to extend to views about music’s status in cognition. 
The New Musicology-inspired approaches are particularly notable in this regard. For 
example, there has been a rejection of cognitive theories such as that of Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff’s GTTM on grounds generally termed as postmodernist (e.g. Fink, 2001; see 
Cross, 2001a for a general discussion of the attitude of New Musicology toward 
psychological and cognitive theories concerning the experience of music). In this regard, it 
must be noted that a cognitive approach to musical syntax is based on the fact that the 
biological constitution of the members of different cultures is not a relative matter, as human 
biology is universal in all but the most negligible respects. It is on a biological basis that any 
approach to a common syntax of music operates, and therefore, such a theory will lay claim 
to universality.    
 
It should be noted that the majority of approaches to musical universals have sought data 
abstracted from the products of musical behaviour – that is, from music itself. As Leonard 
Meyer (1960) points out, a purely descriptive view of musical universals – where different 
sorts of music are simply “observed, measured, classified, and compared” (p. 50) – will not 
provide illuminating answers about the human practice of music. Apart from the confounding 
variability of human music, there is also the problem of the functional reasons underlying 
various human behaviours. Two different cultures may have a similar scale structure, but may 
not share equal perception of the relative importance of particular scale degrees. Something 
similar can be said regarding the perception of beats in relation to periodic accents (see Cross, 
2001b). This requires research to go beyond just surface structure, to a theoretical level that 
accounts for the role of surface phenomena in the activity of music. 
 
Harwood (1976) notes that “[t]he process of understanding and engaging in musical behavior 
[sic] may be more universal than the content of musical knowledge or action” (p. 523, his 
emphasis). It is his suggestion that the focus on musical universals should shift from 
                                                 
67 See Nettl (2005; especially pp. 42ff). It would appear that by the 1950s, relativism was in fashion. Nettl 
suggests that by the 1970s, the hunt for universals was back on. It can be added that since the 1990s and the 
advent of the New Musicology, a relativist view was established that is still dominant in much mainstream 
musicology and ethnomusicology. 
68 This is a particular problem when theory aspires to the level of cognitive or psychological theory. See Cross 
(2001a). 
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examining the ‘music itself’ to the means by which we construct and apprehend musical 
behaviours. The implication of this statement is that the relationship between musical 
universals and a theory of musical syntax should be construed as one of theoretical 
abstraction from (mostly) cognitive evidence. It is at this level of musical cognition that we 
must seek musical universals. The question of universals becomes more interesting (and 
potentially more fruitful) if one considers the biological capacities that allow the surface 
phenomena to be realised at all. Of course, if there are universals pertaining to the 
apprehension and production of music, it is likely that they will be somehow reflected in the 
musical product. However, the search for commonalities between different types of music 
(that is, musical pieces as the products of musical behaviour) should be guided by a bottom-
up approach, from cognition to musical pieces. This is specifically where the notion of a 
formalised syntax comes to the fore. Universals are likely to be found at the level of 
cognition, in the attempt to answer questions about the mental processing of surface 
phenomena. Therefore, any theory of musical universals is likely to be a cognitive theory. 
Syntax should be evident not only in cognitive terms, but also (to a degree) in terms of the 
structure of individual musical performances. Of course, researchers and theorists should be 
wary of taking the linguistic-syntactic analogy too far. The syntax that we describe and 
ascribe universality to should not necessarily be considered nearly identical to that of 
language – an “organ of the mind”, as Chomsky called the ability for language acquisition 
(Chomsky, 1988:131). We already know that musical cognition is a fragmentary affair, a 
mixture of parasitic neural networking (impinging on language, for example) and what could 
possibly be seen as music-specific networks (Patel, 2008a:282-298; Peretz & Coltheart, 
2003). It is therefore unlikely to constitute a monolithic neural system in the brain. This 
filters down to the syntax we are to describe: it may be a syntax of circumstance, rather than 
one tailored to meet the demands of musical communication in particular. In other words, the 
terms in which we describe syntax are unlikely to have a direct correlation to a single 
monolithic module in the mind. Nonetheless, it is on a cognitive level that universals are to be 
identified, and from which a formalised syntactical theory will proceed. 
 
A discussion of details of musical syntax is also likely to be one of the least ‘philosophical’ 
parts of a discussion of music’s power to elicit various mental states in the minds of listeners. 
That is, the ultimate goal of such a project will only be achieved when a large amount of 
relevant empirical data has been made available, primarily of a cognitive or neurological 
nature. However, let us take the following to be the case for the ensuing philosophical 
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discussion: there are aspects of musical structure that are universal to all cultures, and that are 
somehow reflected in the cognitive lives of humans. Furthermore, let us assume that these 
features are of such a nature that we are able to formalise them as a set of syntactical 
principles governing the comprehensibility of musical utterances. These universal syntactical 
principles may spring from several sources. First, they may reflect constraints on auditory 
processing in general. A hypothetical universal syntactic feature may only be such in virtue 
of restraints on the auditory processing system in general. For example, it may be the case 
that the length of syntactical utterances is curtailed due to limitations on working memory, in 
much the same way that sentence complexity is limited by the same constraint.69 The source 
of limitations may be the result of non-cognitive physical constraints as well. For example, 
the length of sung musical phrases is dependent on the average breath capacity of singers.70 
The means of producing musical utterances (that is, instruments) may be curtailed in what 
they can express because of the way that they are designed, whether in the case of a specific 
timbre or limitations on the actual range of sounds that an instrument can make. Another 
source that may result in observed universal syntactical features is a constraint imposed by 
the functionality of music. If we take for granted that human musicality (or some component 
part of it) fulfils a specific function, it may be that the character of that function directly 
influences the nature of its syntax. Linguistic syntax, for example, is strongly influenced by 
its function in conveying information unambiguously. Hence, it is organised in such a way as 
to maximise the effectiveness of propositional communication. It may be the case that similar 
constraints on musical structure may be imposed by the uses to which music is put, either 
now or in the distant past. Of course, such constraints do not simply limit the possibilities 
afforded by syntactical arrangement in music. They also serve to determine and shape that 
syntax in an important way, by defining the range of possible continuations of musical 
statements, as well as the manner in which statements can be constituted and yet remain 
intelligible. 
 
Our discussion about musical syntax will span this and the next chapter. This chapter 
comprises a philosophical consideration of precisely how syntactical features of music 
contribute to the formation of cognitive and affective states in the minds of listeners. In more 
                                                 
69 Indeed, this appears to be the case with the sense of tonal closure (ending a piece in the same tonal centre that 
it begins with). See Cook (1987) and Cross & Rohrmeier (2009) for details regarding the temporal limitations of 
the perception of tonal closure. 
70 The length of most instrumental melodic phrases in many types of music is roughly equivalent. I hasten to 
qualify this with the proviso ‘melodic’, as rhythm-based music independent of melody is not necessarily 
arranged in this manner. 
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colloquial terms, the present chapter will deal with how syntax (whatever that is) contributes 
to musical meaning. This will also include a consideration of how syntax in language 
compares to syntax in music, with regard to the formation of cognitive and affective mental 
states. The next chapter, also on syntax, is the part of the discussion that must remain 
incomplete. Here, we will consider several discussions of syntax in music, as well as several 
general observations about the future of research into musical syntax. However, the current 
chapter’s philosophical discussion requires us to assume that there is a syntactical dimension 
to the phenomenon of music. Hence, we should revisit the idea of musical syntax in order to 
flesh it out further. Before doing so, we should pause to consider the music-theoretical notion 
of form, and its relation to the concept of syntactical theories of musical structure. 
 
 
5.2 Form and syntax 
 
5.2.1 Formal and syntactical analyses of phrases 
 
‘Syntax’ and ‘form’ are essentially concepts utilized by theorists approaching the 
phenomenon of structure in music from different perspectives. ‘Syntax’ is a term borrowed 
from linguistics, whereas analysis of musical form is an activity practiced in music theory. A 
large part of traditional music theory and analysis is devoted to the study of form as it is 
manifested in musical pieces, especially with regard to large scale structure. Indeed, form has 
been the bread and butter of analysts for decades. Statements in form analyses can be seen as 
descriptions of the structure of a piece: how the piece is put together as a whole, how 
different chunks of music are arranged in time, and how the most important events in a 
musical piece are related to one another. For example, many pop songs can be said to be in 
verse-chorus form (alternating groups of thematic material, with each instance of the second 
group having a common lyric content). The jazz standard ‘Autumn Leaves’ is in AAB form 
(a repeated ‘A’ section, followed by a contrasting ‘B’ section). Modern rock and heavy metal 
can have extremely complex formal arrangements. However, the focus of the majority of 
form analyses in the academy has been the music of the Western art tradition. Here, large-
scale formal arrangements range from simple binary (AB) miniatures to compound forms 
such as minuet and trio form and sonata form. Formal analysis also deals with smaller 
structures: fore-phrases, after-phrases, and motives all concern theorists that are interested in 
formal analysis. One of the major music-theoretical projects of the twentieth century was that 
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of Heinrich Schenker, who sought to explain all aspects of formal structure – from tonal 
structure to thematic unity in movements that were tens of minutes long – in terms of a single 
underlying musical idea, expanded in increasing layers of embellishment to create an entire 
musical piece. 
 
Let us, for now, use ‘structure’ as an intermediary term. Structure is the arrangement of 
musical elements within a piece, whether horizontally (in time) or vertically (in space, viz. 
the layering of simultaneous sounds, often referred to as harmony). Thus, a single bar has a 
structure, as does an exposition, or an entire movement, or a chord, or three notes in 
succession. Up until the present moment, the term ‘syntax’ has been used with regard to the 
structure of a musical piece. To syntax was assigned several interesting features. Syntax, it 
was and will further be claimed, facilitates the formation of cognitive and affective states in 
the minds of competent listeners. Indeed, it is in virtue of the syntactical arrangement of 
constituent elements that a musical utterance can be said to be intelligible at all. The concept 
of syntax that has been proposed here thus far is a way of looking at the structure of a musical 
piece in cognitive terms. The music-theoretical approach to structure (that is, form analysis), 
does not see music from this cognitive stance. Rather, the formalisation that results from a 
music-theoretical perspective is more abstract in nature, focusing on the music as an entity in 
itself.71 If a music-theoretical approach to structure can be said to deal with the musical 
intuition, it is the musical intuition of the composer: the planner of the musical piece. Form 
analysis examines the conscious structural choices that a composer has made. Syntax, on the 
other hand, approaches from the standpoint of cognition. In virtue of what is a structural 
arrangement of sounds considered musical by a competent listener? How do musical 
structures result in the perception of meaning? What is it for a musical utterance to be 
intelligible? Both form analysis and syntactical formalisations are approaches to theorising 
about the phenomenon of structure in music, and may hit upon similar explanations of 
musical structure. Both form and syntax are theoretical approaches that deal with the way in 
which musical elements are arranged to create pieces of music. It follows that each approach 
                                                 
71 The reader will recall that in Ch. 3, it was mentioned that philosophical issues (‘chestnuts’) such as the 
identity of a musical work given multiple performances, as well as the ontology of a musical piece in itself, were 
largely reduced to problems about human perception in our theory. It is worth mentioning this again with regard 
to the distinctions and differences between a music-theoretic and a cognitive approach. In formal analysis, 
questions about the ontology of that which is studied naturally arise. However, a cognitive approach is more 
concerned with the production and apprehension of musical behaviour in the mind, and asking whether two 
performances are of a single work is likely to prompt an answer involving human memory capacities, as 
opposed to ontology of musical works. 
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will have different things to tell us about musical structure. Our primary concern has been the 
listener’s intuition that music is somehow meaningful, which is an issue of human cognition. 
This is a feature of the listener’s mental life, and we would expect a cognitive approach to tell 
us much about it. 
 
To display the differences characteristic of these approaches, let us consider an example from 
William Rothstein’s book on phrases and phrase structure in tonal music (Rothstein, 1989). 
Rothstein essentially argues that musical phrases are arranged in a hierarchal manner, with 
phrases occurring within larger phrases. We have ourselves already used the term ‘phrase’ in 
a manner suggesting that it should be considered as a perceptual unit. It has also been 
suggested that the perception of phrases has an ‘upper limitation’ in size, namely, the 
demands of working memory on phrase length. Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
phrase length is also dictated by non-musical issues, such as breath capacity. This physical 
limitation has a tangible effect on the manner in which phrases are performed. Hence, we 
would not expect our cognitive understanding of the term ‘phrase’ to encompass segments of 
music longer than that dictated by physical constraints (for example, all 32 bars of the jazz 
standard ‘Autumn Leaves’ as a single phrase, as opposed to the usual 8+8+8+8 bar 
interpretation of the song’s phrase structure). Rothstein’s approach to the concept of the 
phrase, on the other hand, is one of a music-theoretical persuasion. He firmly places emphasis 
on tonal concerns, stipulating that “a phrase should be understood as, among other things, a 
directed motion in time from one tonal entity to another… If there is no tonal motion, there is 
no phrase” (Rothstein, 1989:5; his emphasis).72 Rothstein’s primary concern is the Western 
art tradition from the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, and therefore his interest in the 
harmonic features of musical phrasing is to be expected. However, off the cuff, this 
understanding of the phrase can lead to some surprising conclusions when considered from a 
cognitive standpoint. In the case of non-tonal rhythmic music, is there no phrase structure? 
Surely, from a perceptive standpoint, we hear rhythmic passages in electronic dance music in 
terms of phrases, even if the medium seems to shun tonality to a large degree.73 Of course, 
                                                 
72 From this proviso (as well  Rothstein’s analysis of the phrases comprising the ‘Ode to Joy’ melody of 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony on pp. 16-17), it is likely that Rothstein will partition ‘Autumn Leaves’ into 
8+8+8+8, according to fairly common musical intuition. However, Rothstein would also argue that there is a 
‘hyperphrase’, 16+16 bars, and a further one, 32 bars. This is far beyond the bounds of perception of phrases as 
we are due to employ the term in our cognitive approach. 
73 It should be pointed out that Western art music, which is precisely what Rothstein is studying, is more 
concerned with creating formal structures that can be called ‘narrative’. This accounts for his interest in tonal 
‘motion’. In contrast, many other sorts of music (such as electronic dance music and trance music) do not have 
this narrative, teleological concern. Rather, these sorts of music are concerned with the creation of a static state. 
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Rothstein’s definition of the concept ‘phrase’ is his to stipulate, but it comes with the 
handicap that it can only be used to analyse tonal music in a music-theoretical manner. 
 
The differences between a music-theoretic and a cognitive approach become more apparent if 
one considers Rothstein’s analysis of Strauss’s Blue Danube Waltz No. 1 (1989:5-10). In this 
analysis, Rothstein’s contention that the determining marker of a musical segment being a 
phrase is tonal motion leads to the suggestion that bars 1-24, being devoid of explicit tonal 
movement toward a cadence, do not constitute phrases.74 (Rothstein, in the reduction example 
on p. 6, goes as far as using brackets to designate phrases. Brackets are missing from the 
reduction of the first 24 complete bars, but are present for bars 25-32, a section with tonal 
motion.) This clearly deviates from what we would expect had he been utilizing a concept of 
the phrase somewhat similar to our own. Rothstein’s analysis is at odds with the musical 
grouping that we perceive when listening to the piece. Instead of subordinating the first 
twenty-four bars to having less perceptive importance, we tend to hear 3 phrases of 8 bars, 
with the strong cadential phrase (the phrase that Rothstein brackets in his analysis as being 
constitutive of a ‘phrase’) forming a fourth 8-bar phrase. Obviously, with regard to the final 
phrase, harmonic figures lead us to hear these last 8 bars as a phrase. The harmonic treatment 
in evidence here suggests an important architectural moment in the piece (viz. a cadence, 
made all the more noticeable given the relative harmonic stasis of the previous three 8-bar 
phrases). However, the general lack of harmonic, rhythmic, and thematic action in the 
previous 24 bars does not prevent us from perceiving them as three separate (albeit similar) 
phrases, irrespective of their lack of harmonic movement. Of course, the differences between 
what Rothstein terms a phrase, and the perceptive concept being discussed here, are nothing 
more than matters of terminology. What this example shows is a tangible difference between 
a music-theoretic approach and a cognitive approach: with music theory, matters of 
perception are not as important as listener-independent structures (the ‘architecture’ of the 
piece); and in a cognitive approach, more light is thrown on how a piece is understood by a 
listener, or produced by a performer. At the root of the terminological dispute regarding 
‘phrases’ is this fundamental difference in approach. 
 
                                                 
74 Unfortunately Rothstein’s reductive analysis (p. 6) and subsequent discussion is difficult to follow in the 
absence of bar numbers of key points in the reduction. I have therefore numbered the bars as they appear in 
Rothstein’s examples. 
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Another excellent and instructive example that may help to illustrate the form-analytical and 
cognitive-syntactical approaches can be found in John Cage’s Sonatas and Interludes (1948). 
Each of the twenty pieces that comprise this collection has a remarkably clear large-scale 
structure. The majority of the pieces take more than two minutes to perform, thus ensuring 
that there are large-scale structural features that are at a level above that of the phrase (as seen 
from a perceptual perspective of ‘phrase’). However, what is most striking about these pieces 
is that the importance of pitch is drastically reduced. The majority of Western tonal music 
depends on pitch relations as a major contributor to intelligibility.75 However, the impact of 
pitch organisation is minimal in the Sonatas and Interludes, as they are written for prepared 
piano. To ‘prepare’ the piano, objects such as screws, bolts, and bits of rubber are inserted 
between the strings, effectively turning the piano into an elaborate keyed percussion 
instrument. This has the result of seriously hampering the influence of pitch relations in the 
Sonatas and Interludes, as the percussive sound is issued from the piano every time a key is 
struck masks many tonal relations. In addition, the pieces were not written with pitch 
organisation as a primary concern.76 This means that, for present purposes, we can generally 
consider the lack of pitch as rendering the majority of phrases in the work non-syntactical. 
(Of course, this example serves illustrative purposes. Thematic unity can be signalled by 
rhythm as well, or even timbre – as should be obvious from a repeat listening of the Sonatas 
and Interludes.) 
 
Despite the fact that most of the phrases in the Sonatas and Interludes can be considered as 
ill-formed from a syntactical perspective (that is, taken in isolation they make little musical 
sense), the pieces can still be said to exhibit a very specific structural arrangement. Most of 
the pieces are, in fact, modelled on AB (binary) form, reminiscent of the form of most of 
Domenico Scarlatti’s keyboard sonatas (Duckworth, 1999:85). In these binary pieces, the first 
and second halves are each repeated in turn, resulting in what is effectively AABB form. 
Consider the first Sonata as an example. In such a case, the mere fact that each section is 
repeated is enough for the listener to divide the piece into two halves. The first instance of the 
B material (bar 13) is an important structural event – important enough to be noticed by the 
listener and utilised as an aural landmark in the piece. This division of the piece into an A and 
a B section is a reflection of its large-scale structure. It is difficult to assign intelligibility to 
                                                 
75 The vast majority (although not all) of the world’s music depends largely on pitch relationships. 
76 The masking of pitch is not entirely perfect. In the recording that I consulted, many clear pitches could be 
heard. Interestingly, it would appear that Sonata IV has the note B as a tonal centre. 
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any of the individual sequences of sounds that make up each section. Apart from the fact that 
the pitch is masked due to the preparation of the piano, and cannot be depended on as a 
constituent of syntactical ordering, there seems to be little intrinsic relation between the 
sounds that make up the two sections.77 It would appear that phrases are indiscernible, and 
that for all intents and purposes, the order of the sounds is non-syntactical, resulting in them 
sounding unmusical. Division of the sections into phrases would largely be an arbitrary affair. 
Hence, it would appear that we have an example of large-scale organisational structure 
operating independently of the intelligibility of the sound elements that make up the 
sections.78 Both Cage and Scarlatti produced sonatas in binary form. However, with Cage, the 
individual musical utterances within each section are ill-formed; with Scarlatti, they are well-
formed. It is a music-theoretical approach that will be able to tell us about the large-scale 
AABB structure of the piece; but from the cognitive viewpoint of syntax, the work is largely 
handicapped in terms of intelligibility. (That is not to say that the AABB form is not 
perceived as such. However, understood syntactically with regard to phrases, the work is 
cognitively unintelligible.)  
 
One thing that can be noted is that in general, the longer the piece of music in question, the 
more likely it is that its structural arrangement is complex and hierarchical.79 The sonatas of 
Cage and Scarlatti are both examples of relatively small pieces, whereas a symphonic 
movement by Beethoven is a much longer affair, with many discernible sections forming 
parts of larger sections, and so on up the hierarchy. Therefore, one would expect that a long 
symphonic movement by Beethoven is much more complex from a formal point of view, 
which is what we generally find. It is worth noting at this stage that the notion of ‘phrase’ that 
was discussed above is only hierarchical to a limited degree (if at all), but the notion of 
grouping is hierarchical beyond perceptive bounds. We should therefore be aware of a 
distinction between grouping as perceived and grouping as a higher-level abstract idea. It 
follows that the higher-level, abstract hierarchical notion of grouping (such as Lerdahl & 
Jackendoff, 1983) is best described by a form-analytical approach. 
 
                                                 
77 Of course, it would appear that bar 1 and bar 3, being comprised of the same material, lend a degree of 
coherence to the opening bars of the A section. 
78 Cage’s music, similarly to many other sorts of modern Western art music, is successful precisely because it 
plays on the listener’s expectations with regard to musical syntax. The music is successful because it flouts our 
expectations, and herein lies the originality. Without those expectations, it would not be nearly as effective. 
79 In the view of Lerdahl & Jackendoff (1983), form and grouping structure are hierarchical through and 
through; and the longer the piece, the higher the hierarchy will reach. 
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A syntactical description of music stems from a cognitive approach to understanding musical 
structure. A syntactical description of musical structure brings with it certain important 
implications. For instance, by analogy with the study of syntax in psycholinguistics, we are 
looking for a description of musical intelligibility that is in some sense related to human 
biology.80 A good example of how this sort of description impacts our conception of musical 
structure is that of physical constraints. The intelligibility of a musical phrase has an 
important constraint, which can be illustrated by analogy with the syntax of language. In 
language, syntax operates on the level of sentences. While the recursive potential of language 
means that a sentence can be infinitely long, there is an important fact of communication that 
cannot be ignored. Sentences, to be comprehendible to a listener, must occur within bounds 
acceptable to working memory, in terms of both self-referential complexity and the overall 
duration of the utterance. Therefore, to be effective, sentences have to be curtailed in terms of 
length and complexity. Likewise, any syntax operational in musical statements will have to 
be compliant with the demands of working memory to be effectual. A musical utterance 
could conceivably be structured recursively, theoretically allowing for an infinitely long 
phrase made up of chord resolutions. From the view of music theory, such a phrase is subject 
to formal analysis. However, a syntactical analysis would be less successful. Like the syntax 
of language, musical syntax is bound by the constraints of working memory. This is 
evidenced by experiments which show that a test subject’s ability to successfully apprehend 
tonal closure is limited to pieces shorter than approximately a minute (Cook, 1987). 
Syntactical analysis would not be able to provide much insight into the structural 
arrangement of music beyond these bounds. As was stressed above, a syntactical analysis 
would be able to tell us about musical perception, whereas formal analysis is an approach that 
seeks to describe a musical piece without concern regarding the physical constraints of 
listeners. 
 
It has therefore already been suggested that a syntactical description of a piece of music 
would be most profitable at a level relevant to the physical constraints of listeners. In 
language, the sentence provides a good example of the unit of syntactical analysis. What, 
then, is the equivalent of a ‘sentence’ in musical terms? What is the discrete entity within 
which we find syntactical rules operating? I would like to suggest that the phrase be 
considered as the locus of syntactical operations in music. Musical phrases, it will be argued, 
                                                 
80 Compare this to the abstract rules used by composers to plan large-scale works. These abstract rules are not 
necessarily apprehended by the listener, and are not biologically determined. 
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are made up of groups that are structured by syntactical rules – to borrow a term from 
linguistics, the rough equivalent of a grammatical formative (“minimal syntactically 
functioning units”; see Chomsky, 1965:3). It is the arrangement of groups within the 
perceptual bounds of phrases that constitute the operation of syntax in music. We will 
examine more closely the notion of groups and formatives in the next chapter. For now, let us 
briefly consider the notion that there may be principles guiding the formation of intelligible 
musical utterances at a level higher than that of phrase, as seen from a cognitive standpoint. 
 
 
5.2.2 Formal and syntactical analyses of structures larger than the phrase 
 
We have mentioned that a token of our syntactical approach is an interest in what occurs at 
the level of phrases in music and sentences in language. Here, it will be proposed that there is 
a difference between principles governing single syntactical structures, and principles 
governing groups of syntactical structures. Let us take the case of syntax in language. A 
transformational grammar is a theory about the rules governing the intelligibility and 
generation of all possible sentences in a given language (e.g. Chomsky, 1965). However, it is 
not a theory about the manner in which successive sentences are strung together to form a 
coherent multi-sentence statement about a particular topic. When presented with more than 
one sentence, the same rules do not apply to the group of sentences as a whole. This 
paragraph is made up of many sentences. We can say that on the level of each sentence, it is 
syntax that governs intelligibility (what we have been referring to as well-formedness). 
However, that same syntax does not govern the intelligibility of the paragraph as a whole. 
Likewise, the syntax governing phrases in music cannot be extended to groups of phrases, 
such as entire sections, movements, or pieces, except in the most abstract terms. A paragraph 
can be made up of sentences that are perfectly syntactical in and of themselves, but that have 
little to do with one another, resulting in a paragraph which does not present a coherent 
argument. Thus, the rules that make a single musical phrase syntactical are not the same as 
those that apply to larger structures made up of many phrases. (Note that formal analysis 
provides a set of tools for understanding larger-scale structures operating beyond the level of 
groups. Only to a limited degree will syntactical analysis also seek to explain perception in 
longer pieces. It is unlikely that syntactical analysis will be able to account for conscious 
decisions about the finer details of structure, such as why the composer chose such-and-such 
a time to revisit an earlier theme, or chose to start the recapitulation section of a sonata in the 
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subdominant key. Consider twelve-tone pieces by Schönberg or Webern: a syntactical 
analysis may have little to say about the theoretical decisions that Schönberg or Webern used 
to create a piece, but it would have something to say about precisely in virtue of what a 
listener finds a particular phrase to be musically intelligible or not.) 
 
Returning to our analogy of sentences making up a paragraph, we may be tempted say that 
the logical layout of a paragraph is analogous to the structure of music above the level of the 
phrase. The final sentence of a paragraph, for example, may be logically entailed by the 
previous sentences – a conclusion to an argument. There may be a particular structure to this 
argument. For the argument to make sense, it may be the case that sentence 3 must be related 
to sentences 1 and 2, and that sentence 3 must also be logically entailed by the other 
sentences (after Patel, 2008a:335-342). Alternatively, it may be the case that a level of 
semantic coherence must be achieved before the paragraph makes sense as being about a 
certain topic. Arguably, a similar scenario exists for musical pieces. This is, after all, where 
ideas of ‘thematic unity’ and ‘coherence’ come from. Whether this implication theory is the 
domain of syntactical or formal analysis is an interesting question. It is likely that both 
approaches will have something to say about this level of structural arrangement. 
 
 
5.3 The robustness of the notion of ‘syntax’ in musical phrases 
 
In earlier chapters, it was mentioned that we should consider music to be organised in a 
manner that could be considered syntactical. The argument could be summarised as follows. 
Musical utterances are made up of elements that are structurally discrete, and are arranged (in 
any given piece) in a particular order. A given piece of music is usually perceived as being 
meaningful in some manner. If the constituent elements of a piece of music have their order 
changed, the perceived meaning of the piece of music changes. Hence, ordering of elements 
contributes, to some qualitative degree, to the meaning of a piece of music. Furthermore, 
some orderings result in a severe handicap in intelligibility: they simply sound like random 
noise. Therefore, if ordering affects intelligibility (with some orderings being intelligible), 
then music is for all intents and purposes syntactical.  
 
Of course, the idea of syntax that was used to guide the argument above was a particularly 
weak formulation of the concept. Under this definition, there are a multitude of phenomena 
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that could be considered as syntactical. The rules governing legal moves in a chess game 
could be considered syntactical – there are moves that are in accordance with rules that count 
as valid and intelligible for the game of chess. Actions in accordance with road rules could be 
considered syntactical in a similar manner. How is the syntax of language and that of music 
distinguished from the rules governing a game of chess, or a sports match? Swain (1997) 
suggests that the fact that music and language are combinatorial systems consisting of 
discrete elements marks the distinction: “The essential syntactic elements – finite discrete 
events bound by rules in hierarchal organizations – eliminate the pretenders to syntax. Sports 
and social occasions may certainly have rules, often explicit ones, but there are no basic 
discrete elements underlying them” (Swain, 1997:26). Swain claims three features that 
differentiate syntax from other rule systems. They are finite elements, hierarchical 
organisation, and a set of rules or principles.81 
 
It is fairly obvious that linguistic syntax meets these criteria, but are they satisfied by musical 
utterances? It would seem that they are. Music has finite elements – notes, chords, motives, 
phrases – that can be combined in different ways to form utterances.82 The arrangement of 
those finite elements is indeed hierarchical. From single notes, chords are formed; from notes 
and chords we can construct motives and phrases. And it would appear that even in the most 
elementary sense, those discrete elements are subject to rules. A haphazard and random 
configuration of notes can result in a musical statement that makes little or no sense. Hence, it 
would appear that according to Swain’s yardstick, music is indeed syntactical. 
 
It is worth noting a further point made by Swain. Linguistic syntax, he claims, has two broad 
functions: controlling the amount of information that must be processed in order to use a 
language effectively, and establishing relationships between words (Swain, 1997:25). With 
regard to information load, language would be difficult to wield without the help of syntax. 
Without syntax, there would be far too many words for effective communication; but with 
syntax, fewer words can be arranged in a manner that allows words to have multiple 
meanings. For example, the word ‘floor’ can change its meaning according to the role it is 
assigned in a sentence by the syntax of the language in question – say, as a verb or a noun. 
                                                 
81 For those who note that chess has discrete elements (that is, individual moves) and rules, Swain correctly 
points out that there is no hierarchical organisation. No legal move is in and of itself more important than any 
other. 
82 Note that I have dispensed with a discussion of the nature of these elements themselves, as pre-syntactic 
entities. For a discussion of the physical manifestation of the bits that go together to form groups (that is, the 
sounds themselves), see Patel (2008a), Levitin (2006). 
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Without the help of syntax, we would require a separate word for each grammatical instance 
of the word ‘floor’ (example from Swain, 1997:27-28). Syntax also provides a means of 
understanding precisely what role a particular word plays in a sentence. Thus, linguistic 
context is important to syntax. Putting ‘running’ in different sentences (and not just different 
parts of a single sentence) changes the meaning of the word, as well as its syntactical function 
(ibid.). The same appears to be true by analogy for the various bits of sound that make up 
music. As we change the order in which discrete elements are combined, we are inclined to 
say that the meaning of the utterance has changed. 
 
It would appear that limitation of a potentially finite catalogue of sounds takes place in 
musical pieces. This is analogous to the control of information intake by syntax in language. 
Thus, Swain’s first function of syntax is present in music. But what of the second, namely the 
establishment of semantic relations between words? Does this have an analogue in music? 
According to Swain, the second role of a musical syntax is not to mediate relations between 
sounds, but rather to mediate tension and its resolution: “As it mediates expressed 
relationships in natural languages, syntax mediates the relation of tension and resolution in 
musical languages” (Swain, 1997:28). The notions of tension and resolution in music also 
found their way into the theory of Lerdahl and Jackendoff. However, I think that the tension 
and resolution considered by both Swain and Lerdahl and Jackendoff is the result of what is 
effectively the syntactical function of a particular musical event in relation to other events. 
One particular chord can function in different ways if placed at different locations within the 
phrase, and it is that placement which affects the sensation of tension and resolution.83 
Nonetheless, it would appear that in musical phrases of many genres, some events anticipate 
or refer to other events, in a manner analogous to the way that syntax in language mediates 
relationships between words. Thus, the second of Swain’s functions of syntax appears to be 
present in musical utterances. 
 
It has already been claimed that music is arranged hierarchically. The reader should note that 
this claim is often paired with another. It is often said that music is arranged recursively (e.g. 
Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983:15-16).84 There seems to be little reason not to suggest that 
                                                 
83 These sensations of tension and resolution are undoubtedly affective states. Thus, tension and resolution are 
the effects of causal relations. 
84 Recursion in language refers to the embedding of phrases within phrases. For example, the phrase ‘who is 
prone to clumsiness’, can be embedded in the sentence ‘My cat has failed to catch any mice’, resulting in ‘My 
cat, who is prone to clumsiness, has failed to catch any mice’. Likewise, it is possible to create infinitely long 
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within the bounds of working memory, various aspects of music are arranged recursively. For 
example, a cycle of ii-V-I chords in a jazz standard can be seen as an instance of recursion 
(Cross & Rohrmeier, 2009). That such instances of musical recursion serve the same (or at 
least a similar) function to recursion in language is not entirely clear. Nonetheless, the idea 
that music features hierarchical structuring will also serve to distinguish its syntax from that 
of traffic lights and chess, and make our understanding of the term ‘syntax’ sufficiently 
robust. The claim that music is structured hierarchically implies that there are events in 
musical experience that are judged to be more important than others. This can be found to 
apply to several aspects of music. The division of a constant repetitive pulse into bars with 
weak and strong beats is an example of such hierarchical structuring in temporal musical 
experience.85 This is especially apparent in irregular time signatures, such as 5/8 (when split 
into groups of say, 2+3).  The fact that we hear some melodies as embellished or ornamented 
versions of an underlying melodic idea also shows that some structural features are perceived 
as hierarchically more important than others. (This last mentioned example is evidenced by 
the fact that when recalling melodies in experimental situations, subjects are likely to 
remember key events in the melodic contour that are deemed as important to the melody’s 
identity. See Patel, 2008a:194ff.) The importance of a tonal centre in the majority of the 
world’s music is another example of elements being heard as more important than others. 
This sense of tonality also accounts for the phenomenon of being able to pick out ‘wrong 
notes’ in a melody. Wrong (or sometimes referred to as ‘sour’) notes are pitches that are not 
related to those otherwise associated with the tonal centre.86 In Western terms, we would 
describe wrong notes as being alien to the key that the music is being played in. The ability to 
hear out-of-key notes, as well as out-of-chord diatonic notes, suggests that some notes do not 
form part of the established hierarchy of pitches in a piece.87 Another example is the 
                                                                                                                                                        
sentences by adding phrases to the beginning or end of the sentence, such as ‘Mary said that her cat has failed to 
catch any mice’, ‘John asked if Mary said that her cat has failed to catch any mice’, ‘Peter doubted that John 
asked if Mary said that her cat has failed to catch any mice’, and so on. Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) 
suggest that recursion is the single part of language cognition and computation that has no analogue in the 
communication systems of other animals. Cross and Rohrmeier (2009) argue that recursive structuring of chord 
progressions can be found in musical phrases, such as the jazz standard ‘Afternoon in Paris’. 
85 Note that I am not claiming that this forms part of the syntax of music itself. However, the hierarchical 
arrangement of pulses into measures acts in tandem with other factors to emphasise syntactically important 
events in musical phrases. 
86 For a relevant perceptual study in this regard, see Trainor and Trehub (1992). 
87 Lerdahl and Jackendoff supply a good example. Imagine listening to a CD. It is likely that if a speck of dust 
resulted in the second chord (for example, a ii chord) of a phrase not being rendered, the listener would be less 
perturbed than had the speck of dust eliminated the resolution of a cadence at the end of the phrase (Lerdahl & 
Jackendoff, 1983:107). 
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automatic adjustment that listeners make when hearing out-of-tune notes. A mistuned note is 
heard as, for example, a flat A, and not a new pitch-class altogether. 
 
The importance of this structural arrangement should become apparent when the reader 
pauses to consider if the above discussion of hierarchal ordering applies to traffic lights or the 
rules of most sport matches. With traffic lights, no single coloured light can be deemed as 
more important than any other (although ignoring a red light usually has dire consequences). 
Within the ‘syntax’ of traffic lights, one does not think of the red light as implying the green, 
or the previous orange light somehow influencing our interpretation of the subsequent red 
light. Likewise, from the stance of a football match, a goal does not rank any higher than the 
kickoff when assessing the well-formedness of the match.88 With music, on the other hand, a 
previous event does influence the assessment of subsequent events. For example, in the jazz 
standard “Afternoon in Paris”, bars 4 to 6 have the following chord progression (the tonic is 
C major): B flat min7, E flat7, A flat (example after Rohrmeier & Cross, 2009). Seen in 
isolation, this is a standard ii-V-I progression, much like the D min7b5, G maj7, C maj that 
ends the phrase (bars 8 to 9). However, the chord progression of bars 4 to 6, while seemingly 
resulting in the tonicisation of A flat, is not experienced as qualitatively similar to the 
progression that ends the phrase. The progression that ends the phrase is structurally more 
important, because it re-establishes the tonic, and it is heard as such. The cadence in A flat 
does not steam-roll the overall tonality of C; it must be heard in the context of C major. In 
hierarchical terms, it is subservient to the final cadence. This is a strong perception, and we 
expect it to be reflected in any formalisation of musical syntax as it would appear to directly 
affect our apprehension of the meaning of a musical utterance. 
 
It is clear that music boasts some sort of syntax in virtue of the fact that the ordering of 
constituent elements has an impact on what listeners consider to be the meaning of an 
utterance. This ordering is hierarchical, with some events being of greater structural 
significance than others. The grammatical structuring of language is also hierarchical, 
although it is not yet entirely clear whether this is the same sort of hierarchy as we find in 
musical structure. (That is, it is hard to say that there are elements in a linguistic utterance 
that are structurally more important than others – although phrase heads do come to mind. 
                                                 
88 Of course, in language and music, the finite elements themselves have the potential to be combined in a 
syntactical manner (in the way the ‘ran’ is usually used as a verb, and not a noun; or the tension created by the 
leading note in much Western music). This ‘vocabulary’ is not a feature of traffic lights or chess moves.  
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Comparison of the hierarchy between the syntactical dimensions of music and language is 
blurred by the semantic dependency of linguistic grammar.) Both music and language consist 
of discrete elements that are ordered in some way. There are orderings of constituent 
elements that appear to make no sense at all, and that are perceived as musically unsound – 
think of, for example, a toddler bashing randomly on the keys of a piano. It would thus 
appear that some sort of set of rules or principles guides the formation of intelligible musical 
utterances. In a similar manner, the ordering of constituent elements in language (formatives 
and words) has an impact on the meaning of utterances over and above the meaning of those 
individual elements in isolation. And, of course, there are orderings of words that make 
absolutely no sense at all. Thus, the rule-bound combination of discrete elements in a 
hierarchical fashion is common to both language and music. Both systems are organised 
syntactically. 
 
It is far from established precisely how closely the syntax of language and music are related. 
However, it seems safe to say that in a broad sense, both language and music are governed by 
syntactical principles that differentiate them as communicative systems from traffic lights and 
flag signals. This can act as a premise in the following discussion of how syntax affects the 
formation of cognitive and affective states in music and language.  
 
(The reader will note that the conditions laid down for syntax in the discussion above 
superficially apply to what is commonly designated as large-scale form. Formal arrangement 
is hierarchical: there appear to be parts of form that stand out as architecturally more 
significant than others. In sonata form, we may say that an introduction or a linking passage 
between principal themes is subservient to those themes.89 Large formal structures are 
arguably made up of discrete units: we are able to distinguish A sections and B sections, 
recapitulations and development sections, and so on. However, it is not altogether clear that 
in all cases these can be recombined as discrete units according to a set of rules. In a sonata 
by Beethoven, it would be inconceivable to substitute the recapitulation of one sonata with 
that of another in the same key. Thematic coherence between the sections would make this a 
futile exercise that would distort any syntax- or form-related meaning. However, the case 
becomes more plausible if we consider substituting a trio section into an 18th century minuet 
                                                 
89 We may be able to distinguish between themes and linking passages by the ‘density of meaning’. Rephrased 
in terms such as those we have been using, we may say that a large part of our ability to distinguish principal 
themes from linking and introductory passages is the ability of such material to evoke cognitive and affective 
states in the mind of the listener to a more significant degree than we find with linking passages. 
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and trio, preserving the correct key relationships. With regard to rules, it could be argued that 
the units that make up large formal structures are bound by some sort of rule system, possibly 
involving thematic coherence. We will return to this problem in the next chapter. As the 
reader may have guessed, the distinction that renders a syntactical approach distinct from one 
of formal analysis is the constraint on the perception of large-scale structural relationships. It 
will become apparent that other aspects of musical syntax, such as metric-pattern regularity, 
do not impose themselves at the level of large-scale structure.) 
 
 
5.4 Syntax and the formation of cognitive and affective states 
 
In earlier chapters, it was suggested that the apprehension of both music and spoken language 
results in the formation of cognitive and affective states in the minds of competent listeners. 
The co-existence of a multitude of such states, elicited by virtue of the musical stimulus and 
conscious consideration thereof, give rise to the perception that music is somehow 
meaningful. When combined with semantics, the elicitation of such states is characteristic of 
linguistic communication via speech. In addition to a lack of semantics, it has also been 
suggested several times that what distinguishes music from language is the fact that it tends 
to elicit affective states to a far greater degree. Discussion of how music can elicit cognitive 
states was delayed, as was a discussion of how it is possible that structural elements of music 
might give rise to affective states. The reader will recall that in language, structure is mostly 
dictated by the demands of syntax, and that syntax is a means to semantic ends. Structure in 
language is subservient to efficacy of communication. The structure of everyday speech has 
little to do with eliciting affective states. The primary purpose of the organization of words in 
an utterance is to convey semantic meaning reliably, and thus allow for the formation of 
cognitive states. We do not use linguistic structure to induce affective states – far easier 
would be the use of articulation, prosody, and other factors similar to those performative 
surface variables outlined in the previous chapter. Of course, in poetry and prose, writers 
often utilize linguistic structure for aesthetic means. Any person who has read or seen a play 
by Shakespeare will be able to attest to the fact that the manner in which language is wielded 
is an important conveyer of affect. Had Shakespeare preserved the semantic meaning of many 
of his sentences, but altered their grammatical construction, the artistic result would not have 
been the same. 
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I would like to contend that this part of the linguistic analogy does not extend to music. That 
is, in music, structure does in fact lead to the formation of affective states on a regular basis. 
Indeed, it is the presence of these affective states that have led to music often being described 
as an ‘aesthetic’ medium, as opposed to the largely communicative uses to which language is 
put. With everyday linguistic statements, one would not expect the manner in which words 
are combined to play a pivotal role in arousing affective states. However, with music, it 
seems to be the case that various structural arrangements do indeed contribute to the 
elicitation of affective states. It is difficult to imagine how a particular musical statement 
could achieve the same affective state if it has been changed in some structural way.  
 
To return once again to our example of Tchaikovsky’s loud orchestral chord, it is hard to see 
how the composer could have made the music as affective without that specific musical 
figure. A soft but dissonant chord would simply not be a satisfactory substitute: it would not 
achieve the same ends. Had the loud chord been placed elsewhere (say, halfway through the 
next phrase), the resultant affective state in the mind of the listener would not be the same. 
Compare this scenario to the semantic content of a sentence informing you of something. The 
semantic content of a linguistic utterance can result in an affective state, by triggering a 
cognitive state that then results in an affect. The listener apprehends the actual semantic 
meaning that constitutes the cognitive state, and then realises the implication of that meaning. 
This realisation can trigger an affective state (e.g., of alarm or sadness). Let us say that John 
has just received a telephone call. The lady on the other end of the line stated: 
“Congratulations, you have just won the lottery draw”. Now, the resultant affective state was 
not achieved by directly causal means. Rather, in John’s mind, a cognitive state is constituted 
by the apprehension of a proposition. This cognitive state relating to winning the lottery may 
be something like John’s belief that he has just won the lottery. Now, John is an excitable 
fellow, and having achieved the belief that he has won the lottery, is subject to an affective 
state that we can call ‘delight’. Where does this affective state of delight come from? It is not 
the result of any performative aspect of the caller’s voice. Rather, it results from the cognitive 
state of believing that he has won the lottery. Furthermore, that affective state in the mind of 
John would not be different had the structure of the sentence changed: “The lottery draw has 
been won by you, congratulations”. Thus, it is the semantics and not the structure of the 
sentence that has, via a chain from cognitive to affective states, resulted in the affect of 
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delight.90 Now consider something analogous in the case of music. If we had changed the 
order (that is, the structure) of the notes in a piece of music, such as placing Tchaikovsky’s 
loud chord at the end of the phrase instead of the beginning, or swapping the V and I chords 
at the end of a Bach chorale, we would not arrive at the same affective state had we not made 
a change. Reflection on such an elementary example shows how important structure is to 
affect in music. In everyday language, affective states arise regularly from semantics, but 
only in exceptional circumstances from the structure of the sentence involved. In music, 
structure is vital to affect. The basis on which a piece of music is constructed is important and 
holds consequences for the resultant affective states in the mind of the listener. 
 
Above, it was mentioned that with language, semantics can lead to affective states by virtue 
of a chain starting with a cognitive state. We will examine such a chain below, and consider 
the difference in the nature of the causality of affective states that are the result of chains of 
other states, and those that are caused by properties of the sounds themselves as they are 
immediately represented in the mind, in a manner similar to automatic reaction. Thereafter, 
the discussion will turn to the structure of music and its ability to elicit affective states. At 
this point, I would once again like to emphasise that I am not able to offer a complete account 
of syntax in music. To do so is not only beyond the scope of this study, but is also a daunting 
task for any musicologist. What would be required would be an immense amount of 
ethnomusicological and ethnographic evidence, tied to data from cognitive musicology in a 
theoretically meaningful manner. When one considers that debates about the fundamental 
nature and theoretical description of linguistic grammar are still lively some five decades 
since modern linguistics took off, the task for musicology seems to be imposing. However, it 
is a task that evolutionary musicology in particular will have to face up to in the future, and I 
think that it is not beyond reasonable expectation that fundamental theories can be forwarded 
already. Nonetheless, we will step off from the premise stated above, namely, that music can 
indeed be said to have a syntactical dimension.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Let us ignore, at present, the deep structure of these two sentences, as posited by theories in transformational 
grammar. In such theories, the two sentences would indeed be seen as identical in deep structure. The fact that 
these two sentences share a deep structure explains why they mean the same thing. 
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5.5 Mechanisms of causality 
 
5.5.1 Directly causal mechanisms and cognitive-causal links in language 
 
We will now consider the claim that cognitive states can themselves induce affective states. 
This is a subtle point that is best explained in terms of the processes of causality under which 
affective states are produced in the minds of apprehenders of musical and linguistic 
utterances. For ease of explanation, we should once again consider the case of language. The 
semantic content of a sentence is determined by the meaning of the words in a particular 
arrangement. In addition to the lottery example described in the previous section, consider the 
following hypothetical case. A robber bursts into a bank, shouting profanities and making 
demands at a high volume. In addition to the robber informing the teller (in virtue of the 
semantic meaning of the words that he uses) that he is robbing the bank, his aggressive tone 
serves to elicit an affective state in the mind of the teller. In this situation, the aggressive tone, 
as represented in the mind of the teller, is in a directly causal relationship with the affective 
state. If the robber had burst in and shouted aggressively in a foreign language, there still 
would have been an affect experienced by the bank teller, such as an affect of fear or alarm, 
resulting from the manner in which the utterance was delivered.91 
 
Let us now try to imagine this example with an absolute minimum of utterance parameters 
that act in a directly causal manner. Imagine that the bank robber stood in the queue, and 
when he got to the teller, he slipped a note under the glass window that read as follows: “This 
is a bank robbery. If you raise an alarm, your life will be in danger, because I have a gun. 
Hand over the cash in silence.” Few would deny that our hypothetical bank teller will 
experience an affective state of fear. But without a directly causal dimension to the utterance, 
how is the teller’s affective state of fear achieved? After all, there was no tone of voice or 
aggression conveyed on the written note.92 The answer has already been put forward in the 
previous section: it is the apprehension of the semantic meaning of the utterance (that is, a 
cognitive state), that triggers the corresponding affective state. 
                                                 
91 It should be added that even if the bank teller does not put two and two together and realise that a robbery is 
in progress, the inflection of the robber’s voice will still elicit an affective state of some kind. This is a 
prediction made by this theory: even if semantic and pragmatic concerns play no part in the apprehension of an 
utterance, the manner of delivery of the utterance can and will result in an affective state by directly causal 
means. 
92 Of course, I am not denying that affective states can be elicited by the features of visual-based 
communication. Think of pictures and paintings, for example. 
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It is clear, then, that the semantic meaning of a sentence can result in the formation of an 
affective state. For an affective state to be realised in the mind of the apprehender of an 
utterance, a causal relationship is at some point required. At some point in the chain of 
cognitive states (beliefs and so forth), there needs to be a causal link that results in the 
affective state. However, because this causal link is in a chain of cognitive states, we can say 
that it is not directly causal. This differentiates such an affective state’s causal history from 
that of affective states elicited by (for example) the inflection of the voice. In the case of the 
first bank robber example, where the robber shouts aggressively, the affective state in the 
mind of the teller is the result of a directly causal process. However, in the example with the 
note, and all other examples that depend on semantics to elicit the affective state, let us say 
that a cognitive-causal link is in operation. Hence, there are two ways in which an affective 
state can be achieved: (a) in a directly causal manner, with no propositional or deductive 
mediation between the stimulus (as it is immediately represented in the mind) and the 
resultant affective state. The affect is involuntary, similar to any other hard-wired reaction 
(given that the listener is competent and is not conditioned to react differently to this 
stimulus); and (b) the affective state is achieved by a cognitive-causal link, where a cognitive 
state results in the elicitation of an affective state, as in the case of semantics causing affects. 
 
 
5.5.2 The elicitation of cognitive states from musical utterances 
 
We saw in the last chapter that a primary mental manifestation of linguistic utterances was 
the cognitive state, often by means of semantics. Semantics also leads to the elicitation of 
affective states by a causal path that we have termed a cognitive-causal link. In addition, in 
cases where characteristics of performance such as voice inflection and prosody affect 
meaning, we noted that spoken language is capable of resulting in directly causal affective 
states. We must now turn to the question of whether music can elicit cognitive states. The 
claim has already been made that music does have this power to some degree. What remains 
is for us to reconsider the state of the argument with regard to directly causal affective states, 
and affective states that are the result of cognitive-causal links. In other words, we must 
consider whether music is able to elicit affective states without the benefit of intermediary 
cognitive states. This is where music’s lack of semantics becomes most apparent. The reader 
may recall that we have already ruled out the idea that music has a semantic dimension, as 
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‘semantics’ defined as per our modified Tarskian definition (SDS) applies only in cases of 
arbitrary symbolism. In language, the cognitive-causal link was the result of semantics: 
namely, the self-reflexive apprehension of the cognitive state itself leads to an affective state. 
One of language’s peculiar powers is the use of otherwise arbitrary symbols to convey 
messages that can have a major bearing on the psychological state of the listener. But is an 
analogous scenario applicable to music? Without semantics, can the sorts of cognitive states 
that are the result of musical experience lead to affective states via a cognitive-causal link? 
For this to be the case, we are looking for a scenario where a chain of cognitive states elicited 
by musical experience can result in an affective state. Can such a scenario be found? 
 
One should note that, as pointed out previously, semantics does not do all the work with 
regard to the cognitive states resulting from language use. For example, in the apprehension 
of any utterance with an affective component, a resultant cognitive state could be the 
apprehender’s awareness that she is experiencing an affect. (The verbal report would be of 
the form, “I am experiencing an affective state”. Note that an accurate and complete 
description of that affective state itself is not possible, as affective states are not expressible 
in linguistic terms. The affective state can, however, be given a name, such as ‘fear’ or 
‘alarm’ or ‘foreboding’, and henceforth be used propositionally.) Other cognitive states could 
be beliefs about the psychological state of the utterer, the state of fearing whatever is implied 
by the semantic meaning of the sentence,93 or cognitive states resulting from the actual 
phenomenal experience of the statement (“The inflection of the utterance was aggressive”, as 
opposed to the affective state induced by the property of aggressive inflection).94  
 
With regard to the phenomenal experience of an utterance, it is important to take note of the 
distinction between cognitive states that are effable in principle, and those that are effable de 
facto. Let us suppose that encoded in the mind is a mechanism that plots the inflection of an 
utterance in physical terms – that is, in terms of the frequency of the fundamental and the 
partials of each note in the utterance, a finely grained and quantified representation of the 
temporal and rhythmic character of the utterance, a highly detailed representation of 
amplitude, and so on. In such a case, the apprehender may not be consciously privy to all the 
details of an otherwise automatic mental analytical operation. Rather, the apprehender may 
                                                 
93 Remember that ‘fear’ is an affective state, but the propositional attitude ‘X fears that p’ is a cognitive state. 
94 Note, too, that in the case of cognitive states resulting from the phenomenal experience of the utterance, some 
states may be conscious and others unconscious. This is discussed in the main text (the distinction between 
effability in principle and effability de facto). 
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simply have conscious access to a phenomenal judgement that is the end product of the 
mental analysis. The apprehender may not be able to say “The amplitude of F1 at time t was 
x”, but he may be able to say “The middle of the sentence was loud”. This phenomenal 
judgement is a sort of mental shorthand for the complex quantified representation that is 
apprehended. Nonetheless, the quantified representation that is unconscious is in principle an 
effable (and therefore cognitive) state, as it can be (in principle) represented in language. 
Such representations are, after all, the very stuff of propositional-computational complexes.  
 
Musical utterances can result in cognitive states in a manner analogous to that of language, as 
described above. Along with the elicitation of affective states, the apprehender of the musical 
utterance can form a cognitive state about a particular affective state. While we may not be 
able to describe in language a particular affect associated with a piece of music, we are able 
to entertain a cognitive state that has the affect as its object. The apprehender will be able to 
report on a belief about the affect in question, for example. The apprehender is able to utter 
general statements about the affect (e.g., “This music makes me feel sad”), without being able 
to ultimately describe the affect in question (the state of sadness).  
 
The idea of states that are effable de facto and effable in principle apply to the case of music 
as well. For instance, the mind may represent a tone quite literally, as the fundamental 
frequency and several partials in a detailed manner. However, the representation in such a 
fine-grained format is probably not available to consciousness – a contention I share with 
Raffman (1988; 1993). Instead, we perceive the sensations we call ‘pitch’ and ‘timbre’. 
Nonetheless, the frequencies and relative volume of the fundamental and partials are, in 
principle, effable. Given an apparatus that can match the detail of the format used in this 
subconscious representation, all available details will be communicable in language. 
However, what bubbles up to consciousness is not a fine-grained representation of the 
harmonic spectrum of a note, but rather a perception of pitch and timbre. This is precisely the 
same case as above: namely, mental shorthand for a quantified representation in the mind of 
the listener. However, a statement such as “The first E-flat in this piece was played slightly 
sharp” results from a cognitive state, and is of course perfectly effable de facto, and the fine-
grained quantified representation in the mind is effable in principle. Indeed, statements about 
the surface details of a musical piece are possible. The listener can comment on form, key, 
tuning, instrumentation, and so on, as these are aspects of the musical experience that are 
manifested in the mind as cognitive states. There seems to be little reason to doubt that it is 
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cognitive states that are at the root of statements about surface details and the relationship of 
the constituent elements of a musical piece (such as form). Our beliefs about the structural 
surface of a piece of music are reportable, even when we may have overlooked some aspect 
of form, or have failed to see some formal relationship that the composer intended us to see. 
 
It is in this manner that music results in cognitive states. But can these cognitive states result 
in affective states in the same way that semantics in language can lead to affective states? 
Can we experience a music-induced cognitive state that leads to an affective state? I would 
like to argue that cognitive-causal chains are a unique characteristic of semantics, and are 
therefore one would not expect to find them in music. In other words, I am contending that in 
music, a chain of cognitive states relating to the music itself cannot result in an affective 
state. Two immediate problems face this claim. First, we have noted that the syntactical 
properties of a musical utterance, which can themselves be represented in the mind as 
cognitive states, result in the formation of affective states. This appears to be in contradiction 
with the above contention that musical experience does not feature cognitive-causal chains. 
Second, the seasoned listener of music will readily tell us that music often does refer to things 
beyond itself; hence, in some sense, music has reference and therefore a semantic dimension. 
This is even true in music that has no programme. Parody, quotation, and arguably genre-
specific musical figures are all cases of music referring beyond itself, to situations beyond the 
bounds of the immediate musical experience. While these two objections are easy to 
formulate separately, they are both answered with reference to music’s lack of semantics. Let 
us consider these challenges in turn. 
 
It has been argued that the syntactical arrangement of the constituent elements of a musical 
utterance have an impact on meaning. It has also been argued that syntactical arrangements 
have an impact on both cognitive and affective states. A particular chord has a structure 
which can be explained in terms of syntax, and is perfectly expressible in language. One can 
describe the notes that make up the chord, their individual fundamental frequencies, the 
quality of the chord in music-theoretical terms, and so on. These are all represented in the 
mind as cognitive states. But that chord, placed in its syntactic context, may also have a 
tangible effect on the formation of affective states. The composer, in using that specific chord 
at that specific time, is able to induce an affect in the listener. So how can it be that features 
of the musical utterance that are represented in the mind as cognitive states do not result in 
affects? The answer, I think, has to do with a distinction between the experience of music and 
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propositional knowledge about music. I would like to contend that there is no link between 
these cognitive states and the affective states resulting from a particular musical figure. 
Rather, the affective state is not the result of cognitive apprehension of the musical figure in 
question – that is, the affect is not caused by anything propositionally known about the 
musical utterance. The affect is instead the result of a directly causal relationship between the 
experience of the musical figure (i.e. the immediate representation of the stimulus), and the 
affective state. This contention amounts to the claim that a listener can be privy to all 
available propositional knowledge with regard to a musical utterance, but will only be able to 
form an affective state if the utterance is actively experienced. That is, a causal relationship 
can only hold if the listener has experienced a musical stimulus. A single musical figure can 
be explained in propositional terms, but without the benefit of experiencing the musical 
figure itself, no causal relationship can result.95 It is not the cognitive realization of the 
structure that leads to the affective state, but rather the experience of the structure. This is a 
directly causal relationship between the immediate representation of the stimulus in the 
listener’s mind and the resultant mental state. 
 
Another way to consider this scenario is by comparison with language. With semantic states 
(which are cognitive states), deduction and induction is possible. It is possible to form 
cognitive states with regard to linguistic utterances, and from the semantics of the utterance, 
infer other cognitive states. It is this scenario that resulted in the postulation of cognitive-
causal links: the realisation of the implications of the semantic meaning of an utterance can 
ultimately result in an affect. The reading of an otherwise causally neutral written note can 
result in the realisation that one is late for a meeting, or has forgotten a birthday, or is about 
to undergo a silent bank robbery. This inference from the original semantic meaning of the 
utterance to a cognitive state resulting in affect constitutes a cognitive-causal link. Now 
consider music. Except under exceptional circumstances, music has no equivalent to 
semantics. Mental states resulting from musical experience cannot be used to infer other 
mental states. Having apprehended the structure of a piece of music, one cannot use this 
information to infer other cognitive states, which will then result in the realisation of an 
affective state. Induction and deduction are not possible without semantic content, and it is 
                                                 
95 It may help the reader to recall that it is the affective mental state that is inexpressible in language, not the 
musical figure itself. Hence, aspects of the musical figure can be represented in a cognitive state, but the affect 
that results from experiencing the musical figure is not effable. 
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contended here that semantic content is precisely the sort of thing that music does not have.96 
Cognitive-causal chains, with cognitive states leading to affects, are what constitute 
deduction and induction in the mind. If musical experience does not result in semantic states, 
it cannot result in deduction and induction, and it cannot feature cognitive-causal chains of 
mental states. The sorts of cognitive states that are present in musical experience are not 
semantic. They are at best cognitive states about the music itself, and not about anything 
beyond the music. The only time that this is not the case is when musical figures are agreed 
by public convention to refer to something beyond the music. In such cases, music is being 
attributed referential properties, and is for all intents and purposes acting in a semantic 
manner akin to language. This leads us to the second objection. 
 
The second objection to the idea that musical experience does not feature cognitive-causal 
links was that musical pieces often do feature figures that refer to things beyond music. A 
good example is Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, which features quotations of the Russian and 
French national anthems, as a direct reference to the French and Russian armies involved in 
Napoleon’s disastrous retreat from Russia in 1812. Here, musical figures unambiguously 
refer to things beyond music. In a hypothetical situation, a particularly misinformed and 
paranoid Russian patriot, oblivious to the Overture’s program, may form a cognitive state 
regarding the two anthems being used, and interpret the music as somehow signalling conflict 
between the two nations. Henceforth, he may arrive at an affective state of ‘fear’ when he 
remembers that his neighbour is French. This appears to a case of a musical experience where 
a cognitive state begets an affect. Therefore, it would appear that a cognitive-causal chain is 
indeed in operation, and that a music-induced cognitive state has resulted in an affective state. 
The answer to this objection once again lies in the fact that music does not boast semantics. 
In purely absolute music, the notes and structures of musical utterances would not refer to 
                                                 
96 There is, of course, the contention that if one syntactic event implies another whose experience will result in 
an affective state, a cognitive-causal chain is present (for example, a particular chord implies a particular 
resolution, that when experienced, results in an affective state). However, I believe that this argument can be 
countered in three ways. The first counter-argument is admittedly rather weak: in such cases, the former 
syntactic event, which implies the latter resulting in an affective state, is acting in a manner analogous to 
semantics (i.e. a semantic scenario is actually present). That is, it is referring to the latter syntactic event, and by 
these semantic means, is resulting in a cognitive-causal link. The second counter-argument is that the rules and 
principles governing the implication of one chord by another may be so weak that several resolutions are 
possible, and therefore, no single syntactic event is implied by another. There are a multiplicity of possible 
implications that a single syntactic event may imply; therefore, it cannot be said to be referring to any future 
syntactic event in particular. The third counter-argument is related to the second, in that it may be that only the 
experience of the latter syntactic event will result in an affective state. In other words, without the experience of 
one of the possible implied syntactic events, no affect is experienced. I believe this case to be the strongest 
argument against the contention, and a similar argument is featured in the main text. 
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anything. However, exceptional and artificial circumstances can be thought out with non-
absolute music. These are circumstances of public convention, and are equivalent to the 
public conventions that result in the words of a language having particular referents (as 
manifested in sounds and in written form). Public convention allows us to say that ‘cat’ refers 
to furry four-footed felines, and that a certain combination of sound structures, by virtue of 
being an anthem, refers to either France or Russia. In other words, when a musical figure is 
agreed by convention to refer to something beyond music, it is not simply operating in a 
manner analogous to semantics in language. It is semantics. There is no qualitative difference 
here: when musical figures have conventional, non-musical meanings, music is being treated 
like language. In these cases, music has been attributed a semantic dimension by the listener 
by virtue of public convention. And where there is semantics, there are cognitive-causal links. 
As long a musical utterance is semantics-free, there will be no cognitive-causal chains 
possible, and cognitive states will not lead to affective states. 
 
Of course, we often attribute conventional, public meanings to musical figures. In this regard, 
music is given semantic properties and functions like language. In practice, this is a regular 
occurrence. It is on these grounds that programmatic music operates. Quotation and parody of 
musical style also depend on musical figures being treated semantically. However, if we were 
able to imagine an idealised case without such semantic references, we would find that there 
are no cognitive-casual links in musical experience. It is only when music is used as language 
that it boasts this linguistic property at all. Otherwise, the absence of cognitive-causal links is 
a major disanalogy between music and language as communicative media. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF MUSICAL 
SYNTAX 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
[Similarities between music and language] include the existence of multiple levels of 
combinatorial organization, hierarchical (and recursive) structuring between elements in 
sequences, grammatical categories that can be filled by different physical entities, 
relationships of structure versus elaboration, and context-dependent grammatical functions 
involving interdependent relations between elements. These similarities are interesting 
because they suggest basic principles of syntactic organization employed by the human mind.  
(Patel, 2008a:267) 
 
 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that from a philosophical point of view it is profitable 
to think of music as being organised syntactically. Changes in the ordering of the constituents 
of a musical utterance result in changes in the meaning perceived by the listener. Hence, it 
would appear that the principles governing the structure of a musical statement contribute to 
its meaning, and ipso facto, that music boasts some sort of syntactic structuring. It was also 
stressed in the previous chapter that arriving at a definitive description of musical syntax is a 
task beyond the means of the current study (and, arguably, the current state of empirical 
knowledge, especially with regard to our present neuroscientific understanding of musical 
cognition). The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the state of research surrounding musical 
syntax, as well as the nature of the enterprise of formalising relevant empirical data to best 
represent musical syntax theoretically. As has already been suggested, the most 
comprehensive and influential formalisation of a musical syntax is Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s 
A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983; hereafter referred to as ‘GTTM’). Although the 
theory has occasionally come under fire from musicologists inclined toward the ‘New 
Musicology’ paradigm (e.g. Fink, 2001; Cook, 2001b), its impact on studies of music 
cognition has been large and researchers in the field ignore it at their peril.97 
                                                 
97 Approaching from a postmodernist perspective, Fink claims that the ‘surface-depth’ approaches he associates 
with the GTTM ‘[seem] arrogant and naïve, if not simply hopeless’ (2001:103). In the same volume, Nicholas 
Cook suggests that the structuralist approach he sees inherent in the GTTM has the effect of ‘[explaining] music 
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The GTTM is not only important with respect to the details of the theoretical formalisation it 
proposes. It also represents an important disciplinary milestone. Lerdahl and Jackendoff were 
inspired to a theory of this kind due to the interest generated by Leonard Bernstein’s lectures 
at Harvard in 1973 (published as Bernstein, 1976). Bernstein’s lectures were in turn inspired 
by linguist Noam Chomsky’s transformational generative grammar theories of the 1950s and 
1960s (especially Chomsky, 1957; 1965). The GTTM is a complex theory that seeks to 
describe the unconscious abstraction that is made in the mind of an experienced listener when 
encountering a piece of tonal music. Lerdahl and Jackendoff use the term ‘generative’ to 
imply that the application of a set number of rules could result in a listener arriving at a 
structural abstraction of any given tonal piece; or, as Patel (2008a:240) puts it, “the use of 
formal procedures to generate a structural description of a given musical piece”. However, it 
is important to realise that while the ultimate inspiration for the GTTM was the work of 
Chomsky, Lerdahl and Jackendoff sound a stern warning for those embarking on comparative 
studies of music and language: “pointing out superficial analogies between music and 
language, with or without the help of generative grammar, is an old and largely futile game” 
(Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983:5). The GTTM does not simply attempt to apply the tools and 
techniques of generative grammar theories to music cognition. There are none of the strained 
comparisons between the elements of music and parts of speech, such as nouns and verbs, 
which can be found in Bernstein’s lectures. The famous syntactic trees that are featured in the 
GTTM do not relate to music in the manner which Chomsky and other linguists mapped the 
syntactical constituents of sentences, but rather illustrate the hierarchy of events in terms of 
tension and resolution and structural importance (Patel, 2008a:241, 263; Lerdahl, 2009). 
 
What sorts of similarities exist between music and language that led to Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff being inspired by Chomskian linguistics? First, both music and language are 
arranged according to hierarchies, with structure being realised on multiple levels. In a 
similar manner to which language forms sentences from phrases, phrases from words, and 
words from morphemes; musical utterances are composed of phrases, chords, and individual 
notes, in hierarchical fashion. Lerdahl and Jackendoff also contend that music features 
recursion (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983:14-16). This is a contention that is shared by several 
                                                                                                                                                        
without musicians’ (Cook, 2001b:242). Cook also claims that the commentary on the intelligibility of modern 
musical composition in Lerdahl (1988), which is based on Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983), ‘slips imperceptibly 
from description to prescription, so reinforcing the hegemony of theory’ (Cook, 2001b:252). 
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authors on the topic of music cognition (Cross & Rohrmeier, 2009; Jackendoff, 2009; 
Mithen, 2005:17; Cross, 2005). The idea that structure governs the intelligibility of musical 
statements, and that structure can be elaborated hierarchically, is also an important similarity 
that is brought out by the GTTM (as is pointed out by Patel, 2008a:267). This implies that a 
musical statement is heard in structural terms by the listener, and all the surface features of 
that statement are heard in relation to key structural features.98 Thus, it would appear that the 
syntax of music is complex enough to merit a comparison with that of language. 
 
In a seminal article on the conceptual issues surrounding the investigation into the 
evolutionary origins of language, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) note that the 
investigation of those aspects of our linguistic capacities that appear to be human-specific 
have to do with our syntactic capabilities.99 Following suit, Patel (2008a:267) has noted that 
the presence of another syntactic system in the mind (that is, music) would demand attention 
from cognitive scientists. This idea is present in the GTTM, with its cognitive approach that 
attempts replicate the methodology that has been so successful in the study of language. 
However, as has already been noted, the GTTM was not simply an exercise in the application 
of theory from generative linguistics to musical perception. There are major differences 
between music and language that are reflected in the formalisation, differences such as the 
lack of semantics characteristic of music and the resulting lack of grammatical categories. 
The true influence of the Chomskian influence is most clearly recognised as a matter of 
methodological style. In the words of Lerdahl, reflecting on the 25th anniversary of the 
GTTM,  
 
it was Chomsky’s way of framing issues that attracted us: the supposition of specialized 
mental capacities, the belief that they could be studied vigorously by investigating the 
structure of their outputs, the distinction between an idealized capacity and its external and 
often accidental manifestations, the idea of a limited set of principles or rules that could 
generate a potentially infinite set of outputs, and the possibility that some of these principles 
might be unvarying beneath a capacity’s many cultural manifestations.  
(Lerdahl, 2009:187) 
 
                                                 
98 The reader may profitably draw an analogy with the idea of deep structure in linguistics. 
99 Although, Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch hypothesize that even these syntactical abilities may be the result of 
aspects of cognition that are employed in different ways in other animals. 
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This undoubtedly places the GTTM within the class of theories that was described as 
‘cognitive’ in the previous chapter (as opposed to ‘music-theoretical’).100 It is this approach 
that is characteristic of theories focussing on music perception. The GTTM’s perceptual 
question is as follows: what are the musical intuitions of a listener who is experienced in a 
genre of music when he or she listens to a musical piece? It is worth noting that in the 
GTTM, no assumption is made as to whether there are aspects of musical cognition that are 
music-specific innate mechanisms, or if innate learning mechanisms (whether music-specific 
or domain-general) are present in the mind of the listener. Rather, the theory accounts for 
experienced listeners, who have had adequate exposure to the tonal idiom as to allow them to 
‘understand’ the music. At first blush, this proviso and the fact that the music handled is 
tonal, may lead the reader to believe that the GTTM has relatively narrow concerns (that is, 
the cognition of a specific target group within a specific musical genre). Nonetheless, Lerdahl 
and Jackendoff propose that many of the rules they postulate are universal, and can be found 
in all the musical cultures of the world. Some of these rules do indeed appear in radically 
different types of music. For instance, Temperley (2000) has eloquently argued that the 
grouping and metrical rules proposed by the GTTM are present in most African music. 
However, what is important to note is that the GTTM’s rules are open to empirical 
investigation (granted, however, that there are difficulties involved in quantifying tension and 
relaxation in prolongation reduction – see Patel, 2008:257-258 for a discussion).  
 
The GTTM has been immensely influential in music cognition research. However, the theory 
is not without its problems. Some of these problems have been noted by Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff themselves, and efforts have been made to improve the model. For example, the 
theory of tonal pitch space (Lerdahl, 2001; TPS) has been proposed to further refine the 
notions of tension and relaxation in the GTTM’s prolongational reduction component (that is, 
the perception of the ebb and flow of tension in a musical piece). The TPS theory also allows 
for a quantification of musical tension and relaxation. While claims that tension is perceived 
hierarchically have been supported by research (such as Lerdahl & Krumhansl, 2007), it is 
difficult to apply such analyses to music where harmonic tension is not a driving force, but 
the perception of tension is still generated by other means. An example in this regard is 
Ravel’s famous Bolero, which generates tension by means of orchestration techniques and 
crescendo, instead of through hierarchical tonal arrangement. 
                                                 
100 This despite the fact that Lerdahl discusses the GTTM as a contribution to music theory (see Lerdahl, 2009). 
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The GTTM does not readily address issues of musical meaning. Of course, the work is a 
theory about perception of structure, as opposed to the listener’s musical experience as a 
package. This has been emphasised by Jackendoff’s comment that he has no objection to the 
“enhancement of affect associated with activity” being constitutive of musical meaning 
(Jackendoff, 2009:197). However, if the perception of musical meaning is the result of the 
causal properties of propositional and non-propositional mental states, as has been argued in 
this study, it would appear that structure itself has an important role to play in questions of 
meaning. Theories of musical syntax must seek some sort of connection between syntax and 
meaning in a more comprehensive manner than in the GTTM. Of course, tension is easily 
connected to musical affect. Therefore, it would appear that the GTTM formalisation, in 
combination with the TPS theory, would not require any major theoretical contortions to 
incorporate an account of meaning (provided that meaning is seen in terms of varying levels 
of tension, as perceived by the listener). Indeed, such a view may easily concur with the 
picture that has been painted in this study: syntax resulting in affect. 
 
In this regard, it is worth noting a particularly difficult methodological puzzle concerning the 
study of the respective syntaxes of music and language. The source of this puzzle is (once 
again) semantics. Many of the words making up phrases and sentences have arbitrary 
meanings of their own. It is the meaning of words that helps us to analyse the grammatical 
structure of a sentence. We have no such helping hand when considering the case of music. 
The formatives (that is, minimal syntactically functioning units) of language are arbitrary in 
nature: there is no direct association between the word and its referent beyond the 
conventions of a linguistic community. The result is that words have a cognitive component 
that is divorceable from the manner of delivery. As will be argued below, the equivalent of 
linguistic formatives in music differ in their fundamental nature: they have no dimension of 
arbitrary meaning. Rather, they depend on their sonic features (including manner of 
performance) to elicit states in the mind of the listener. The mere fact that words have 
arbitrary meanings results in grammar being able to influence what is understood by the 
listener, because by virtue of arbitrariness, syntax can allow for a single word to have 
multiple meanings. In music, discrete units, such as short phrases or notes, do not have 
arbitrary meanings. Rather, they act causally. This results in (a) classes of units having one 
sort of causal affect (for example, loud noises only causing alarm-type states); and (b) a 
syntax that does not need to unambiguously handle cases where a formative has more than 
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one meaning. This matter will be further discussed below, as the nature of the formatives of 
language and music are a major disanalogy that has important consequences for how we think 
of musical syntax. 
 
 
6.2 Chomsky’s fundamental assumptions and their applicability to the GTTM and 
cognitive theories 
 
Considering that Lerdahl and Jackendoff have provided one of the most important theories of 
musical syntax in the form of the GTTM, it would be wise to consider some of the influences 
brought to the theory by the study of generative grammar in linguistics. In this regard, it is to 
Chomsky that the authors owe their biggest debt. A cursory reading of the opening chapters 
of Chomsky’s Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) – a work with which Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff were intimately acquainted – provides many basic standpoints on the issue of 
linguistic syntax that could easily be applied to a study of music. 
 
First, both the GTTM and Chomsky’s work use the term ‘generative’ to describe their 
respective syntactic theories. Chomsky defines it thus: “by a generative grammar I mean 
simply a system of rules that in some explicit and well-defined way assigns structural 
descriptions to sentences” (1965:8). The application of these rules ‘generates’ a structural 
description of an utterance. “When we speak of a grammar as generating a sentence with a 
certain structural description, we mean simply that the grammar assigns this structural 
description to the sentence” (Chomsky, 1965:9). This is not far removed from what we see in 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s theory. With the GTTM, the competent listener, upon hearing a 
musical piece, is able to assign a structural description to the piece – in other words, the 
listener is able to abstract structural information pertinent to musical understanding. 
However, Lerdahl notes that whereas Chomsky’s model of language starts from an ideal 
structure (a mental structure) that generates a surface structure (the sentence) through the 
application of rules, the GTTM starts with a surface structure (the musical piece) and works 
backwards to produce the structure that is heard by the listener (Lerdahl, 2009:188). It is 
worth pointing out that the reason this particular arrangement was noted was because Lerdahl 
and Jackendoff could not see how to justify a basic mental blueprint underlying all musical 
pieces from which all well-formed musical pieces could be produced by the application of 
generative rules. In Chomsky’s theory of 1965, a number of basic strings are assumed to 
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underlie all well-formed sentences. These basic strings have a structural description that 
Chomsky calls a “base Phrase-marker” (1965:17ff). Lerdahl and Jackendoff clearly do not 
make such an assumption with regard to music. In fact, the idea is rejected altogether, along 
with Schenker’s belief in an Urlinie underlying all tonal music. Rather, the listener abstracts a 
structure from the piece itself, according to rules. In this way, the GTTM is generative: given 
a musical piece, the listener generates a structural description according to rules. But whereas 
Chomsky’s transformational model steps off from an ideal structure, to which are applied 
generative rules in order to produce a surface, the GTTM starts with the surface and arrives at 
a structural description via the application of generative rules. In Chomsky’s model, it is the 
surface that is generated; in the GTTM, it is the underlying structural description.  
 
The reader should not immediately jump to the conclusion that the GTTM has nothing to tell 
us about the production of musical statements, and that Chomsky’s transformational grammar 
has nothing to tell us about the apprehension of sentences. The reason for Lerdahl (2009) 
explicitly mentioning this distinction has more to do with the sorts of ‘mental objects’ that are 
being assumed in either theory. With the theories of Chomsky, many commentators have 
noted that the cognitive system underlying our linguistic capabilities is constitutive of a 
mental organ dedicated to language (e.g., Pinker, 1994). Throughout Aspects of the Theory of 
Syntax (and many other works) Chomsky refers to ‘knowledge of language’ in the mind of 
the listener. However, it is unclear (and, according to Lerdahl and Jackendoff, unjustifiable) 
that there is similar ‘musical knowledge’ in the mind of the listener. That is, of course, 
excluding the knowledge gained by the competent listener as a result of being immersed in 
the musical idiom in question.101 Rather, it is not assumed is that there is an underlying 
structural description for musical pieces in the listener’s mind that is applicable to all 
idiomatic music, such as knowledge of the Urlinie that would be assumed if Schenker’s 
theory were formalised. Such mental objects are the product of generative processes in the 
GTTM, rather than the start. Structural descriptions are the end product of the application of 
generative musical rules. 
 
This brings us neatly round to the question of ‘rules’ in not only the GTTM, but also with 
regard to our own usage of the term thus far. What are the ‘rules’ of which grammarians and 
music theorists speak? When tackling this question, it is important to remember that a theory 
                                                 
101 Indeed, this is the reason for the proviso mentioned by Lerdahl and Jackendoff that the theory concerns the 
musical intuitions of persons experienced in the tonal genre. 
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of syntax (such as that forwarded by Chomsky) is a theoretical formalism. Such formalisms 
have, as their objects, things like ‘mental organs’ and the ‘language faculty’ (Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch, 2002). The principles by which things like the language faculty produce 
everyday language are usually referred to as ‘rules’, and are the stock in trade of theoretical 
linguistics. It is primarily for this reason, as well as the use of the term in the GTTM, that this 
style has been adopted throughout this study. But these rules are part of a formalism, and as 
such, are merely ways in which we speak of phenomena. Hence, we would not necessarily 
expect to find a ‘rule’ hardwired into the brain, or constituting some neural network. 
However, we may well find a neural network that performs a function that effectively 
implements a rule we have described in the formalism.102 Furthermore, it may be the case that 
a neural network is not dedicated to the implementation of that rule, but simply (by chance) 
acts in a manner that produces the effect we described with a rule.103 
 
Thus, the referent of the term ‘rule’ is merely a formalised description of a mental 
phenomenon. The choice of the term ‘rule’ follows standardised usage in linguistics. In 
addition, I have been using the term ‘well-formed’ to designate musical utterances that are in 
accordance with syntactical rules; this, too, is borrowed from linguistics. Note that these 
terms carry no connotations beyond their technical usage. The syntactical rules governing the 
intelligibility of musical (and linguistic) utterances should not be seen as prescriptive rules 
that somehow impinge on the aesthetic domain of musical experience. A ‘well-formed’ 
utterance that is in accordance with syntactical rules is by no means a determinant of 
aesthetic value, any more than the literary value of a poem or novel is determined by whether 
the sentences it contains are grammatical or not. Rather, this is a matter of musical cognition 
and intelligibility. 
 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff formulated two kinds of mental ‘rules’ to describe the assessment of 
a piece of music in the tonal idiom. These rules are ‘Well-Formedness Rules’ and ‘Preference 
Rules’. It is worth exploring the distinction between these two sorts of rules, as they were 
formulated to address a problem particular to the formalisation of music, and largely absent 
from language. The reader will recall that it was earlier stated (with regard to syntax and its 
                                                 
102 An instructive example of how such abstract operations may be realised in the brain can be found with 
Pinker’s discussion of logical operators (1997:98-111). 
103 The reader should note that this discussion mirrors the debate as to whether mental modules have physical 
reality. Interestingly, two of the most ardent mentalists of recent times, Chomsky and Fodor, argue that mental 
modules are no more than theoretical abstractions, largely divorced from their physical manifestation. See Fodor 
(1998) for more on this debate. 
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implications for the formation of cognitive and affective states) that sounds that could be 
recognised as musical could be thought of as being placed on a continuum of well-
formedness. Some utterances could be understood as music despite featuring several 
syntactical violations. However, at some point, syntactical violations would outweigh 
parsable sequences. In such cases, the utterance would not be deemed music at all. 
Furthermore, there are a large number of utterances that differ with regard to surface 
structure, but are equally syntactical. The problem is precisely how to formalise such a wide 
array of possible conditions, without the help of semantics to guide us in identifying 
ungrammatical utterances. 
 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff attempted to solve the problem of distinguishing the array of possible 
grammatical musical statements by postulating not only rules for well-formedness, but also 
rules encompassing and differentiating possible realisations of grammatical statements. 
 
We have found that a generative music theory, unlike a generative linguistic theory, must not 
only assign structural descriptions to a piece, but must also differentiate them along a scale of 
coherence, weighting them as more or less “preferred” interpretations (that is, claiming that 
the experienced listener is more likely to attribute some structures to the music than others)... 
[they are] well-formedness rules, which specify the possible structural descriptions, and 
preference rules, which designate out of the possible structural descriptions those that 
correspond to experienced listeners’ hearings of any particular piece.  
(Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983:9) 
 
In introducing preference rules, the GTTM is able to describe the myriad of possible fully 
syntactical utterances that are in agreement with well-formedness rules. It must be noted that 
no equivalent of preference rules exists in linguistics. 
 
Part of the challenge that linguists face when constructing grammars is accounting for the 
creative aspect of language, especially in the face of the limited means by which language is 
implemented. This is the famous ‘infinite use of finite means’ characteristic of language: with 
a limited vocabulary and a finite set of rules, language is capable of expressing an unlimited 
number of thoughts, and every user of language can produce and comprehend sentences 
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which have never been uttered before.104 Can a similar thing be said of music? Does music 
boast this ‘creative’ dimension? The analogy is, admittedly, a bit strained in this regard. As 
has been argued at length, the sorts of thoughts expressed in language (namely, propositions) 
are not communicated via musical means. The question of whether an infinite number of 
analogous musical thoughts can be communicated seems to be trivial. In any case, the view 
of communication that was elucidated earlier in this study seems to forgo such discussion of 
communication somehow transferring information from one mind to another. Rather, it was 
suggested that it would be profitable to think of musical communication as an attempt to alter 
the mental states of the listener. If we frame the question about the creativity of music in this 
manner, we would be able to say that musical statements are able to alter mental states in an 
infinite number of ways. 
 
Prominent amongst Chomsky’s basic assumptions is a distinction between competence and 
performance. In terms of language, Chomsky considers competence to be the speaker’s 
knowledge of the language (regardless of whether that knowledge is open to conscious 
introspection or not), while performance is the use of language in everyday situations 
(1965:4). This distinction is often coupled with the notion that linguistic theory deals with an 
“ideal speaker-listener”, that is able to wield language in a manner not limited by non-
grammatical constraints, such as memory limitations and mistakes in application of linguistic 
knowledge (p. 3). The purpose of this ideal speaker-listener assumption has to do with the 
investigation of the mental capacity for language in isolation from factors that otherwise 
disrupt performance. While the performance of speakers is a part of linguistics, it is seen as a 
topic distinct from the construction of grammars.105 It could be noted, however, that 
competence is not reflected perfectly in performance in the real world, but only in the ideal 
conditions assumed for the study of grammars. That is, performance only reflects competence 
perfectly when the speaker-listener is the idealised one assumed by grammarians for the 
purpose of studying the computational procedures underlying language (Chomsky, 1965:4). 
 
Do we need to make such a distinction between competence and performance for our theory 
of music in the mind? It is unlikely. Like Lerdahl and Jackendoff, I find it difficult to justify 
the idea that there is musical knowledge in the mind that is applied to musical pieces, a sort 
                                                 
104 Chomsky attributes this idea to Wilhelm von Humboldt in the Preface to Aspects of the Theory of Syntax 
(1965:v). 
105 Despite this, Chomsky suggests that worthwhile theories of performance all take ideal grammars as a starting 
point. See Chomsky (1965:10ff). 
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of structural yardstick by which musical pieces are judged (that is, serving as the 
‘competence’ part of the dichotomy). This is the view suggested by Raffman (1988; 1993) 
when she suggests that there is a musical schemata in the mind to which incoming musical 
pieces are compared. Of course, I am not denying that musical knowledge can be built up 
over time. But I do not see sufficient reason to posit a mental schema or idealised structure 
for musical pieces in the mind, somehow analogous to Chomsky’s “base Phrase-markers” – a 
limited subset of ideal musical strings in the mind of the listener. It is this justification that 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff also found to be problematic. It underlies the notion of the GTTM 
working backwards, as discussed above. That is, whereas language involves a structural 
description that produces a surface (the sentence) through the application of generative rules, 
musical cognition starts with the surface and then uses rules to generate a structural 
description. I believe that in the case of language, if structural descriptions are such an 
important part of language usage, they may (in some sense) be innate or somehow facilitated 
by mechanisms in the mind of infants to aid with the acquisition of language. It would appear 
that a similar argument for innateness with regard to musical abilities is at odds with current 
evidence (Patel, 2008a:377-385). That is, the case for innate linguistic structural descriptions 
appears to be much more plausible than the idea of innate musical structural descriptions. 
Rather, it may be that the rule system for music apprehension is innate. In other words, 
cognitive processes handy for the generation of musical structural descriptions may well be 
innate, but the structural descriptions themselves by no means are. This is an important point 
to keep in mind when approaching the syntax of music from the vantage point of linguistic 
syntax: whereas a case can be made for innate structural descriptions in language, the same 
cannot be said for music. 
 
A major component of Chomsky’s theories about language is the notion of deep and surface 
structure. The deep structure of a sentence is related to the surface structure by means of 
transformational rules. Chomsky notes that, with regard to a sentence, it is “a deep structure 
that determines its semantic interpretation and a surface structure that determines its phonetic 
interpretation” (1965:16; Chomsky’s emphasis). For example, it is a common deep structure 
that results in the following four sentences meaning roughly the same thing, despite having 
different surface structures (example after Aitchison, 1989:98): 
 
1. Charles captured a rabbit. 
2. A rabbit was captured by Charles. 
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3. It was a rabbit which Charles captured. 
4. What Charles captured was a rabbit. 
 
These four sentences share a deep structure, which determines the semantic interpretation of 
each sentence (and ensures that a competent English speaker’s interpretation of each is 
basically the same). They differ in terms of the means by which they are realised – that is, 
they differ in terms of surface structure, their phonetic interpretation. In Chomsky (1965, 
1972), it is held that the deep structure and the surface structure are linked by ‘grammatical 
transformations’: “rules expressing the relation of deep and surface structure” (Chomsky, 
1972:166; as quoted in Aitchison, 1989:98). 
 
Is it profitable to think of music in terms of deep and surface structure? First, it would be 
important to again remind ourselves that there is no semantic component to music. Therefore, 
any notion of a musical deep structure as related to semantics must be modified. We might 
imagine that a sense of deep structure could be understood if one speaks of either 
elaborations of a basic musical phrase (similar to an Urlinie), or possibly the manner in which 
thematic material is changed or developed in the course of a musical utterance. Let us 
examine this question with regard to the GTTM. Lerdahl and Jackendoff rule out the notion 
of deep structure from their own formalisation (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983:278ff). However, 
they do not write deep structure off altogether. Rather, they suggest that what may be of 
interest are “simple, normative, archetypical forms” underlying more complex surface 
structures (p. 288). They speculate that there may be a sense of ‘transformational rules’ in 
virtue of which the possible surface structures that may be generated from an archetypical 
form. However, they are hesitant to refer to such forms as deep structures (ibid.). Instead, 
they suggest that such archetypical forms (if they exist) are ultimately the products of the 
preference rules expounded in the GTTM.  
 
The problem with thinking about musical syntax in terms of deep structure is two-fold. First, 
music has no semantic component. Deep structure was posited as an explanation for the 
phenomenon of sentences with differing surface structures but similar meanings. Music, it 
would appear, has no such bedrock of semantic meaning. Without semantics, it is difficult to 
see what precisely the purpose of a deep structure for musical utterances is. Second, the 
notion of deep structure assumes mental objects in the mind that serve as the elementary 
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statements. I concur with Lerdahl (2009) that such mental objects are difficult to justify in the 
case of music.  
 
A salient point of difference between music and language that must be reflected in any theory 
of musical syntax is the fact that in music, multiple utterances can be combined in a manner 
that retains (to a large degree) intelligibility. These are cases of voice-leading and polyphonic 
texture, characteristic of many sorts of music in the world. This is also a facet of musical 
syntax that is not handled in the GTTM or any other cognitively-orientated theory of which I 
am aware. This has already been alluded to as the perceived multi-dimensionality of musical 
experience. Music is not only perceived in terms of time (that is, horizontally), it is also 
perceived in terms of space – that is, horizontally, with more than one event being 
apprehended at any given moment. This scenario is not optimal for effective language use, as 
it would hinder the ultimate purpose of propositional communication. It is vital that in 
language performance, semantic meaning is communicated as clearly as possible. With 
musical utterances, however, multiple events can (and do) contribute to the formation of 
meaning-relevant mental states. Future theories of musical syntax must confront this feature 
of musical experience, and recognise it as a major point of difference between music and 
language. 
 
Part of the reason why the generative theories of Chomsky and other linguists of the 1950s 
and 1960s were seen as revolutionary has to do with the fact that universal claims about the 
nature of linguistic behaviour were made. An important objective of modern theoretical 
linguistics has been describing those features of languages and linguistic behaviour that are 
common to all humans. These features underwrite and partially determine the nature of the 
various cultural manifestations of language. Instead of a focus on the phenomenon of 
language as a particular, localized phenomenon, Chomsky and his followers sought to 
describe languages in terms of their commonalities (or, more accurately, in terms of universal 
cognitive features reflected in the output of a hypothesised language faculty). The question of 
universality with regard to musical behaviour has already been discussed at length. The 
GTTM project, too, made certain claims with regard to universality, despite the fact that the 
study was focused on tonal music. However, much empirical work still needs to be conducted 
before the validity of Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s claims can be properly ascertained. 
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6.3 Groups as formatives in musical syntax: a disanalogy between music and language 
 
A fundamental difference between music and language is the nature of the constituent units 
making up utterances. This is particularly noticeable when music is compared to the elements 
in language which we will refer to as ‘formatives’. This word has been chosen after 
Chomsky’s definition, where formatives are seen as “minimal syntactically functioning units” 
(Chomsky & Halle, 1965:98; see also Chomsky, 1965:3). (For a description of formatives in 
a more modern and technical linguistic sense, see Mohanan, 1995:40-43. I will be using 
Chomsky’s definition.) Superficially, what Chomsky is referring to are those bits of language 
that are combined and manipulated by syntactical means: words, affixes, suffixes, and so on 
(that is to say, not only words, but also affixes and suffixes such as ‘de-’, ‘re-’, ‘ex-’, ‘-ed’, 
and ‘-s’, which are subject to description in syntactic terms). Below the level of the 
formative, sounds have no meaning whatsoever and can make no syntactical contribution to 
linguistic utterances. It is formatives that are governed by grammatical rules.  
 
Can we say that there are units similar to Chomsky’s formatives in musical syntax? In other 
words, are there minimal syntactically functioning units in musical utterances, units upon 
which syntactical principles act? It will be argued here that there are. Not to argue for 
minimal syntactically functioning units in music would beg the question of what it is that our 
postulated musical syntax governs, because to assume a musical syntax is to assume that 
there are units that the syntax regulates. It will also be argued that the nature of these minimal 
syntactically functioning units (musical formatives) is radically different from those of 
language. This difference principally stems from the fact that formatives in language are 
essentially arbitrary symbols that act in a cognitive manner, whereas those of music act 
causally. The formatives of language have conventional meanings, and linguistic syntax 
governs these units in virtue of their semantic qualities. Of course, a suffix such as ‘-ed’ does 
not have a referent, but its appendage to a word such as ‘smoke’ can be syntactically 
described and has an impact on semantics. Thus, in language, we can say that formatives are 
‘semantically rich’. According to the model of musical meaning discussed in this study, we 
could say that the formatives of language have the power to elicit cognitive mental states by 
virtue of their function as both syntactic and semantic units. 
 
Musical formatives, on the other hand, do not feature a semantic dimension. Rather, they 
have an impact on mental states by directly causal means. To appreciate this point fully, we 
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will have to consider in more detail what exactly constitutes a musical formative. The 
definition cited above calls for a ‘minimal’ syntactically functioning unit. In the case of 
language, this can be taken to refer to the smallest unit that can be said to have any meaning 
at all, or whose combination with another unit results in a change in meaning for that unit. 
Minimal units are not, however, the only parts of linguistic utterances upon which syntax has 
an impact. Units above the level of the formative are also affected by syntax, for example 
noun and verb phrases. In this manner, we can say that formatives are the bottom in a 
hierarchy of syntactically relevant groups, up to the level of a sentence (i.e., formatives and 
words, to phrases, to sentences). It seems to make sense to say that music operates in a 
similar manner. Single sound events are at the bottom of the hierarchy; what follows are 
motives, then phrases, and so on. That is, musical formatives (single musical discrete 
elements) are the things that are minimal syntactical functioning units.  
 
What are examples of single musical discrete elements or musical formatives? The most 
obvious candidate would be a single note – a sound with a clearly definable fundamental 
pitch and a duration, which is discrete.106 However, further reflection will reveal that a single 
note cannot serve this function adequately in light of music’s lack of semantics. With 
language, any sound can serve as a formative: all a linguistic community needs to do is agree 
on what that formative refers to, or what syntactical role it is chosen to fulfil. What separates 
formatives from other discrete ambient sounds is the fact that an arbitrary meaning has been 
assigned to the formative. Thus, a drum strike can count as a formative in English, with a 
syntactic function, if a community agrees on a meaning for the sound (and, consequently, a 
syntactic function – for example, the drum strike could be a name, and fulfil the function that 
regular nouns do; alternatively, it could be used as a verb, with similar syntactic results). 
Arguably, certain suffixes and affixes that are combined with other formatives are 
semantically based in some sense, as they always affect the semantics of other formatives in 
the same manner. For example, despite not having a fixed referent, the affix ‘non-’ implies 
negation, as in ‘non-governmental’; ‘-ex’ is usually associated with ‘former’ or ‘no longer’, 
as in ‘ex-communist’.107  
 
                                                 
106 The property of discreteness means that there is no more sense in speaking of ‘half a note’ then speaking of 
‘half a suffix’. 
107 This is not a hard and fast rule. It is arguable that the suffix ‘-al’ has no particular sense, but does act 
syntactically in rendering words in their adjective form, e.g. ‘fundamental’, ‘syntactical’, and ‘formal’. A similar 
example is the past tense function of ‘-ed’, as in ‘worked’, ‘played’, and ‘faded’. 
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However, the notes of musical utterances have no such semantic foundation, nor can they be 
used predictably to change syntactical function. An E flat in isolation is not identifiable in 
terms of its potential function in a musical phrase (if it is considered in isolation). 
Furthermore, a single E flat is indistinguishable as a musical note unless it is embedded in a 
musical phrase with other notes. Without an arbitrarily assigned meaning, an E flat may as 
well be simply another ambient sound that happens to have a discernable pitch. Only when 
the E flat is in combination with another pitch, and a relationship between the pitches is 
established, is a musical formative in evidence. It is the relationship between two musical 
discrete elements that constitutes a musical formative. Therefore, the minimal syntactically 
functioning units of music must consist of at least two musical discrete elements, so that a 
syntactical relationship is at least implied. And, whereas a linguistic formative can elicit 
cognitive states in virtue of its semantic qualities, a musical formative can only act causally, 
and hence result in non-propositional affective states.108 
 
The issue of minimal syntactically functioning units can be described in terms of the theory 
of cognitive states that has been the focus of this study. Linguistic formatives function as 
syntactical units in virtue of their impact on semantics. The result of semantics on mental 
states is of a cognitive nature: words, for example, are represented in the mind as cognitive 
states. Cognitive states are propositional in nature, and are achieved by non-directly causal 
means. Musical sounds (indeed, the remainder of sounds) achieve mental states largely due to 
causal  relationships, where the sound as it is immediately represented in the mind can be 
seen as being in a causal relationship with regard to the resultant non-propositional mental 
state. This is the difference between musical formatives and formatives in language. In 
language, minimal syntactically functioning units have a cognitive dimension, and in music 
minimal syntactically functioning units have a causal dimension. Thus, the formatives of 
language can result in cognitive states, whereas musical formatives cannot, and instead 
operate principally by virtue of a causal relationship between the sound and a resultant non-
propositional mental state. 
 
 
                                                 
108 This discussion of musical formatives can be fruitfully compared to the notion of ‘musemes’ forwarded by 
Tagg (1979), and discussed by Middelton (1990). Designed to be directly analogous to the morpheme in 
linguistics, the museme is the most elementary figure that can be said to have musical meaning. However, as our 
discussion thus far has dealt with the notion of musical meaning, to adopt the concept of a museme would imply 
a hint of circularity. 
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6.4 Grouping 
 
It is argued here that the musical equivalent of linguistic formatives is largely a perceptual 
matter (as opposed to a propositionally-processed cognitive matter), and that musical 
perception will have a large part to play in any formulation of musical syntax. Whereas a 
large portion of linguistic syntax depends on semantics in some manner, musical syntax has 
far greater concern with aural perceptive principles in general. Therefore, many aspects of 
musical syntax are not music-specific in any meaningful way. Such a view is congruent with 
the theory sketched in this study, namely that a large part of the apprehension of musical 
meaning has to do with the causal powers of ambient sounds in eliciting non-propositional 
mental states. With natural language, both the meaning of words and the structure of the 
language’s grammar provide a means of interpreting the otherwise meaningless strings of 
noises emitted by another person. Linguistic syntax, in particular, provides a means of 
demarcating and grouping semantic structures and relations, which are then apprehended as 
compound but discrete semantic entities (e.g. phrases). Without structural rules for 
understanding grammar, the identification of sentences (the statements of a language) is not 
possible. The application of grammatical rules to a sequence of sounds, in combination with 
the assigning of a meaning to the individual elements within the sequence, allows us to 
distinguish communicative statements from other ambient sounds. In order for meaning to be 
generated by structure and semantics, a communicative medium must have elements upon 
which semantic and syntactical rules can operate: in other words, parsing of auditory input in 
the form of discrete units is fundamental to mental processing with respect to communicative 
acts. 
 
It is broadly conceivable that musical groups play an analogous functional role to words in 
language (that is, as discrete entities), but it is not entirely clear that they satisfy the ‘minimal’ 
condition for formatives (that is, ‘groups’ are conceivably reducible to smaller groups, and 
eventually to single musical events – it is a minimum of two musical discrete elements that 
play the role of formatives in music). Of course, the syntax of language and the syntax of 
music allow for additional generation of meaning over and above the individual meaning of 
discrete units or formatives. Any attempt to draw an analogy between groups and formatives 
in music to words or phrases and formatives in language will bring to light an interesting 
feature characteristic of musical formatives. Whereas the formatives of language are (in some 
cases) combined with other formatives to construct words (such as the combination of work 
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and -ed, or non- and entity), their hierarchality tends to end there. Clarity and brevity are, 
after all, important and essential requirements of natural language.109 With musical 
formatives, however, the hierarchical possibilities are much further exploited. A single 
musical formative, such as D-A motive, is usually compounded with many others to create 
phrase-length musical utterances. Whereas a typical English sentence may have around a 
dozen to two dozen formatives, a typical musical statement of comparable length may have 
dozens more. A single chord opening a romantic piano sonata may contain upwards of five 
notes. In Western polyphonic music before the 18th century, the issue becomes even more 
marked. In such music, each voice has a melodic identity in addition to its contribution to the 
harmonic progression present in other similarly handled voices. Therefore, the listener is 
confronted with a far greater number of minimal syntactically functioning units than with a 
linguistic utterance, which is obviously possible since musical formatives do not require any 
semantic effort on behalf of the listener. 
 
What then, constitutes a group in musical utterances, and what is their position in musical 
syntax? Lerdahl and Jackendoff take grouping perception to be hierarchical all the way up, 
from a single event, into groups (perceived as such by virtue of Gestalt-like perceptual 
principles), to phrases, sections, through to entire musical pieces. The rule stating that “a 
piece constitutes a group” (GWFR 2; Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983:37-38) shows the extent to 
which they project hierarchical grouping. However, there is little made in the GTTM of the 
fact that Gestalt grouping rules operate not on the level of the musical piece, but rather within 
smaller, localised time spans. That something such as the grouping of similar sections (e.g. a 
repeat of an exposition in sonata form) is not to be explained in terms of Gestalt principles 
describing the grouping of similar notes occurring after one another, is not a seriously 
discussed issue in the GTTM. It is unlikely that any perceptually-derived rules operating on 
localised events (such as the first three notes in the famous opening of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony) can be described as operating on events occurring at a much higher level (such as 
the repeat of the exposition in the same movement). A formalisation of musical syntax will 
have to mark the distinction between events occurring on the level of phrases and those 
occurring on considerably larger levels (such as sections). Formalising this is not an easy 
                                                 
109 Theoretically, the combination of formatives to create words need not be constrained by the demands of 
efficiency. Some monstrous words can be created, for example ‘antidisestablishmentarianism’. However, in 
practice, everyone but bureaucratic tyrants and academics avoid such words. Many styles of music, however, 
thrive on such rich combinatorial potential, made possible by the lack of a need to unambiguously communicate 
propositions. Also note that linguistic syntax permits infinitely long sentences because of recursion. 
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problem to solve. Theoretically, then, grouping is hierarchical, as Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
suggest; in terms of the types of rules that act at the level of the phrase and at higher levels in 
the hierarchy, it would appear that this is not necessarily the case. 
 
Grouping, nevertheless, plays an important part in our apprehension of musical statements. 
The primacy of grouping in musical syntax is helpfully explained by Lerdahl and Jackendoff: 
 
 
The process of grouping is common to many areas of human cognition. If confronted with a 
series of elements or a sequence of events, a person spontaneously segments or “chunks” the 
elements or events into groups of some kind. The ease or difficulty with which he performs 
this operation depends on how well the intrinsic organization of the input matches his 
internal, unconscious principles for constructing groupings. For music the input is the raw 
sequences of pitches, attack points, durations, dynamics, and timbres in a heard piece. When a 
listener has construed a grouping structure for a piece, he has gone a long way toward 
“making sense” of the piece: he knows what the units are, and which units belong together 
and which do not. This knowledge in turn becomes an important input for his constructing 
other, more complicated kinds of musical structure. Thus grouping can be viewed as the most 
basic component of musical understanding.  
(Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983:13) 
 
 
It can be taken as given that musical phrases are perceived as groups, themselves being 
constructed hierarchically. Thus, there is a hierarchical organisation within the phrase. We are 
able to distinguish groups of notes within phrases, and those groups of notes can be further 
separated into distinct, single minimal syntactically functioning units (musical formatives), 
and at the lowest level, single discrete musical events. It is worth noting that in many sorts of 
human music, it is possible to syntactically alter intra-phrase groups and still arrive at 
intelligible phrases. For example, it is possible to imagine many phrases of Viennese classical 
music (for example) with different opening motives, provided that syntactical determinants 
such as tonality are preserved. We can imagine a piece of music having intra-phrase groups 
substituted with altered ones; as long as the modifications are syntactical, the phrase is 
perceived as musical.  
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There is a fair amount of consensus that music is temporally perceived in terms of grouping. 
Furthermore, it would appear that much of this grouping adheres to the same sorts of 
principles described by the Gestalt psychologists of the early 20th century, such as 
Wertheimer (1923). The reliance on Gestalt perceptive principles is present in much work on 
music perception, including work by Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1981; 1983; 2006), Shepard 
(1964; 2001), Deutsch (1980; 1982; 1992), Tenney and Polansky (1980), Levitin (2006), and 
Temperley (2000), to name but a few. It is important to realise that the majority of Gestalt 
perception principles formulated in the early years of Gestalt psychology were geared toward 
the explanation of visual grouping. Shepard (2001:32) provides some relevant Gestalt 
grouping principles, applicable to visual processing, that easily find correlates in aural 
perception: 
 
a)  Proximity: Objects that are close together are perceived as belonging to the 
same group. 
b)  Similarity: If objects are equally spaced, those that are similar are grouped 
together (provided they are adjacent). 
c)  Symmetry: Symmetrical patterns are grouped together, due to the fact that it is 
statistically unusual to find a degree of symmetry amongst objects arranged 
randomly. 
d) Good continuation: collinear objects tend to be grouped together. 
e)  Common fate: objects that move together are usually perceived as a single 
group. 
 
These principles may seem self-evident or even trivial. However, the fact that these principles 
dominate our day-to-day interaction with external phenomena is important. There are 
numerous examples of objects which have no real intrinsic or causal connection being 
perceived as forming a single group. These cases of false correlation show how dominant our 
perception of grouping is.  
 
To the above must be added the intuitive concept underlying most Gestalt theory, namely the 
idea that groups are seen as more than the sum of their individual parts. A visually perceived 
group is more than just an assemblage of parts; a forest is more than a thousand individual 
trees, and a rabbit is more than simply “undetached rabbit parts” (to paraphrase Quine). This 
is likely to go far toward explaining why we tend to hear chords not as collections of different 
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notes, but as units that function in a particular manner and have characteristics that can be 
attributed to the chord as a whole. It is also this intuition which is probably at the base of 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s ‘Grouping Well-Formedness Rule 2’ – namely, that a piece 
constitutes a group, and that “a piece is heard as a whole rather than merely as a sequence of 
events” (1983:37). 
 
Before continuing, we may be prompted to pose an interesting question regarding Gestalt-like 
perception: to what extent would evidence of the same grouping principles applying to non-
musical aural stimuli be an indication that Gestalt perception in music is the result of a 
general brain mechanism? Does it just happen to be that evolutionary pressures hit upon the 
same grouping principles for the perception of both our visual and our aural environments, 
and that both use the same system? Is it most plausible to say that music-related grouping 
perception is parasitic on our general aural grouping capabilities? (Of course, Gestalt-
grouping is a very successful cognitive shortcut – for purposes of survival, it could hardly be 
a hindrance.) The answers to these questions undoubtedly lie in neuroscience, and it is an 
answer which I am not suitably qualified to give. However, aural and visual grouping 
principles, if as important to survival as they appear to be, were probably in place long before 
the rise of the hominid line, and will be present in many non-human animal perceptive 
systems. If fact, we would expect them to have been in place for a very long time indeed: 
probably as long as hearing and vision have been a dominant factor in the survival of 
complex organisms. Therefore, I think that it is fair to assume that Gestalt-grouping in music 
is a function of general perceptual systems that apply equally to all aural perception. 
However, the ability to detach or abstract such groups from their general auditory context, 
and then consider them in relation to other similarly detached groups according to rules, is a 
human-specific feature of auditory cognition. 
 
How do these grouping principles manifest themselves in musical perception in particular? 
Tenney and Polansky (1980) see the temporal Gestalt units of musical perception as being 
built up from small elements that are not temporally divisible, such as single notes.110 These 
temporally indivisible units form, in turn, larger and larger groups in hierarchical fashion 
(1980:207). Further support for the idea that the basic grouping principles present in music 
                                                 
110 A single note is, for Tenney and Polansky’s (and our) purposes, temporally indivisible in that it makes little 
sense to speak of ‘half a note’, or to say that we perceive the first note as a group made up of two instances of 
‘half-the-first-note’. In other words, temporally indivisible single musical elements are what we have thus far 
been referring to as discrete. 
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are similar to Gestalt principles comes from psychologist Diana Deutsch. In her 1980 article, 
Deutsch suggests that a fundamental principle of musical processing is the grouping of music, 
usually along the lines of Gestalt principles (pp. 168-170). Despite the age of this article, it 
shows some good examples of musical grouping principles in action. Furthermore, Deutsch 
suggests that these grouping principles sometimes ‘override’ other parts of our processing. 
For example, in fast pseudopolyphonic scale runs (leaping monophonic lines with alternating 
high and low notes, with the high notes descending and the low notes ascending), perception 
of irregularities in time between the two lines is less successful than in a single voice, single 
register pattern (p. 171). This strongly suggests a preference to group similar registers 
together, as well as providing an interesting counter-example to Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s 
contention that only temporally adjacent events can form groups. Other perceptual grouping 
phenomena are described by Deutsch, such as those that arise from pseudopolyphonic 
passages that are heard through headphones, during which the stereo effect is changed by 
panning from one ear to the other (illustrated in Deutsch, 1980:172) – yet another example of 
perception being governed by grouping principles rather than remaining faithful to the 
stimulus. This is what we would expect if grouping principles were fundamental to musical 
and aural processing. 
 
Another Gestalt grouping principle is that of common fate. Shepard (2001) expands on the 
principle of common fate, noting that “[d]emonstrations of auditory common fate typically 
involve common onset time, common amplitude modulation, and common frequency 
modulation” (2001:33). Shepard states that this principle underlies our ability to distinguish 
between different instruments in (for example) an orchestral setting. According to Shepard, it 
is the grouping of harmonics according to the time of onset, common amplitude, and 
presumably related frequencies that allow us to tell one instrumental event from another. This 
is also possible if the fundamental pitches of two instruments are the same: difference in 
timbre from two different sources (such as a trumpet and a cello) allow us to discriminate 
according to the principle of common fate. This is mirrored by Levitin’s description of the 
grouping of complex overtones into the sound of a single trumpet playing a single note 
(2006:77).111 Thus, it would appear that the discrimination of discrete pitches from one 
another is aided by principles that could be partially explained by auditory scene analysis (as 
described in Pinker, 1997:529-539). To what extent these are instances of the same level of 
                                                 
111 In general, Levitin’s remarks around (2006:76-80) are the same as those expressed by Shepard (2001). There 
is little discussion of the grouping of multiple notes into in motives and phrases. 
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operation of Gestalt principles as discussed by Lerdahl and Jackendoff is a moot point, as 
these are cases of the perception of single musical events and not syntactically operating 
portions of utterances. In terms of the structure of music (i.e. how it is organized), Lerdahl 
and Jackendoff have more to say. 
 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff view grouping and metrical structure as separate sets of rules 
(1981:480), although one set may reinforce perception of the other. One example is the 
musical phenomenon of pulses, or beats. At this point, it is important to distinguish between a 
recurring pulse or beat, and the perception of a hierarchical meter. The ability to entrain to an 
external beat has not been observed in animals that have a close phylogenetic relation to 
humans, and along with the interactive behavioural aspect of entrainment, is a possible 
candidate for a music-specific evolutionary adaptation (an opinion shared by Patel, 
2008a:402ff). Metrical hierarchy, however, is possibly a factor in the grouping of sounds 
during language acquisition in 7 month old infants (Hannon & Johnson, 2005; cited in 
Trehub & Hannon, 2006), although these infants cannot yet entrain to an external beat (Patel, 
2008a:405). Thus, it may be that the metrical perception of regular pulse is just an instance of 
a general perceptive principle concerned with the hierarchy of events in time (Patel, 
2008a:406).112 However, it is the metrical hierarchy of a regular pulse that Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff are interested in. Regarding this, there are a few subtle points made: (a) beats are 
points in time, and do not have a duration – they are hypothetical; (b) the periods of time that 
pass between the occurrence of beats are called time-spans; (c) beats are always perceived as 
regular (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1981:489). 
 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff arrive at the following conclusion regarding the nature of groups and 
metrical structure: “grouping structure consists of units [i.e. physical bits of music] organised 
hierarchically; metrical structure consists of beats organized hierarchically” (1981:494). 
Many of these units are instances of aural Gestalt perception. Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
consider grouping principles to be the most basic and fundamental elements of “musical 
understanding” (p. 481). A possible conclusion to be abstracted from Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff’s text is that grouping involves partitioning the actual musical sounds into groups 
based on cues from the music itself, whereas metrical hierarchy is something that we perceive 
                                                 
112 It is on this basis that the work of Trehub and Hannon (2006) is called into question by Patel (2008a:406). He 
similarly cites the conclusions of Hannon and Johnson (2005) and Phillips-Silver and Trainor (2005) as 
problematic with regard to the nature of beat perception in infants below the age of 4. 
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due to the pulse and events on the surface of the music. Grouping is not strictly hierarchal in 
nature, because groups can overlap (elide) on multiple levels (see Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 
1981:481-482; this was a principle determining factor in the proposal of what they call 
‘transformational rules’ – not the same sort of transformational rules as can be found in 
generative grammar, however).113 Grouping is recursive in the sense that groups can be part 
of other larger groups: “Because of this uniformity from level to level, we can assert that 
grouping structure is recursive, that is, capable of indefinite elaboration by the same rules” 
(Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1981:483). Grouping structure is perceived as more fundamental than 
the stresses of the meter, i.e. grouping principles tend to override metrical perception. 
According to Lerdahl and Jackendoff, this is evidenced in music such as Gregorian chant and 
the alap introductions of the North Indian raga (p. 486), where grouping is favoured over 
adherence to strong and weak beats in meter.  
 
It would be worthwhile to note that Lerdahl and Jackendoff distinguish three types of ‘accent’ 
present in the musical utterance that aid with our abstraction of the metrical hierarchy. An 
event that occurs on the foreground or surface of the musical line, that gives emphasis or 
stress to the particular moment of that event, is called a phenomenal accent (Lerdahl & 
Jackendoff, 1981:485). For example, articulation that functions as an emphasis of a note can 
be classed as a phenomenal accent. It is worth noting that phenomenal accents would fall into 
the class of phenomena we called ‘surface variables’ in the previous chapter. Structural 
accents are accents affected by virtue of harmonic or syntactic stress (ibid.), regardless of 
other events that bring further attention to that moment (for example, a phenomenal accent of 
some kind). Structural accents are caused by the rules of the GTTM. Metrical accent is 
different in that it is supplied by the listener. This is the ‘perception’ – or more accurately, 
imposing of – beats and a beat hierarchy in a piece of music. This is supplied with the help of 
cues from the music itself (that is, via the other rules of GTTM). Once metrical accent has 
been inferred, it is not easily abandoned by the listener, unless there is strong evidence to the 
contrary (see for example Temperley, 2000). Syncopation occurs when the conflicting 
evidence on the musical surface is not strong enough to affect a change in metrical accent in 
the listener’s perception (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1981:485-486; see also the discussion of 
syncopation in Temperley, 2000:82-86). 
                                                 
113 Note that the relation between non-adjacent but similar groups (e.g. group b in [a a b a a b]) is governed not 
by grouping rules, but by rules of associational structure (1981:484). In other words, grouping the two instance 
of b together is not done in virtue of Gestalt rules, but rather due to association. This type of structure is not 
hierarchical. 
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The rules for grouping and rhythm proposed by Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1981; 1983:345-
347) have been taken up by ethnomusicologist David Temperley. In an article on African 
rhythmic grouping and meter (2000), Temperley finds that broadly construed, the metrical 
and grouping preference rules from GTTM apply to the African music that he investigated. 
Temperley concludes that the grouping principles for Western music (that is, the principles 
expounded by Lerdahl and Jackendoff) and those for African music are very similar. This is 
what we would expect to find if fundamental Gestalt-type perceptive principles were 
instrumental to grouping processing, as they are common to the human species. Indeed, 
Temperley notes Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s belief that the grouping principles “reflect 
‘gestalt’ [sic] principles of similarity and proximity which are known to apply to perception 
in general” (Temperley, 2000:90; citing Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983:40-43). 
 
As might be expected, Temperley found that the perceptive phenomenon of meter extraction 
was present in the African music he surveyed. Often, it is found that this underlying pulse is 
not actively expressed in the music itself. Instead it is expected that the listener supplies the 
pulse. The generally accepted tempo range of 80-170 b.p.m. for the tactus is regarded as 
common ground between Western and African music.114 If the tactus is inferred from music 
which does not readily supply obvious cues from which to abstract the tactus, we may expect 
to find that less obvious cognitive rules serve as a guide to the listener and performer. An 
example is the type of continuous syncopation that we find in African music, as well as the 
use of stressed syllables in sung lines over weak beats in much African music. Furthermore, 
just as we find with Western music, the African music surveyed by Temperley suggests that 
there are only duple and triple relationships between one rhythmic level and the next level up 
in the hierarchy (2000:20), a feature claimed to be characteristic of Western tonal music by 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff.115  
 
                                                 
114 The tempo range of 80-170 b.p.m. for dotted crotchets is, according to Temperley, fairly close to the range 
that Lerdahl and Jackendoff propose as the ideal tactus in Western music (1983:73; as cited in Temperley, 
2000:69).  
115 Interestingly, Lerdahl and Jackendoff consider this feature as not universal (1983:69). The sort of music that 
may have prompted them to claim this is some varieties of Balkan folk music (such as the Slovenian music cited 
in Omerzel-Terlep, 2000:913). For example, meters such as 5/8 are perceived in terms of non-regular beat 
lengths, such as 2+3 and 3+2. However, I have been unable to ascertain whether there is any ‘naturally’ 
occurring music that features groups of 2+2+1 for 5/8 time. What I am implying here is that I think it may be so 
that beats are never perceived in groups of 1 (i.e., two strong beats cannot be adjacent at any level). 
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Patel, in mentioning that both language and music boast rhythmic organisation of some kind, 
suggests that perceptual grouping is a major intersection between the two phenomena 
(2006:99). He claims that music and speech both feature rhythmic perceptual grouping: “the 
mental clustering of events into units (e.g., phrases) at different hierarchical levels” 
(2006:99). He cites evidence from neuroimaging suggesting that grouping perception in 
language and music require the same hardware in the brain (ibid.; Knösche et al, 2005; Patel, 
Peretz, Tramo & Labrecque, 1998). Patel writes that “grouping in music may well be an 
offshoot of prosodic grouping abilities” (p. 99), a hypothesis worth investigating.116 
 
By way of comparison, Trehub and Hannon (2006) define grouping, rhythm, and meter as 
falling under the general topic of temporal processing (pp. 81-82): “Grouping refers to the 
perception of boundaries between groups and subgroups of elements in an unfolding musical 
sequence. Rhythm refers to the pattern of temporal intervals in a sequence… Meter refers to 
the abstract, hierarchical structure of music, which is experienced as a strong and weak 
alternation of ‘beats’” (Trehub & Hannon, 2006:82; note that Trehub and Hannon subsume 
both meter and pulse under the heading ‘meter’). They appear to suggest that musical 
grouping principles observed in pre-linguistic infants117 are the same as those used as cues in 
the appropriation of environmental stimuli for language acquisition. This would suggest that 
group cue awareness is not music-specific, but rather a part of language acquisition. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the use grouping principles is not species-specific either (p. 
83). The link between grouping and language acquisition is further supported by Patel (2006; 
2008a). All of this in turn supports our hypothesis that grouping principles are general 
cognitive mechanisms for the perception of utterances of both music and language.  
 
As a side note: rhythmic processing of some form is also found by Trehub and Hannon to be 
used for language cues, as well as not being human-specific. Meter is linked by them to the 
ability to synchronise oneself with music. They state that no activity in a non-human animal 
has been observed with regard to music, although they suggest that meter may be the product 
of general mechanisms for cyclical patterns in organisms the world over. Basically, Trehub 
and Hannon are wary of saying that music or any of its constituents is modular (domain-
specific), especially because of the links with language learning and the rhythmic grouping 
                                                 
116 Patel suggests that there may well be a hierarchy of meter in speech, but not a regular pulse (2006:100). 
117 Trehub and Hannon are not very clear as to precisely what these grouping principles are. However, it seems 
to be suggested that they are falls in contour toward the end of groups – pauses perceived as being in the middle 
of such falls are generally perceived with alarm. 
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abilities of non-human animals. This runs contrary to the view expressed by Peretz and 
Coltheart (2003), who saw fit to describe some aspects of music cognition in terms of domain 
specificity (i.e. dedicated processing evolved for musical activities). 
 
 
6.5 The question of narrative or coherence rules above the level of the phrase  
 
The majority of our focus thus far has been on musical utterances that have a temporal 
duration roughly equal to that of sentences, given physical restraints such as working 
memory. It was mentioned that the principles in operation at the level of the phrase cannot be 
assumed to be the same principles that govern larger structures. That is, it cannot be assumed 
that phrase-relevant rules are simply reapplied at higher hierarchical levels to handle larger 
musical structures. This is analogous to the idea that grammatical rules work on the level of 
sentences, but do not apply to entire paragraphs (groups of sentences). The principal reason 
why this is not possible for the case of music is because the phrase-relevant rules are derived 
from localised perceptive principles that are not in operation over longer periods of time. 
What we should now consider is the idea that there is a distinct set of principles operating at 
these higher hierarchical levels, ignoring for now the precise circumstances under which 
these higher-level rules come into effect. This is similar to the idea of some sort of set of 
principles governing the understanding of the logical course of argument in a group of 
sentences. 
 
In the case of music, let us refer to this possible set of rules as narrative or coherence rules.118 
These are the sorts of principles that govern how phrases themselves follow one another, how 
several phrases combine to form a recognisable section of a piece, all the way up to the level 
of the piece as a whole. What should be immediately apparent is that these principles – if they 
can be said to exist – are of a far weaker variety than the perceptive principles operating at 
the level of the phrase. They should be thought of as analogous to the sorts of guiding 
principles for constructing arguments in language, as if there was some sort of implication of 
logic guiding the manner in which certain arguments are made. This point is illustrated by 
                                                 
118 ‘Coherence’ is chosen after ‘discourse coherence’ (Patel, 2008a:335-342; Kehler, 2002). I have added 
‘narrative’, as ‘coherence’ is already a music-theoretical concept regarding thematic material in musical pieces. 
However, ‘narrative’ has also been a concept used to describe the course of musical pieces within the New 
Musicology paradigm (see, for instance, Almén, 2008). The usage here has only a superficial similarity to that 
found in ‘narratological’ studies in New Musicology.  
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Patel (2008a:335-342), in a discussion on ‘discourse coherence’, drawing upon the work of 
Kehler (2002).119 Consider the following examples (from Patel, a8:335): 
 
 
1. The father saw his son pick up his toy chainsaw. Seashells are often shiny on the 
inside. John likes peas. 
2. The father saw his son pick up his toy chainsaw. The boy pretended to cut down a 
tree, but didn’t touch the delicate flowers growing in the garden. Mom was pleased. 
 
 
The sentences in the two examples quoted above are grammatically well-formed, providing 
no violations of standard English grammar. However, a listener is likely to judge the 
sentences of (1) as having no relation to one another – as being incoherent as an argument or 
piece of discourse. The sentences comprising (2) are, however, coherent. Hearing (2) as 
coherent requires several assumptions. For example, the father’s son and ‘the boy’ are 
understood as referring to the same person; it must be assumed that what Mom was pleased 
about was the fact that the boy meant no ill-harm to her flowers; and that the make-believe 
cutting was done by the toy chainsaw. In the examples stated above, it is notable that 
discourse coherence depends greatly on semantics. It is the meanings of the sentences that 
allow the second and last sentences of (2) to follow each other coherently. This is a major 
obstacle to the application of Kehler’s principles to music, as music has no semantic 
component to aid coherence. It is clear then that if coherence principles are in operation in 
music, they would not be operational by virtue of semantics. What then results in us hearing 
two phrases as part of the same piece of music, or a phrase entailing another phrase? Or, in 
virtue of what do we judge successive phrases and sections to be parts of the same musical 
pieces? 
 
In the case of Western tonal music, tonality often serves as a determinant of coherence. For 
instance, if confronted with a 16-bar section in a piece of Viennese Classical music with a 
tonality of C major, comprised of an 8-bar forephrase and an 8-bar afterphrase, the piece 
would be considered less coherent if the afterphrase were transposed to a remote key, such as 
F sharp major. Similarly, if the afterphrase was completely atonal, it is unlikely that an 
                                                 
119 The nature of discourse coherence is discussed in more detail by Patel (2008:335-342). 
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unprepared listener would consider it to be part of the same piece as the forephrase. However, 
Western music’s fixation with tonality is mostly culturally determined. Many sorts of music 
do not have a similar emphasis on tonal function and the idea of transposable tonal centres. If 
we imagine a music that is mono-tonal (that is, remaining in one key), how is coherence 
further achieved? It may be the case that two successive sections have a common tempo, a 
common meter, or a similarity in thematic material. Successive sections may have similar 
pitch contours, or similar rhythmic treatment of material. Timbre and register may be other 
factors, as can less precise similarities, such as similarity in articulation. These factors lend a 
degree of coherence to successive sections. The judgement of coherence will be based on a 
(possibly weighted) judgement of the degree of similarity of successive sections in 
comparison with differences. Judgements of coherence in musical structures larger than a 
phrase are likely to place much reliance on statistical processes. For example, successive 
sections may have a common meter, but different timbres, rhythmic treatment, contour, and 
tempo, resulting in a lack of coherence between these sections. Coherence rules are unlikely 
to be hard and fast. Instead they will have to entertain a measure of flexibility, possibly being 
similar in nature to the preference rules described in the GTTM.  
 
If coherence rules exist and can be described as such, it is likely that a large proportion of 
them will be stylistically (and hence culturally) determined. For example, sections with 
different tempos that are unrelated thematically are perceived as separate sections, and were it 
not for their conventional placement alongside one another, would not be thought of as 
belonging to the same piece of music. In a similar manner, we are able to distinguish between 
the movements of a symphony; and despite the fact that the movements of early Classical 
symphonies are related tonally, we judge them to be separate pieces of music on the basis of 
tempo and thematic content. Some factors contributing to coherence, like tempo and meter, 
register, melodic contour, timbre, rhythmic identity, and possibly tonality in some weak 
sense, may not be culture-specific. I feel that there is an argument to be made for the idea that 
some basic features of coherence are the product of perceptive discrimination. While the task 
may appear daunting, it is easily imaginable that matters of coherence are empirically testable 
in discrimination tests. Thus, researchers may be able to determine what factors lead to a 
decrease in coherence between successive sections by asking test subjects to discriminate 
between sections on basis of perceived coherence (e.g. as to whether adjacent sections are 
considered part of the same or different musical pieces).  
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Whether coherence rules that are not culturally-derived are the result of general principles of 
cognition or of the physical constraints of the matter of the mind is an open question. 
However, it should be noted that in general, as we move from phrases to larger structures, the 
amount of mental, biologically determined rules progressively diminishes, and the 
importance of conventional, culturally determined factors increases.120 
 
 
6.6 Overview: Basis of a theory of musical syntax 
 
Let us consider where this leaves us. A large portion of this study has been devoted to 
pointing out that because of music’s lack of semantics, any theory of syntax will ultimately 
have to incorporate an account of how it is that music is often perceived as meaningful. 
Whereas semantics provides a bedrock of meaning that aids the theorist in the construction of 
linguistic grammars, music has no such semantic helping hand. Furthermore, in the mental 
picture of meaning that has been sketched in this study, the manner in which music is put 
together is an important contributor to its meaning, as syntactical features contribute directly 
to the formation of (especially affective) mental states. The syntax of language does 
contribute to meaning in some sense, in that the ordering of constituent elements of sentences 
has an impact on meaning. But the syntax of language does not, to any sizeable extent, 
contribute to the formation of affective states. The syntax of language functions as a 
facilitator of cognitive states. Therefore, future theories of musical syntax cannot afford to 
discriminate between matters of meaning and matters of structure. 
 
An adequate theory of syntax will also have to account for what has been termed the vertical 
dimension of musical utterances: the fact that in music, there is often more than one discrete 
event occurring at any given moment (for example, in polyphonic or chordal passages, where 
many notes or melodies occur at one time). This is not a major concern for linguistic syntax. 
The goal of syntax in language is to aid the relay semantic meaning as unambiguously as 
possible. Considering that spoken language is most efficient when there is only a single 
horizontal line of discrete elements being uttered at any given time, it is not surprising that 
linguistic syntax has no means for coping with multiple events occurring at once. However, 
                                                 
120 The term ‘biologically determined’ includes what might be considered ‘psychologically determined’ rules, 
thus accounting for the idea that some rules, and the perception of some features of musical utterances (such as 
perceived tension and resolution, or tonal closure) are better characterised as psychological (as opposed to 
biological in the hard-wired, genetically-determined sense). 
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the vertical arrangement of simultaneous events happens in many sorts of music. A theory of 
syntax has to be able to handle this vertical dimension of music: the fact that multiple lines 
can be combined to form intelligible utterances, with more than one discrete event occurring 
at any given moment. 
 
How would an ideal theory of syntax look? The theory will have to clearly identify what 
sonic elements are being ordered by syntactical rules. Therefore, a minimal syntactically 
functioning unit, or musical formative, will be the unit upon which syntactical principles 
operate. It was argued here that because of the lack of arbitrary meaning being attributed to 
single musical events, a minimum of two musical discrete elements should count as a musical 
formative in virtue of the fact that some syntactical function is implied. Single musical events 
considered in isolation (e.g. a single sound with a discernible fundamental frequency and a 
duration) are indistinguishable from ambient sounds unless they are heard in relation to other 
events, implying or fulfilling some musical-syntactic function. Formatives are combined into 
groups by virtue of Gestalt-like perceptive principles, and these groups are combined to 
create phrases in a hierarchical manner. 
 
A distinction between phrases that are comparable in length to spoken sentences, and larger 
scale structures, needs to be made by any syntactical theory. A theory will also have to 
account for the perception of musical events on levels higher than the phrase, as well as 
explaining how coherence between adjacent phrases is achieved. In music-theoretic terms, it 
seems to make sense to say that phrases are hierarchically combined to create larger-scale 
structures such as sections through to entire pieces. Lerdahl and Jackendoff advocate a 
similar scenario for grouping: from groups of notes, through to phrases, sections, and 
eventually entire pieces. However, the grouping principles that regulate grouping up till the 
level of the phrase are unlikely to be the same as those governing the perception of sections 
or pieces as groups, due to limitations on our immediate cognitive grouping abilities. Hence, 
we would expect that grouping perception is at its strongest within the temporal duration of 
the phrase, and becomes weaker as the temporal duration increases. 
 
The various principles making up the syntactical organisation of phrases is likely to have a 
degree of biological dependency (such as a dependency on Gestalt grouping principles). 
However, as we proceed from groups and phrases to supra-phrase structures (such as 
forephrase and afterphrase sections, up to larger sections and eventually pieces) the 
 147 
dependency on biological principles is likely to progressively diminish. It still appears that at 
supra-phrase levels, a certain amount of coherence is at play in musical pieces. A theory of 
syntax will need to describe how this sense of supra-phrase coherence comes about, as well 
as distinguishing coherence rules from the rules that operate at the level of the phrase. As the 
temporal duration of the structures in question increases, the role of biological syntactical 
determinants decreases, and culture-specific factors become more pronounced. Therefore, 
due to the universality of cognitive processing, one would expect to find most syntactical 
universals on the level of the phrase (such as Gestalt-type grouping principles), with more 
cultural specificity on higher hierarchical levels.  
 
A further question that will ultimately have to be confronted by theorists attempting to 
formalise the syntax of musical cognition is whether the physical manifestation of syntax in 
the mind is by nature cognitivist or physicalist. In other words, are the mental rules present in 
musical cognition the result of general mental principles, or are do they reflect physical 
limitations on mental computation? This is a complex question which waits upon empirical 
evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience before it can be answered in full. 
However, it is worth noting that Patel’s ‘shared syntactic integration resource hypothesis’ 
suggests that there are aspects of cognition shared by both music and language processing 
(2008a:183-298). This would imply that there are aspects of musical syntax that are not 
music-specific. However, whether these syntactical resources are the ultimate product of the 
manner in which cognition happens to work (cognitivist), or more fundamental physical 
limitations on cognition arising due to the matter and construction of the brain (physicalist), 
remains a challenging question.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
Now suppose that [Lerdahl and Jackendoff] are right; does it follow that music is a language? 
That is not a meaningful question because the notion of what is a language is not a 
meaningful notion. Is it a human language? No, of course not; it is not a human language. Is it 
like human language? Well, sure, in some ways but then the question is: how ‘like’ do you 
mean? 
 
To say that something is a language is not a meaningful comment; it is just to say – ‘it is 
enough like human language so that I’ll call it “language”.’ It is like asking: does somebody 
live near Boston? There is no definite answer to that.  
(Chomsky, 2000:44-45) 
 
 
Language has acted as the analogical foil against which we have considered the nature of 
musical meaning. Music and language are obviously not different versions of the same 
phenomenon; one is not just a wholesale specialisation of features found in the other. 
However, they are not completely isolated behaviours either, whether in biological or 
conceptual terms. As was suggested in the second chapter of this study, it is helpful to think 
of music and language as communicative media that operate in a similar way to writing, 
intentional gestures, and other symbolic and iconic activities; in that the primary objective of 
such behaviour is to alter the mental states of conspecifics. If communicative media are 
thought of in this manner, one can then imagine that music and language are cases of 
communicative media where one or another particular function has been specialised. Even 
then, however, differences exist. Semantics is the prime example. In cases where music can 
be said to be referring by the use of conventional, arbitrary symbols, it has been suggested 
that music is simply acting as language. (Although, obviously, the use of words in 
combination with a purpose-built computational system is generally more efficacious than 
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leitmotivs.) In such cases, regular semantics is in operation, and meaning can be studied in 
the same way that it is studied in cases of semantics in linguistic behaviour.  
 
Even though much research still needs to be conducted, there seems to be little doubt that in 
cognitive terms, music and language are related. What remains to be seen is in what further 
respects and to what extent music and language share neurological realisation, and what 
implications such knowledge will have for our conception of the independence and domain-
specificity of either behaviour. In conceptual terms, there seems to be much to learn in 
pursuing an analogy between the two behaviours. Scruton holds that analogies are “based in 
resemblance and they are illuminating only if the resemblance is deep, so that the knowledge 
of the one thing casts light upon the other” (1997:171). Of course, pursuing an analogy that is 
not entirely apt may prove an equally profitable exercise in conceptual terms. Deep 
differences in the music-language analogy may help us to understand why they are separate 
phenomena; when the analogy breaks down, we have a critical angle at which to investigate 
differences between the two phenomena. Semantics was a case in point. Absolute music per 
definition does not refer to things beyond music. When music does come to act semantically, 
it is functioning like language. Semantics is a feature of language that is simply not present in 
music, until music is treated as having the linguistic property of semantics. (That is, there are 
no separate semantic systems for language and music respectively in the brain. Rather, there 
is a single semantic system, which is exploited when any communicative medium refers to 
objects and concepts beyond itself. Of course, the principal raison d’être for the 
computational system Language [the faculty of language in the narrow sense, FLN], when 
utilised for communication, is the reliable implementation of semantics.) 
 
Apart from the matter of semantics, it would appear that, when regarded as communicative 
media, music and language share many mechanisms for eliciting mental states in the minds of 
listeners. Both result in cognitive and affective states via the manner of their performance, 
and hence trigger processes in the mind of both a computational and directly causal variety. 
Although the study was geared toward explaining music, the application of these ideas to 
studies of linguistic semantics and the mind, as well as other sorts of communicative 
behaviour, is possible. This broader understanding of ‘meaning’ can encompass both 
semantic and pragmatic considerations in language- and music-related meaning. As I am 
aware of no such similar approach to the topic of musical meaning, it would be wise to 
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consider some of the ways in which the approach of this study differs from other theories of 
musical meaning. 
 
 
7.2 Key differences in approach 
 
7.2.1 The term ‘semantics’ 
 
As this study draws much of its inspiration from analytic philosophy, clarity with regard to 
the term ‘semantics’ has been an important point. We utilised a definition of Tarski (1944) to 
define the term accurately. According to this definition (SDS; Ch. 3), semantics is the study 
of the relations between propositions and the states of affairs in the world which they can be 
said to refer to. This implies that reference is a necessary prerequisite for semantics; hence, 
any behaviour that is used to communicate without propositions cannot be said to have a 
semantic dimension. This narrow definition is congruent with the modern analytic 
philosophical usage of the term ‘semantics’. A hallmark of propositions is truth and falsity: a 
proposition can be said to be true or false when compared to the state of affairs in the world 
that it refers to. Truth and falsity do not apply to non-programmatic music. A minuet cannot 
be ‘true’ or ‘false’, simply because it does not refer to states of affairs beyond the music. 
Music cannot therefore be thought of has having a semantic dimension. 
 
The model advocated in this study differs from other approaches to meaning in music in that 
it adheres to the philosophical definition of ‘semantics’. This is principally a means of 
avoiding confusion. The established currency of the term can lead to confusion when it is 
loosely employed with regard to both communicative meaning and meaning in its non-
communicative sense (as something’s value or significance for someone; see Ch. 1). For 
example, the manner in which semantics is discussed in Kramer (2002; see especially pp. 
151-159) leaves the reader to assume that music does indeed refer arbitrarily to things beyond 
music in a manner similar to words in language. But Kramer blurs the distinction between 
meaning as the property of a communicative act, and meaning as the significance of music to 
someone. A similar scenario exists in the semiological work of Nattiez (1990; 2004). By 
adhering to established use of the term in analytic philosophy, a field where communicative 
meaning is a major topic of investigation, this study avoids confusion by clearly marking the 
distinction between semantics and propositions on the one hand, and the various mental states 
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that result in the apprehension of what we call ‘meaning’ in communication in general, all the 
while not confusing the communicative and non-communicative senses of the word 
‘meaning’. 
 
 
7.2.2 Ontological questions 
 
Questions of ontological status have been major concerns in music philosophy (e.g. Ingarden, 
1986; Kivy, 2002; Davies, 2003; amongst others), with many opposing views being 
supported. The philosophical webs that are spun in such arguments can be rather thick. For 
instance, there are those that hold that the musical work is an abstract object, somehow 
existing in some Platonic sense beyond the physical confines of time and space. In an article 
entitled “Musical works as eternal types”, Julian Dodd claims that there is no relation of 
identity between an entity called the musical ‘work’ and performances of the work (Dodd, 
2000). In other words, the ‘work’ is an object existing independently of performances of it. 
Works, says Dodd, are “abstract objects which have sound-sequence-occurrences as 
instances” (p. 242). This places him in rough alignment with the theoretical view of Levinson 
(1990), who, according to Dodd, argues that musical works are types whose tokens are 
instances (performances) of them. The argument becomes irretrievably complex when Dodd 
considers an argument discussed by Levinson. Levinson notes that if works are abstract 
‘sound structures’ that are independent of time and space, then it would be impossible for 
them to be created by composers. What follows is a complex discussion of how to adequately 
qualify musical works in Platonic terms, by suggesting an alternative understanding of the 
notion of ‘creation’ with regard to musical composition.  
 
The only possible question of importance with regard to the ontology of musical works to 
issues of meaning seems to me to be that of which identity-granting parts of a musical work 
are responsible for the elicitation of mental states, and which are dependent on aspects of 
performance. In other words, are there aspects of instances of similar musical pieces which 
boast features that result in the perception of the music as meaningful, that can be attributed 
to all instances of that musical piece? And are there meaning-relevant features unique to 
performance? However, on the view of musical meaning sketched here, the question of the 
ontology of musical works seems to me to be largely irrelevant to musical meaning. As the 
phenomenon of musical meaning is a mental affair, we would expect that if the musical 
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‘work’ – whatever it is – has some contribution to the perception of meaning, that is to be 
explained in mental terms. In other words, even if a work has a reality independent of the 
listener, be it nominal, Platonic, or whatever, it makes no difference to meaning, as the 
listener only perceives what she hears as a single instance of a work (or more accurately, the 
mental representation of what is heard). Of course, past experience of similar performances 
of a musical work have an impact on what we ultimately come to understand as the work’s 
significance for us, and we can become deaf to certain features which upon earlier listening 
may have resulted in affective states.121 Of course, a listener can be conditioned to react 
differently to a musical work upon repeated listening. But the features of some abstract entity 
are not an issue here: rather, it is the similarity of repeated stimuli that leads to such 
conditioning. Thus, this model simply sidesteps the issue of ontology because it is 
perceptually irrelevant.  
 
 
7.2.3 Avoidance of arguments claiming that meaning is the perception of some specific 
feature of musical experience 
 
The discussion of meaning as it is constituted in the mind by means of mental states allows us 
to avoid the tricky situation where we would have to contend that the perception of some 
particular aspect of the music is meaning (e.g., meaning is understanding the formal qualities 
of the music). Rather, it is suggested here that musical meaning is a mental state that is 
caused, either computationally or causally, by relevant physical properties or features of 
musical utterances. It is the perception of those aspects of musical utterances that results in 
the mental states that we in turn perceive as musical meaning. This means that we do not 
need to say that ‘the perception of musical meaning is the perception of x’. Rather, we are 
able to say ‘the perception of musical meaning results from the perception of x, by definable 
processes’, where x constitutes meaning relevant properties of musical utterances.  
 
The problem with views that musical meaning is the perception of some or other feature of 
music is that such views are limited in their explanatory power in only being able to account 
for meaning in music that boasts that feature. For example, it is commonplace for authors to 
                                                 
121 Of course, a fundamental assumption in this study was naturalism akin to the causal closure of physics. 
Therefore, any view of musical ontology would consequently have to be of a naturalist variety. The idea of a 
Platonic ideal of the musical work existing independent of space and time must therefore be rejected on grounds 
of the causal closure of physics. 
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claim that the meaning of music has to do with emotion (Brown, 2000; Mithen, 2005), or, 
more broadly, ‘feelings’ (Raffman, 1993; Jackendoff, 2009). Apart from the general 
vagueness of many of these explanations (for instance, Brown’s assertion that the meaning of 
music is simply emotion), the implication of such views is that music that is not seen as 
emotional, such as Venda children’s music or modern electronic dance music, is considered 
to be meaningless in the communicative sense. Furthermore, such views presume that there is 
something intrinsic to the structure of emotionally-relevant music that is necessarily absent 
from music without that structure, with the latter music being meaningless.  
 
 
7.2.4 Universality and ethnocentricity 
 
The model forwarded here is intended to be construed broadly enough for it to be applicable 
to a wide variety of musical styles, genres and cultures. The argument from mental states is 
widely applicable, and is not restricted to any particular genre of music. Many other sorts of 
models of musical meaning are genre-dependent. Semiotic approaches (such as Nattiez, 1990, 
2004; Tarasti, 1995) depend on the nature of the musical ‘signs’ themselves, and are hence 
genre-specific. Cooke’s The Language of Music (1959) depends on melodic and harmonic 
figures from tonal Western art music of the common practice period. Other approaches, such 
as that of Kramer (2002), reduce matters of musical meaning to social context, and are hence 
also culture-specific.  
 
Having been inspired by recent research suggesting that human musicality is biologically 
determined, this study has sought to steer clear of the twin troubles of ethnocentrism and 
presentism (Cross, 1999; 2001a). Ethnocentrism is here taken to be an erroneous assumption 
that conclusions about the object of study in one’s own culture apply equally to the same 
object in other cultures, without due consideration of their universal validity. Presentism is 
the chronological equivalent: the assumption that the object, as observed in the present, is 
identical to the object as it was in the past. It is believed that these two assumptions have, as 
far as possible, been avoided in this study. In other words, the theory forwarded here is stated 
in terms general enough to have applicability to music as it is practised now in diverse 
cultures, as well as in the past. 
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An example of a view of music that is considered by Cross (1999) to be ethnocentric is the 
well-known passage on music’s status as an evolutionary adaptation in Pinker (1997:529-
539). Pinker suggests that music is a prime example of a universal human activity that is 
nevertheless not an evolutionary adaptation. Instead, it is the sort of activity that merely 
‘tickles’ the reward systems of the brain, in the same way that we have a tendency to indulge 
in sweet and fatty foods because of in-built reward systems that provided an incentive to find 
these rare resources in the past. Pinker went as far as to claim that music was “auditory 
cheesecake” and would not even be missed by humans if it were not there, in the way in 
which cheesecake has not been seen as instrumental to human survival. After an initial 
backlash from the music-psychological community (see Trehub, 2003; Cross, 1999, 2001a; 
Huron, 2003; Levitin, 2006; for example), it has generally been held that this view may well 
be at least partly true. (It is a conclusion arguably forced by Patel’s recent consideration of 
music as an adaptation [Patel, 2008a].) In the dozen or so years that have passed since 
Pinker’s pronouncement, the idea that musical behaviour is, in part, parasitic on other aspects 
of cognition has generally come to be accepted because of the view that ‘musicality’ consists 
of a package of abilities, some of which are not music-specific.122 However, it is the means 
and not the validity of Pinker’s final conclusion that are of interest to us here. According to 
Cross, “all the evidence that Pinker presents and the assertions that he makes as to the nature 
of music in human experience are again most directly applicable to what music has become 
over the last hundred years within technologised and capitalistic Western society: an aural 
commodity to be consumed, dispensable on command” (Cross, 1999:7). In other words, the 
idea that music is something that is made by a specialist class of people in society with 
special skills, and passively listened to by the rest for pleasure only without any physical 
involvement, is not a condition of music the world over. Rather, it is simply the manner in 
which it occurs in the industrialised and commercially-driven Western world wherefrom 
Pinker hails; a condition of listening to music that has been shaped by the powers of radio 
and the recording industry over the past century. It is therefore not indicative of all the 
world’s music. A similar failure with regard to ethnocentrism is that of Miller (2000), who 
backs up his argument of an origin for musical behaviour in sexual selection (specifically 
mate attraction by males) by citing infamous cases of modern rock musicians’ promiscuity. 
Miller has mistaken a single form of music, where the specialist performer is idolised by 
                                                 
122 For example, one can see an early attempt at a modular interpretation of musical cognition in Peretz and 
Coltheart (2003). An adapted version and discussion of the conclusions reached in that paper can be found in 
Mithen (2005). 
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listeners, and whose music is often distributed en masse, and used this as evidence that 
musicality in humans developed from courtship rituals. However, few societies elevate their 
musicians to the status of superstars, and few societies draw a distinction between musicians 
and listeners as separate social classes (Cross, 2001a). Therefore, the case of the sexual 
prowess of a rock star in Western popular culture cannot be attributed to musicians of other 
cultures. 
 
We have already seen some of this ethnocentrism occurring with regard to the dominance of 
the relation of performances to the ‘work’ concept in the philosophy of music. The interest in 
the concept of the work, with single authorship, and its reception by audiences, has resulted 
in an interest in its relation to individual performances. However, as mentioned above, the 
idea of the work-concept has limited applicability to the world’s music. Any Platonic idea of 
an ideal work surely cannot apply to spontaneous improvisation or the trance music of the 
San people. The problem of ethnocentrism is most pronounced when one considers the 
formulation of musical syntax, as it should be universally applicable. Hence, at the more 
elementary levels of musical syntax described in the previous two chapters, it was suggested 
that general and universal cognitive principles play an important part; and as the variables 
multiply in longer musical utterances, the role of contextual and cultural parameters in basic 
musical intelligibility becomes more pronounced. 
 
 
7.3 Is ‘meaning’ still missing from the computational machine? 
 
The argument thus far can be summarised as follows: when somebody perceives a piece of 
music as meaningful, what occurs in the mind of the listener is a change in mental states. This 
change is essentially caused by the musical stimulus, as it is immediately represented in the 
mind of the listener. There are two types of mental state, cognitive and affective. When 
somebody perceives a piece of music as meaningful, all the mental states (which are 
arrangements of matter in the brain) can be described in terms of these two sorts of states. A 
change in mental states reflects a change in the arrangement of matter in the brain. These 
states are, in some way, constitutive of the meaning that is perceived by the listener. When 
someone truthfully says, “I perceive this musical piece as meaningful”, they are actually 
saying that the piece of music in question has caused certain sorts of mental states to exist in 
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their mind. Thus, ‘meaning’ is a mental phenomenon, and never independent of minds; 
however, it is determined by relevant causal characteristics of the stimulus.  
 
This appears to leave us with a scenario where the description of mental states exhausts the 
explanation of musical meaning. In other words, there seems to be nothing more to be said 
about musical meaning other than mental states and the processes of causality responsible for 
their existence. ‘Meaning’ would simply be a way we speak about these brain states, just like 
‘heat’ is how we speak of the energy of particles, or ‘sound’ is used to describe the 
compression of particles in air. In a sense, we would have ‘reduced’ the phenomenon of 
musical meaning to simpler things (mental states). This raises the possible criticism that, by 
reducing a complex, subjective phenomenon to more basic components that are not 
individually instances of meaning, we have an explanation of meaning with no meaning in 
sight. It would appear that we have described a mechanistic system in the mind, and meaning 
– the phenomenon that we had originally wished to explain – is nowhere to be found. By 
explaining meaning as mechanistically as our description of mental states, it would appear 
that there is no longer any meaning in our answer! We could refer to this intuitively 
postulated missing meaning as the ‘meaning missing from the computational machine’, the 
computational machine being the description of mental states as constitutive of meaning.123 
 
There appear to be two ways out of this intuitive impasse that leave the argument intact: (a) 
by suggesting that the intuition that meaning is missing from the explanation is fallacious by 
virtue of circularity. We want to explain meaning, and if there is still meaning in our answer, 
then the argument must be circular. This is akin to asking what ingredients are to be found in 
a particular cake, and arriving at an answer of eggs, milk, flour, and cake. In this case, 
missing meaning is nothing more than an illusion, as mental states exhaust the explanation of 
meaning; (b) the intuitive meaning missing from our account can be explained as something 
else that is not mechanistically (that is, causally) connected to the processes described in this 
study. For example, a possible suggestion is that the missing ‘meaning’ in the computational 
machine of the mind is actually a dimension of the actual qualitative experience of those 
mental states. Thus, when we look at the constitution of meaning in the mind from a third-
person perspective, our intuitive feeling that meaning has not been explained can be 
                                                 
123 This term is chosen after the term ‘the ghost in the machine’, which was used by Ryle (1949) to describe the 
Cartesian notion that within the material body, a non-material spirit is to be found, despite the problems of how 
material and non-material entities could possibly interact. Ryle argued that Descartes had arrived at this 
conclusion by fallacious thinking (in particular, category mistakes).  
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accounted for in that it is only with the first-person experience of those states that meaning 
achieves its subjectivity. The meaning that is felt to be missing from our otherwise 
mechanistic explanation would then lie in the subjective, first-person experience of those 
mental states. This would also explain why our third-person mechanistic explanation seems 
to lack this intuitive missing meaning. 
 
Let us consider case (b) further. Any attempt to account for the intuition of missing 
meaningfulness by appealing to our subjective, qualitative experience of meaning, is 
essentially explaining the experience of meaning in terms of qualia. Qualia are the subjective 
experiences in consciousness: the smell of coffee, the redness of colour, the taste of wine. 
These are very real parts of our everyday experience of the world – it’s the way things seem 
to us, from the subjective, first-person vantage point. Usually, issues surrounding qualia arise 
in explanations of consciousness. They are of bearing to our discussion in that case (b) is an 
appeal to the subjective nature of the experience of mental states – what it is like, from a first-
person perspective, to entertain meaning-relevant mental states. Ultimately, one must decide 
whether this experience can be explained physically, or whether it in some sense lies beyond 
physics.  For example, it is easy to explain all the physical facts about tasting wine, but not as 
easy to explain what it is like to taste wine. If a wine scientist knew absolutely everything 
about the physical causes and effects of tasting wine, but had never drank wine himself, 
would he learn something new when he tasted it for the first time? If your answer is yes – he 
does learn something new – then you must conclude qualia to be non-physical, because our 
scientist knew all the physics already. But if you answer no – he already knew what wine 
tasted like subjectively before drinking it (by virtue of his omniscience regarding the physical 
facts of wine-tasting) – you are suggesting that the subjective experience of qualia can be 
accounted for physically.124 
 
The problem raised concerned the intuition that something is missing from the theory of 
mental states being constitutive of meaning (or meaning being reduced to mental states). 
Objection (b) implies that a purely mechanistic explanation of the mental processes occurring 
in the minds of listeners fails to account for the subjective experience of meaning. Arguments 
about the nature of qualia become relevant in the following scenarios: 
 
                                                 
124 Example after Jackson (1982). 
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1. The ‘meaning missing from the computational machine’ is our qualitative experience 
of affective and cognitive mental states, but meaning itself is constituted, indeed 
exhausted, by mental states and the processes that determine them. What is intuitively 
felt to be missing is the qualitative experience of these states, and not the determinants 
and mental constitution of meaning itself. Therefore, our explanation of meaning is 
complete if it accounts for the mechanistic principles underlying the formation of 
mental states, and any sense of missing meaning is simply a case of mistaking the 
experience of meaning-relevant mental states for the meaning-constitutive mental 
states themselves.  
2. The ‘meaning missing from the computational machine’ is our qualitative experience 
of affective and cognitive mental states, and it is this qualitative experience that is 
meaning. Mental states and procedures are just mental states and procedures; meaning 
itself is the qualitative experience – the qualia – of entertaining those states in your 
mind. 
 
(1) reduces meaning to mental states, and suggests that the ‘missing meaning’ is mental state 
qualia. With (1), the intuition that meaning is missing from our explanation is simply a case 
of mistaking meaning itself for the experience of meaning. (2) suggests it is the quale itself 
that is the meaning (including missing meaning). In (2), meaning is exhausted by what we 
experience in first-person perspective, and the mechanistic explanation deals with the 
machinery behind the experience. In both instances, the missing element is not denied, but is 
as real (and as difficult to explain) as the qualitative experience of the taste of coffee or the 
redness of red. Both suggest that the qualitative experience is missing from the theory; but (1) 
says that ‘missing meaning’ is just qualitative experience and not meaning; and (2) says the 
qualitative experience of mental states is meaning.  
 
This is a subtle difference and I am not sure if the argument could be settled. According to 
both (1) and (2), the ‘meaning missing from the computational machine’ has something to do 
with qualia.  With (1), the intuitive ‘missing meaning’ is simply the experience of mental 
states. With (2), meaning in its entirety is the experience of mental states (that is, mental 
states and processes are nothing more than mental states and processes, and ‘meaning’ is the 
experience of being subjected to those states and processes). So, with (2), what seems to be 
the case is that whatever one’s position on the fundamental nature of qualia is, will determine 
the ultimate nature of this missing meaning. If you take qualia to be non-physical, then 
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according to (2), the missing meaning will be non-physical and irreducible to a mechanistic 
explanation. With (1), the missing meaning is not equivalent to qualia, so the nature of qualia 
does not determine the ultimate nature of meaning.  
 
Alternatively, the objection that there is something more to meaning that simply explaining 
mental states can be approached from another angle. When confronted with the intuition that 
the explanation does not account for the phenomenon of musical meaning in its entirety, we 
can interrogate ourselves as to precisely what we are looking for when we claim that 
something is missing. Although it is tempting to call this missing element ‘meaning’, it may 
not be meaning at all. Our intuitions may be satisfied if we look for some other element of 
musical experience that is distinct from communicative meaning. For example, it may be that 
we feel that there was some more abstract goal behind the composer or performer’s choice of 
musical utterance: the composer’s ultimate intentions. A composer may use an utterance that 
strikes us as sad or forlorn. In and of itself, this is all that is communicated. However, if 
understood with the composer’s ultimate intention in mind – say, using the utterance to 
express grief at the loss of a loved one – the utterance may be afforded a further sense of 
profundity. It is this sort of deeper intention behind musical statements that no mechanistic 
theory of mental states can fully account for, simply because it lies beyond the explanatory 
boundary of communicative meaning heard in isolation from context.  
 
There is, I think, another similar issue to keep in mind, which was initially raised in Ch. 1. 
The intuitive ‘missing meaning’ should not be confused with the value we attach to musical 
meaning; that is, a value judgement about meaning, that is not itself constitutive of meaning. 
That is, it is possible that the missing meaning is just the value we place in communicatively 
meaningful music. Consider language: statements in conversation and statements in 
Shakespeare are both meaningful in a communicative sense, and the meaning in Shakespeare 
can be explained by means of cognitive and affective states like any other linguistic 
statements. It is the value which we place in the mental states that Shakespeare conjures up 
that makes it so significant. As another example, consider Finnegan’s Wake by James Joyce. 
The sentences are non-syntactical and difficult to read. However, it is the value that we place 
in Finnegan’s Wake as a major literary artwork that results in its special meaning for us, 
which is something different from the meaning of the statements themselves. Phrased 
differently, two senses of the word ‘meaning’ must not be confused: meaning as a property of 
communication (“the meaning of a sentence or musical statement”) and the meaning of things 
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in our lives (“the meaning of James Joyce”, or rephrased, “The significance of James Joyce to 
me or to society”).125 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
In the introductory chapter, it was mentioned that this study found its principal inspiration in 
recent work on the biology and evolutionary history of human musicality. It has been 
proposed that one of the most vexing features of music – that it is often perceived as being 
meaningful in some ambiguous sense – can be explained as a mental phenomenon arising 
from our experience of musical stimuli. At this level of conceptual analysis, music and 
language seem to have much in common. Like spoken language, music can be used to 
communicate in virtue of the causal properties of utterances. This conceptual agreement is 
assuring in the light of recent empirical work that suggests that parts of our musical and 
linguistic processing are interlinked. If music and language to some extent share a biological 
realisation, we would expect them to have an intertwined evolutionary history. Keeping this 
in mind, questions of evolutionary history may be informed by a conceptual analysis that sees 
music as a potential communicative medium with the property of communicative meaning. 
One would expect that if music and language are to be explained in mutual evolutionary 
terms, the nature of their functioning as communicative media would need to be explained 
with reference to both behaviours. 
 
The human species is a musical one. All over the world, large resources of time and energy 
are spent on the making of music for pleasure, ceremonies and rituals, religious purposes, 
social reasons, and even economic gain. Because music keeps us very busy, it comes as no 
surprise that there is intense interest in how it manifests itself in our everyday lives. This, 
added to the fact that music and musical experience is so highly valued by communities, may 
partly account for the fact that the problem of musical meaning has become a major topic of 
interest. However, the problem is not intractable: with adequate conceptual clarity, much of 
the mystery surrounding musical meaning and its role in musical experience becomes subject 
to investigation. With advances in our understanding of the biological relation between music 
and language processing, the problem of musical meaning appears to be a problem of 
                                                 
125 That is, meaning as a property of communicative acts versus “meaning of something for somebody”.  
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understanding our communicative apparatus and behaviours in their entirety. Pre-empted by 
the GTTM, Raffman’s attempt to define ineffable musical experience in terms of mental 
computation provided an important example of how to approach a subjective phenomenon of 
musical experience that was previously taken as a mysterious fact of musical life. Instead of 
merely accepting that there was something unexplainable about our attachment to music, 
Raffman sought to clarify the issues surrounding musical ineffability. I hope that in this 
study, a similar aim has been achieved: further clarification of a subjective phenomenon, that 
is now becoming a point of interest in investigations into the fundamental nature of musical 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Almén, B. 2008. A Theory of Musical Narrative. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Aitchison, J. 1989. The Articulate Mammal: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics, third 
edition. London: Unwin Hyman. 
 
Bernstein, L. 1976. The Unanswered Question: Six Talks at Harvard. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Bickerton, D. 1996. Language and Human Behaviour. Seattle: Washington University Press. 
 
Blacking, J. 1995. Music, Culture, and Experience: Selected Papers of John Blacking, ed. R. 
Byron. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Blacking, J. 1976. How Musical is Man? London: Faber and Faber. 
 
Blacking, J. 1967. Venda Children’s Songs: A Study in Ethnomusicological Analysis. 
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. 
 
Blackmore, S. (ed.) 2006. Conversations on Consciousness: What the best minds think about 
the brain, free will, and what it means to be human. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Botha, R. 2000. Discussing the Evolution of the Assorted Beasts Called ‘Language’. 
Language and Communication, 20 (2): 149-160. 
 
Brown, S. 2000. ‘The “Musilanguage” Model of Music Evolution.’ In N. L. Wallin, B. 
Merker, and S. Brown (eds.), The Origins of Music, pp. 271-300. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Brown, S., B. Merker, and N. L. Wallin. 2000. ‘An Introduction to Evolutionary 
Musicology.’ In N. L. Wallin, B. Merker, and S. Brown (eds.), The Origins of Music, pp. 3-
24. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 163 
 
Burkholder, J. P. 2006. ‘A Simple Model for Associative Musical Meaning.’ In B. Almén and 
E. Pearsall (eds.), Approaches to Meaning in Music, pp. 76-106. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
Carston, R. 2008. Linguistic communication and the semantics/pragmatics distinction. 
Synthese, 165: 321-345. 
 
Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Chomsky, N. 2000. The Architecture of Language, ed. N. Mukherji, B. N. Patnaik, and R. K. 
Agnihotri. New Dehli: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chomsky, N. 1995. The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chomsky, N. 1988. Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chomsky, N. 1972. Problems of Knowledge and Freedom. London: Fontana. 
 
Chomsky, N. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chomsky, N. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton. 
 
Chomsky, N., and Halle, M. 1965. Some Controversial Questions in Phonological Theory. 
Journal of Linguistics, 1 (2): 97-138. 
 
Clarke, E. 2005. Ways of Listening: An Ecological Approach to the Perception of Musical 
Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Cook, N. 2001a. Theorizing Musical Meaning. Music Theory Spectrum, 23 (2): 170-195.  
 
 164 
Cook, N. 2001b. ‘Analysing Performance, Performing Analysis.’ In N. Cook and M. Everist 
(eds.), Rethinking Music, pp. 239-261. New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Cook, N. 1987. The Perception of Large-Scale Tonal Closure. Music Perception, 5 (2): 197-
205. 
 
Cooke, D. 1959. The Language of Music. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Cross, I. 2005. ‘Music and Meaning, Ambiguity and Evolution.’ Preprint version. In D. 
Miell, R. MacDonald, and D. Hargreaves (eds.), Musical Communication, pp. 27-43. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Cross, I. 2001a. Music, science, and post-positivist pluralities. Intégral, 14/15: 20-26. 
 
Cross, I. 2001b. Music, cognition, culture and evolution. Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, 930: 28-42. 
 
Cross, I. 1999. ‘Is music the most important thing we ever did? Music, development and 
evolution.’ In S. W. Yi (ed.), Music, Mind and Science, pp. 10-39. Seoul: Seoul National 
University Press.  
 
Cross, I., & Tolbert, E. 2009. ‘Music and meaning.’ In S. Hallam, I. Cross and M. Thaut 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Music Psychology, pp. 24-34. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Cross, I., & Rohrmeier, M. 2009. ‘Tacit tonality: Implicit learning of context-free harmonic 
structure.’ Paper presented at ESCOM, 12-16 August 2009, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. 
 
Cross, I., & Woodruff, G. E. 2008. ‘Music as a Communicative Medium.’ In R. Botha and C. 
Knight (eds.), The Prehistory of Language, pp. 113-144. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Davies, S. 2003. Themes in the Philosophy of Music. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown. 
 165 
 
Deutsch, D. (ed.) 1992. The Psychology of Music, second edition. San Diego: Academic 
Press. 
 
Deutsch, D. 1982. ‘Organizational Processes in Music.’ In M. Clynes (ed.), Music, Mind, and 
Brain: The Neuropsychology of Music, pp. 119-136. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Deutsch, D. 1980. Music Perception. The Musical Quarterley, 66 (2): 165-179. 
 
Devitt, M., & Sterelny, K. 1987. Language & Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Dissanayake, E. 2008. If music is the food of love, what about survival and reproductive 
success? Musicae Scientiae Special Issue 2008: 169-195. 
 
Dodd, J. 2000. Musical works as eternal objects. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 40 (4): 
424-440. 
 
Duckworth, W. 1999. 20/20: 20 New Sounds of the 20th Century. New York: Schirmer 
Books. 
 
Erpf, H. 1967. Form und Struktur in der Musik. Mainz: B. Schott. 
 
Fink, R. 2001. ‘Going Flat: Post-hierarchical Music Theory and the Musical Surface.’ In N. 
Cook and M. Everist, Rethinking Music, pp. 102-137. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fodor, J. 1998. The Trouble with Psychological Darwinism. London Review of Books, 20 (2): 
11-13. 
 
Grice, H. P. 1991. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Gillon, B. S. 2008. On the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese, 165 (3): 373-384. 
 
 166 
Hannon, E. E., and Johnson, S. P. 2005. Infants use meter to characterise rhythms and 
melodies: Implications for musical structure learning. Cognitive Psychology, 50: 354-377. 
 
Harwood, D. L. 1976. Universals in Music: A Perspective from Cognitive Psychology. 
Ethnomusicology, 20 (3): 521-533. 
  
Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., and Fitch, W. T. 2002. The Faculty of Language: What Is It, 
Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve? Science, 298:1569-1579. 
 
Huron, D. 2003. Is Music an Evolutionary Adaptation? In I. Peretz and R. Zatorre, The 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Music, pp. 57-76. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ingarden, R. 1986. The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity, trans. A. Czerniawski, 
ed. J. G. Harrell. Houndmills: Macmillan Press. 
 
Jackendoff, R. 2009. Parallels and Nonparallels between Language and Music. Music 
Perception, 26 (3): 195-204. 
 
Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127-136. 
 
Juslin, P. N., and Laukka, P. 2003. Communication of emotions in vocal expression and 
musical performance: Different channels, same code? Psychological Bulletin, 129: 770-814. 
 
Juslin, P. N., and Sloboda, J. A. (eds.) 2001a. Emotion and Music: Theory and Research. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Juslin, P. N., and Sloboda, J. A. 2001b. ‘Music and Emotion: Introduction.’ In P. N. Juslin 
and J. A. Sloboda (eds.), Emotion and Music: Theory and Research, pp. 3-20. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Kehler, A. 2002. Coherence, Reference, and the Theory of Grammar. Stanford: CLSI 
Publications. 
 
Kivy, P. 2002. Introduction to a Philosophy of Music. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 167 
 
Kivy, P. 1990. Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.  
 
Knösche, T. R., C. Neuhaus, J. Haueisen, K. Alter, B. Maess, O. Witte, and A. Friederici. 
2005. Perception of phrase structure in music. Human Brain Mapping, 24 (4): 259-273. 
 
Koopman, C., and Davies, S. 2001. Musical meaning in a broader perspective. The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 59 (3): 261-273. 
 
Kramer, L. 2002. Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Lerdahl, F. 2009. Genesis and Architecture of the GTTM Project. Music Perception, 26 (3): 
187-194. 
 
Lerdahl, F. 2001. Tonal Pitch Space. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lerdahl, F. 1988. ‘Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems.’ In J. Sloboda (ed.), 
Generative Processes in Music, pp. 231-259. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lerdahl, F., and R. Jackendoff. 2006. The capacity for music: What is it, and what’s special 
about it? Cognition, 100: 33-72. 
 
Lerdahl, F., and R. Jackendoff. 1983. A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
Lerdahl, F., and R. Jackendoff. 1981. On the Theory of Grouping and Meter. The Musical 
Quarterly, 67 (4): 479-506. 
 
Lerdahl, F., and C. Krumhansl. 2007. Modeling Tonal Tension. Music Perception, 24 (4): 
329-366. 
 
 168 
Levitin, D. 2006. This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human Obsession. New 
York: Dutton. 
 
Levinson, J. 1990. Music, Art and Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Lewis-Williams, D. 2002. The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art. 
London: Thames & Hudson. 
 
List, G. 1971. On the Non-Universality of Musical Perspectives. Ethnomusicology, 15 (3): 
399-402. 
 
Lindsey, G. 1994. Review of Raffman (1993). Journal of Linguistics, 30 (2): 575-577. 
 
McClary, S. 1991. Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
 
Meyer, L. B. 1960. Universalism and Relativism in the Study of Ethnic Music. 
Ethnomusicology, 4 (2): 55-59.  
 
Meyer, L. 1956. Emotion and Meaning in Music. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Middleton, R. 1990. Studying Popular Music. Philadelphia: Open University Press. 
 
Miller, G. 2000. ‘The Evolution of Music Through Sexual Selection.’ In N. Wallin, B. 
Merker, and S. Brown (eds.), The Origins of Music, pp. 315-328. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Mithen, S. 2005. The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind and 
Body. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
 
Mohanan, K. P. 1995. ‘The Organization of the Grammar.’ In J. A. Goldsmith (ed.), The 
Handbook of Phonological Theory, pp. 24-69. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
 
 169 
Nattiez, J. J. 2004. The Battle of Chronos and Orpheus: Essays in Applied Musical 
Semiology, trans. J. Dunsby. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nattiez, J. J. 1990. Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music.  
 
Nettl, B. 2005 [1983]. The Study of Ethnomusicology: Thirty-one Issues and Concepts. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Omerzel-Terlep, M. 2000. ‘Slovenia.’ In T. Rice, J. Porter, and C. Goertzen (eds.), The 
Garland Encyclopedia of World Music, vol. 8, pp. 911-914. New York: Garland. 
 
Patel, A. D. 2008a. Music, Language, and the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Patel, A. D. 2008b. Talk of the tone. Nature, 453: 726-727. 
 
Patel, A. D. 2006. Musical Rhythm, Linguistic Rhythm, and Human Evolution. Music 
Perception, 24 (1): 99-103. 
 
Patel, A. D., Peretz, I., Tramo, M., and Labrecque, R. 1998. Processing prosodic and musical 
patterns: a neuropsychological investigation. Brain and Language, 61 (1): 123-144. 
 
Peretz, I. 2006. The nature of music from a biological perspective. Cognition, 100: 1-32. 
 
Peretz, I., and Coltheart, M. 2003. Modularity of music processing. Nature Neuroscience, 6 
(7): 688-691. 
 
Phillips-Silver, J., and Trainor, L. J. 2005. Feeling the beat: Movement influences infants’ 
rhythm perception. Science, 308 (5727): 1430. 
 
Pinker, S. 1997. How the Mind Works. New York: Norton. 
 
Pinker, S. 1994. The Language Instinct. New York: Morrow. 
 
 170 
Polger, T. W., and Flanagan, O. 1999. ‘Natural Answers to Natural Questions.’ In V. G. 
Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays, pp. 221-247. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Premack, D., and Woodruff, G. 1978. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 1 (4): 515-526. 
 
Raffman, D. 1993. Language, Music, and Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Raffman, D. 1988. Toward a Cognitive Theory of Musical Ineffability. The Review of 
Metaphysics, 41 (4): 685-706. 
 
Rothstein, W. 1989. Phrase Rhythm in Tonal Music. New York: Schirmer Books. 
 
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson’s University Library. 
 
Scruton, R. 1997. The Aesthetics of Music. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Scruton, R. 1987. Analytical philosophy and the meaning of music. The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, 46: 169-176. 
 
Shannon, C., and Weaver, W. 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press. 
 
Shepard, R. 2001. ‘Cognitive Psychology and Music.’ In P. R. Cook (ed.), Music, Cognition, 
and Computerized Sound: An Introduction to Psychoacoustics, pp. 21-35. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Shepard, R. 1964. Circularity in Judgments of Relative Pitch. The Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, 36 (12): 2346-2353. 
 
Stalnaker, R. C. 1970. Pragmatics. Synthese, 22 (1/2): 272-289. 
 
Swain, J. 1997. Musical Languages. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 171 
 
Tagg, P. 1979. Kojak: 50 Seconds of Television Music. Göteborg: Skrifter från 
Musikvetenskapliga institutionen, 2.  
 
Tarasti, E. (ed.) 1995. Musical Signification: Essays in the Semiotic Theory and Analysis of 
Music. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
 
Tarski, A. 1944. The Semantic Conception of Truth, and the Foundations of Semantics. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (3): 341-376. 
 
Temperley, D. 2000. Meter and Grouping in African Music: A View from Music Theory. 
Ethnomusicology, 44 (1): 65-96. 
 
Tenney, J., and Polansky, L. 1980. Temporal Gestalt Perception in Music. Journal of Music 
Theory, 24 (2): 205-241. 
 
Trainor, L. J., and Trehub, S. E. 1992. A comparison of infants’ and adults’ sensitivity to 
Western musical structure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 18: 394-402. 
 
Treitler, L. 1993. ‘Gender and Other Dualities of Music History.’ In R. Solie (ed.), 
Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship, pp. 23-45. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Trehub, S. E. 2003. ‘Musical Predispositions in Infancy: an Update.’ In I. Peretz and R. 
Zatorre (eds.), The Cognitive Neuroscience of Music, pp. 3-20. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Trehub, S. E., and Hannon, E. E. 2006. Infant music perception: Domain-general or domain 
specific mechanisms? Cognition, 100: 73-79. 
 
Williams, A. 2001. Constructing Musicology. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
 172 
Wertheimer, M. 1923. Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie. Erlangen: Philosophischen 
Akademie.   
 
Wittgenstein, L. 1961 [1922]. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. 
McGuiness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
 
 
 
